United States v. Williams , 225 F. App'x 151 ( 2007 )


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  •                              UNPUBLISHED
    UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
    FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
    No. 06-4044
    UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
    Plaintiff - Appellee,
    versus
    RODERICK LAMAR WILLIAMS, a/k/a Rox,
    Defendant - Appellant.
    Appeal from the United States District Court for the Western
    District of North Carolina, at Statesville. Richard L. Voorhees,
    District Judge. (5:03-cr-00004-8)
    Submitted:   March 7, 2007                 Decided:   April 17, 2007
    Before WILLIAMS, GREGORY, and SHEDD, Circuit Judges.
    Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.
    James B. Craven, III, Durham, North Carolina, for Appellant.
    Gretchen C. F. Shappert, United States Attorney, Charlotte, North
    Carolina, Amy E. Ray, Assistant United States Attorney, Asheville,
    North Carolina, for Appellee.
    Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
    PER CURIAM:
    Roderick Lamar Williams appeals his conviction by jury
    and sentence on charges of conspiracy to possess with intent to
    distribute at least five kilograms of cocaine and at least fifty
    grams or more of cocaine base, in violation of 
    21 U.S.C. § 846
    (Count One); possession with intent to distribute at least 500
    grams of cocaine and aiding and abetting that possession, in
    violation of 
    21 U.S.C. § 841
     and 
    18 U.S.C. § 2
     (Count Six); and two
    counts of possession of a firearm during and in relation to a drug
    trafficking crime and aiding and abetting the same, in violation of
    
    18 U.S.C. §§ 924
    (c)(1) and 2 (Counts Seven and Nine).         The district
    court sentenced Williams to life imprisonment on Counts One and
    Six, to be served concurrently, and to consecutive terms of sixty
    months’ imprisonment on Count Seven, and 300 months’ imprisonment
    on Count Nine, for a total term of imprisonment of life plus 360
    months.    The district court also sentenced Williams to a ten-year
    term of supervised release on Count One, an eight-year term of
    supervised release on Count Six, and five-year terms of supervised
    release on each of Counts Seven and Nine, all such terms to be
    served    concurrently,   and   ordered   payment   of   a   $400   special
    statutory assessment.       On appeal, Williams contends that the
    judge’s application during sentencing of the murder cross-reference
    for complicity in an uncharged murder, pursuant to U.S. Sentencing
    Guidelines Manual (“USSG”) § 2D1.1(d) (2004), violated his right to
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    a jury trial.1        He also challenges generally the sufficiency of the
    evidence to support his conviction.2
    This court reviews the imposition of a sentence for
    reasonableness.         United States v. Booker, 
    543 U.S. 220
    , 260-61
    (2005); United States v. Hughes, 
    401 F.3d 540
    , 546-47 (4th Cir.
    2005).        After    Booker,   courts   must   calculate   the   appropriate
    guideline range, making any appropriate factual findings.              United
    States v. Davenport, 
    445 F.3d 366
    , 370 (4th Cir. 2006).              The court
    then should consider the resulting advisory guideline range in
    conjunction with the factors under 
    18 U.S.C.A. § 3553
    (a) (West 2000
    & Supp. 2006), and determine an appropriate sentence that is
    “sufficient, but not greater than necessary,” to achieve the goals
    of § 3553(a).         Davenport, 
    445 F.3d at 370
    .        If a court imposes a
    sentence outside the guideline range, the district court must state
    its reasons for doing so.         Hughes, 
    401 F.3d at 546
    .
    Here, Williams contends that his sentence is unlawful
    because      the   district   court   made    findings   that   increased   his
    sentence beyond what it would be based only on facts found by the
    jury.        He objects to the enhancement because no evidence was
    1
    USSG § 2D1.1(d) provides that the offense level set forth in
    USSG § 2A1.1(a) is to be used “[i]f the victim was killed under
    circumstances that would constitute murder under 
    18 U.S.C. § 1111
    had such killing taken place within the territorial or maritime
    jurisdiction of the United States.”
    2
    Because Williams is represented by counsel on appeal, we
    decline to review the numerous issues Williams seeks to raise pro
    se, except for those asserted by counsel.
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    presented at trial relative to the enhancement and the murder was
    not charged in the indictment in his present case, nor had he been
    tried on the murder in any other case, as of the date of his
    sentencing. However, this general argument was rejected in Booker.
    After Booker, the sentencing court is authorized to make factual
    findings   in    order     to   appropriately     determine   the   defendant’s
    advisory range under the guidelines.              See Davenport, 
    445 F.3d at 370
    ; see also United States v. Martinez, 
    136 F.3d 972
    , 979 (4th
    Cir. 1998) (holding that a sentencing court may enhance defendant’s
    sentence based on its findings of conduct by a preponderance of the
    evidence, even where jury acquitted defendant of that conduct).
    Under our now advisory sentencing guidelines, these authorized
    factual findings would include a finding as to whether "a victim
    was killed under circumstances that would constitute murder under
    
