Zhang, Xiu J. v. Mukasey, Michael B. , 260 F. App'x 930 ( 2008 )


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  •                      NONPRECEDENTIAL DISPOSITION
    To be cited only in accordance with
    Fed. R. App. P. 32.1
    United States Court of Appeals
    For the Seventh Circuit
    Chicago, Illinois 60604
    Argued July 11, 2007
    Decided January 23, 2008
    Before
    Hon. RICHARD A. POSNER, Circuit Judge
    Hon. JOHN L. COFFEY, Circuit Judge
    Hon. DIANE S. SYKES, Circuit Judge
    No. 06-4153
    XIU JUAN ZHANG,                                On Petition for Review of an Order of
    Petitioner,                          the Board of Immigration Appeals
    v.                                       No. A78-848-829
    MICHAEL B. MUKASEY,
    Attorney General of the United States,
    Respondent.
    ORDER
    Facing removal for attempting to enter the United States with a false
    passport, Xiu Juan Zhang applied for asylum, withholding of removal, and relief
    under the Convention Against Torture, claiming that she fears arrest and torture in
    her native China for helping her parents organize Falun Gong meetings. The
    Immigration Judge (“IJ”) denied all forms of relief, finding Zhang not credible
    primarily based on inconsistencies between her testimony at the removal hearing
    and earlier sworn statements. The Board of Immigration Appeals (“BIA”) affirmed,
    and Zhang petitions for review. Although some of the IJ’s reasons for disbelieving
    Zhang involved mere speculation or conjecture, we conclude that the crux of the IJ’s
    adverse credibility finding is supported by substantial evidence, and we deny the
    petition for review.
    No. 06-4153                                                                            Page 2
    Background
    Zhang, 32, comes from the city of Changle, in Fujian Province. She lived
    there with her parents, who she says have practiced Falun Gong—including hosting
    group meditation and video screenings in their home—since late 2000. Zhang
    herself has never practiced Falun Gong, but she says she helped her parents by
    handing out fliers and notifying neighbors about upcoming meetings.
    On July 26, 2001, Zhang arrived at O’Hare Airport in Chicago. After an
    immigration officer recognized her passport as false, Zhang made a series of sworn
    statements, through an interpreter, in response to his questions. At first she
    explained that she fled China because authorities had tried to arrest her after
    discovering her association with Falun Gong. Later during the interview, though,
    she acknowledged that she had never been arrested or even threatened with arrest.
    When the inspector then demanded to know whether Zhang had been “lying” when
    she said that the police “tried to arrest” her, she responded: “Yes, but they arrested
    other people. They arrested a couple of my neighbors. Once I found out I left the
    country.”
    Two weeks later, again with the aid of an interpreter, Zhang sat for her
    credible-fear interview. When the asylum officer asked whether she had been
    mistreated in China, Zhang said that she fled the country upon learning that the
    police were going to arrest her for organizing her mother’s Falun Gong group. She
    made no claim that she had been arrested in China before she fled.
    Two and a half years later, Zhang filed her asylum application.1 For the first
    time, she asserted that she had been arrested and detained for ten days in China.
    That arrest, she said, was for “trying to escape China”; she did not link it to her
    connection with Falun Gong.
    Zhang’s story changed again at her removal hearing. There she explained
    that her association with Falun Gong began causing her trouble in early June 2001
    when she heard from a friend that the police had come to her house while she was
    out. Zhang said she later learned that the police were looking for her because other
    Falun Gong practitioners had identified her as an organizer of Falun Gong
    meetings. According to Zhang, the policemen’s visit immediately spurred her to
    obtain a fake Chinese passport and attempt to flee China.
    1
    At her asylum hearing, the IJ noted that Zhang attempted to file her asylum
    application in 2002, within one year of her arrival, but that it was incorrectly rejected and so
    the one-year limitation was not an issue. See 
    8 U.S.C. § 1158
    (a)(2)(B).
    No. 06-4153                                                                    Page 3
    Zhang testified that she did not succeed on her first try and was arrested at
    the border in Guangxi Province on June 8, 2001. During the next two days, she
    said, security officers gave her little to eat, forced her to sleep on a cement floor,
    prodded her with an electric rod, and struck her head with a heavy book. After
    that, Zhang continued, she was transferred back to her home city of Changle and
    detained at a police station for a week. On her first day there, she recounted,
    officers beat her and cut her neck with glass, requiring two security policemen to
    escort her to a hospital. Zhang submitted a receipt from a Changle hospital dated
    June 11, 2001, which corroborates that she was cut by glass on the lower left part of
    her neck, was bleeding seriously, and required eight stitches. (At Zhang’s hearing
    the IJ acknowledged that she has a scar.) Zhang testified that for the duration of
    her detention in Changle she received just one meal per day and was interrogated
    about her fake Chinese passport and her association with Falun Gong.