    18 U.S.C.A. § 1111
    " which would call for application of the murder
    guideline,      USSG   §   2A1.1     (First     Degree   Murder).    See   USSG
    § 2D1.1(d)(1).
    We specifically find that the evidence presented at the
    sentencing hearing supported the district court’s conclusion, by a
    preponderance of the evidence, that Williams was involved in the
    drug-related     homicide       of   Houston,    a   confidential   government
    informant.      Agent David Ramsey testified that Houston, who was
    cooperating in an investigation into drug trafficking, was murdered
    in January 2003, following Williams’ indictment on drug conspiracy
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    charges. Following the trial at which Williams and Morrison, a co-
    conspirator,      were   convicted,    Morrison    told   Agent   Ramsey    that
    Williams offered to pay him $10,000 to kill Houston.              Agent Ramsey
    further testified that Morrison related specific conversations
    during which Williams warned Houston that he would kill him if he
    learned    that   Houston   had   informed    on   him    and   discussed   with
    Morrison the possibilities of killing Houston.             Morrison also told
    Agent Ramsey that he ultimately agreed to kill Houston and that he
    went with Williams to Houston’s house with the intention of killing
    Houston, but Morrison was unable to go through with the murder.
    Morrison told Agent Ramsey that Williams later told him that
    Williams had offered another person $5000 to do the killing but
    that Williams finally decided that “he would handle the situation
    himself.” Agent Ramsey further testified that during Williams’ and
    Morrison’s trial, Williams described in more detail to Morrison the
    murder of Houston and admitted shooting Houston.
    The Government also presented testimony of two other
    witnesses    that   support   the     conclusion   that    Williams   murdered
    Houston.    One witness housed with Williams in jail in 2003 related
    that Williams had confessed to him that Williams had murdered
    Houston, and further attested that Williams had provided him with
    details regarding the murder.            Another witness testified that
    Williams had confessed to having killed a “snitch.”
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    This     evidence    fully   supports    the    district    court’s
    determination, by a preponderance of the evidence, that "a victim
    was killed under circumstances that would constitute murder under
    
    18 U.S.C. § 1111
    ," and therefore we find that the district court
    properly applied the murder guideline, USSG § 2A1.1.                   See USSG
    § 2D1.1(d)(1). Because the district court adequately explained the
    basis   for    its    sentencing    decision   and    considered     Williams’
    arguments and the § 3553(a) factors, as well as the cross-reference
    for murder enhancement, and because the sentence was within the
    properly calculated advisory guidelines range, we find that the
    resulting     sentence    is     reasonable.        See    United   States   v.
    Montes-Pineda, 
    445 F.3d 375
    , 380 (4th Cir. 2006), petition for
    cert. filed,          U.S.L.W.       (U.S. July 21, 2006) (No. 06-5439);
    United States v. Green, 
    436 F.3d 449
    , 457 (4th Cir.), cert. denied,
    
    126 S. Ct. 2309
     (2006).
    In addition, we have reviewed Williams’ sufficiency of
    the evidence claim, and conclude that the claim is without merit.
    In evaluating the sufficiency of the evidence supporting a criminal
    conviction on direct review, “[t]he verdict of the jury must be
    sustained if there is substantial evidence, taking the view most
    favorable to the Government, to support it.”                Glasser v. United
    States, 
    315 U.S. 60
    , 80 (1942).          Substantial evidence is evidence
    “that a reasonable finder of fact could accept as adequate and
    sufficient to support a conclusion of a defendant’s guilt beyond a
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    reasonable doubt.” United States v. Alerre, 
    430 F.3d 681
    , 693 (4th
    Cir.   2005),   cert.   denied,   
    126 S. Ct. 1925
       (2006)   (internal
    quotation and citation omitted).        We consider circumstantial and
    direct evidence, and allow the Government the benefit of all
    reasonable inferences from the facts proven to those sought to be
    established. 
    Id. at 858
    ; United States v. Tresvant, 
    677 F.2d 1018
    ,
    1021 (4th Cir. 1982). In resolving issues of substantial evidence,
    we do not weigh evidence or review witness credibility.               United
    States v. Lomax, 
    293 F.3d 701
    , 705 (4th Cir. 2002).             Rather, it is
    the role of the factfinder to judge the credibility of witnesses,
    resolve conflicts in testimony, and weigh the evidence.               United
    States v. Manbeck, 
    744 F.2d 360
    , 392 (4th Cir. 1984).
    Ample evidence was presented at trial in this case to
    support the jury’s findings that Williams was involved with others
    in an established conspiracy to possess with intent to distribute
    significant amounts of cocaine and cocaine base, that he possessed
    firearms during and in relation to drug trafficking crimes, and
    that he aided and abetted the same.          Several witnesses, including
    co-conspirators and Government agents, attested to Williams’ trips
    out-of-state and out-of-the-country with others to purchase large
    amounts of cocaine and cocaine base and transport it back to North
    Carolina   where   it   was   prepared,      packaged,    and   distributed.
    Williams was identified as a member of “The Cream Team,” an
    established narcotics trafficking organization operating in and out
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    of North Carolina.      A number of such witnesses also testified that
    Williams often carried a firearm on or immediately near his person
    while he conducted drug trafficking transactions.                The evidence
    introduced at the trial of this matter clearly supports the jury’s
    determinations with regard to the offenses charged, and we reject
    Williams’ claim that the evidence was insufficient. See Burgos, 94
    F.3d at 857.
    Accordingly, we affirm Williams’ conviction and sentence.
    We further deny Williams’ motion for writ of mandamus, as well as
    his motions to proceed pro se on appeal, to relieve his attorney
    from representation, to file pro se briefs, supplemental and
    oversized pro se briefs, supplemental and oversized appendix, and
    pro se reply brief.          We dispense with oral argument because the
    facts   and    legal   contentions    are     adequately   presented    in   the
    materials     before   the    court   and     argument   would   not   aid   the
    decisional process.
    AFFIRMED
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