    Zhang finally was released, she said, on the condition that she pay a fine of
    3000 yuan (then about $362). This penalty, she explained, was assessed not
    because she tried to leave China on a false passport (as Zhang had said in her
    asylum application and as is memorialized on the purported record of the fine she
    submitted at the hearing), but because of her connection to Falun Gong. Zhang
    testified that she also was told to report regularly to the Changle police, attend a
    reeducation class, and remain in the city. Zhang said she later heard that her
    parents also had to attend reeducation classes.
    When the IJ pressed Zhang about why she had not disclosed this purported
    arrest and detention earlier, Zhang claimed that no one had asked her if she had
    been arrested. And, she added, she did not volunteer information about the arrest
    because she was afraid she would be sent back to China.
    Zhang testified that after her release she bought a false United States
    passport from a snakehead for a total cost of $68,000. She paid $7000 up front,
    with her parents obligating themselves to pay the balance of $61,000 once she
    arrived safely in the United States. That passport got her as far as O’Hare Airport.
    The IJ disbelieved Zhang’s story and denied her application. In finding
    Zhang not credible, the IJ pointed first to the inconsistencies between her hearing
    testimony and the statements she made upon arriving at O’Hare and during her
    credible-fear interview. The IJ reasoned that Zhang’s failure to disclose her alleged
    arrest, detention, and beating in either her airport interview or credible-fear
    interview “casts serious doubt on the credibility of her overall claim.” The IJ also
    noted a variety of purportedly “confusing” and “implausible” aspects of Zhang’s
    testimony. First, he did not believe Zhang’s testimony that she was detained for ten
    days for helping her mother organize Falun Gong meetings since in her asylum
    application she had given as the reason for her arrest her attempt to leave China on
    No. 06-4153                                                                    Page 4
    a false passport. Second, the IJ thought it implausible that Chinese authorities
    would beat Zhang solely for associating with practitioners of Falun Gong but leave
    her parents, who are practitioners, unharmed. Third, he did not believe that Zhang
    would notify neighbors about Falun Gong meetings in the face of the government’s
    crackdown on the practice. He also found troubling Zhang’s testimony that she
    knew little about the practice of Falun Gong. Finally, the IJ doubted that Zhang, as
    a nonpractitioner of Falun Gong, would pay $68,000 to flee China knowing that the
    worst punishment her parents had suffered for actually practicing Falun Gong was
    a reeducation class. He speculated that Zhang came to the United States for
    economic reasons and not because of a fear of persecution.
    The IJ further concluded that Zhang had not submitted sufficient
    corroborative evidence to overcome her lack of credibility. He noted that Zhang did
    not submit affidavits from family members in China or present enough evidence to
    conclude that her scar was indeed caused by her alleged detention. He also noted
    that the record of her 3000 yuan fine states that she was penalized for trying to
    depart China illegally, not for associating with Falun Gong.
    The BIA affirmed, highlighting the discrepancies between Zhang’s initial
    statements to authorities and her testimony before the IJ about her alleged arrest
    in China. The BIA also noted the inconsistency between Zhang’s initial testimony
    that she was arrested for attempting to depart China illegally and her later
    testimony that she was detained because of her association with Falun Gong. The
    BIA concluded that Zhang had not provided sufficient corroboration of her claim to
    overcome the significant discrepancies in her testimony and dismissed her appeal.
    Analysis
    Zhang argues that the adverse credibility finding is not supported by
    substantial evidence. She maintains that her statements at her airport and
    credible-fear interviews were not inconsistent with her hearing testimony, and that
    her explanation for initially omitting the story of her arrest—that she was afraid of
    being sent back to China—should have been believed. She also argues that the IJ’s
    confusion about the circumstances of her arrest were his alone and that his disbelief
    that she would receive harsher punishment than her parents is not supported in the
    record. Finally, Zhang says that the IJ’s conclusion that she came to the United
    States for economic reasons is speculative and illogical.
    Where, as here, the BIA affirms, adopts, and supplements the IJ’s opinion,
    we review both the IJ’s decision and any additional reasoning of the BIA. Mema v.
    Gonzales, 
    474 F.3d 412
    , 416 (7th Cir. 2007). We will uphold the IJ’s decision if it is
    supported by reasonable, substantial, and probative evidence on the record
    considered as a whole, and will overturn it only if the record compels a contrary
    No. 06-4153                                                                           Page 5
    result. 
    Id.
     An IJ’s credibility determination must be supported by “specific, cogent
    reasons that bear a legitimate nexus to the finding.” Feto v. Gonzales, 
    433 F.3d 907
    ,
    911 (7th Cir. 2006).1 Immaterial discrepancies in an asylum applicant’s testimony
    will not support an adverse credibility finding, Giday v. Gonzales, 
    434 F.3d 543
    , 551
    (7th Cir. 2006), nor will an IJ’s “own speculation, conjecture, or unsupported
    personal opinion,” Jiang v. Gonzales, 
    485 F.3d 992
    , 995 (7th Cir. 2007).
    We agree with Zhang that some of the IJ’s reasons for disbelieving her
    testimony rest on “speculation, conjecture, or unsupported personal opinion.” See
    Jiang, 
    485 F.3d at 995
    . For example, the IJ was skeptical that Zhang, who does not
    practice Falun Gong, would help her parents organize Falun Gong meetings. But
    he does not explain, nor can we see, why that aspect of her story should be
    disbelieved. Nor do we find implausible Zhang’s testimony that her parents would
    ask her to contact neighbors about upcoming meetings, despite the Chinese
    government’s crackdown on the practice. And given Zhang’s consistent testimony
    that she did not practice Falun Gong, we are not troubled, as the IJ was, by her lack
    of knowledge of Falun Gong. Lastly, we cannot infer, as the IJ did, that Zhang’s
    payment of a large sum to a snakehead revealed an economic motive for coming to
    the United States; her willingness to pay could just as easily support her fear of
    persecution. See Gao v. Gonzales, 
    457 F.3d 33
    , 38 n.2 (1st Cir. 2006).
    Despite these weaknesses in the IJ’s opinion, though, the main
    inconsistencies cited by the IJ and the BIA—Zhang’s failure to disclose her
    purported arrest and detention during her airport interview and later credible-fear
    interview—suffice to support the adverse credibility finding because the omissions
    undermine Zhang’s entire claim of past persecution. See Tarraf v. Gonzales,
    
    495 F.3d 525
    , 532-33 (7th Cir. 2007); Huang v. Gonzales, 
    453 F.3d 942
    , 945-47 (7th
    Cir. 2006) (upholding adverse credibility determination based on a single significant
    inconsistency); Giday, 
    434 F.3d at 551
    . At the airport interview, Zhang said that
    the Chinese authorities had arrested Falun Gong practitioners, but she admitted
    that they did not try to arrest her. And instead of saying that she had been
    detained and beaten for associating with Falun Gong, she said that she left the
    country immediately after she heard that others had been arrested. Then weeks
    later at her credible-fear interview with a different immigration officer, Zhang
    again said nothing about having been arrested and detained. Indeed, when asked
    specifically whether she or a member of her family had been mistreated or
    threatened, she said only that she fled the country because she had been told that
    the police were going to arrest her. Even in her asylum application, where she first
    1
    Our credibility analysis is unaffected by the passage of the REAL ID Act of 2005, see
    Pub. L. No. 109-13, 
    119 Stat. 231
    , which governs only cases in which the petition for asylum
    was filed on or after May 11, 2005. Oyekunle v. Gonzales, 
    498 F.3d 715
    , 717-18 (7th Cir. 2007).
    No. 06-4153                                                                    Page 6
    disclosed her purported arrest and detention, Zhang swore that she was caught
    trying to leave China illegally and punished for that offense, not for associating
    with Falun Gong. At her removal hearing four years later, the story changed yet
    again: the police did not merely “try” to arrest her; they arrested her, detained her
    for ten days, and beat her—and this time Zhang insisted that the reason was her
    association with Falun Gong.
    The IJ and BIA reasonably discredited Zhang’s testimony based on her
    alteration and embellishment of earlier stories. We have said repeatedly that “in an
    attempt to bolster the asylum claim, the addition of new factual assertions that
    were not originally set forth can be viewed as inconsistencies providing substantial
    evidence that the applicant is not a reliable or truthful witness.” Oforji v. Ashcroft,
    
    354 F.3d 609
    , 614 (7th Cir. 2003); see Tarraf, 
    495 F.3d at 532-33
    . In Oforji, the
    applicant said at her airport interview that she had fled for economic reasons and
    had not been persecuted in her native Nigeria, but later claimed in her asylum
    application that she fled because of her political activity and because the
    government had arrested and killed her husband. 354 F.3d at 613-14. In Tarraf,
    the applicant did not mention any physical violence in his asylum application and
    said that he had been detained and questioned for three days; but at his hearing he
    said that he had been detained, severely beaten, and tortured and interrogated for
    thirty days. 
    495 F.3d at 533
    . Like the applicants’ new details in Oforji and Tarraf,
    Zhang’s story of her arrest and detention added significant factual
    assertions—indeed, her entire claim of past persecution—that she never made in
    her initial interviews, despite being asked multiple times whether she had been
    arrested or mistreated.
    Zhang argues that the IJ should have credited her explanation for failing to
    disclose the arrest and detention at her credible-fear interview. But her initial
    explanation—that she was not asked whether she had been arrested—was false.
    And her subsequent explanation—that she did not volunteer the information
    because she was afraid of being sent back to China—was not so compelling as to
    require us to overturn the adverse credibility finding. See Tarraf, 
    495 F.3d at
    533-
    34. Zhang omitted the story of her arrest and detention both in her airport and
    credible-fear interview, but she was not afraid to reveal to U.S. authorities that the
    police “tried” to arrest her, that she feared arrest if returned, and that she entered
    using a false passport. Although we have said that “testimony that an applicant
    gave false information to immigration authorities for fear of deportation to a
    persecuting country can be entirely consistent with a fear of persecution,” Galicia v.
    Gonzales, 
    422 F.3d 529
    , 537 (7th Cir. 2005), the record does not compel that
    conclusion here.
    Accordingly, we DENY the petition for review.