United States v. N.J.Y., (Juvenile) , 180 F. App'x 1 ( 2006 )


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  •                                                                         F I L E D
    United States Court of Appeals
    Tenth Circuit
    UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
    May 3, 2006
    TENTH CIRCUIT                        Elisabeth A. Shumaker
    Clerk of Court
    UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
    Plaintiff - Appellee,                    No. 05-8064
    v.                                           (D. Wyoming)
    N.J.Y. (a juvenile),                           (D.C. No. 05-CR-35-02-D)
    Defendant - Appellant.
    ORDER AND JUDGMENT *
    Before TACHA, Chief Circuit Judge, ANDERSON and BALDOCK, Circuit
    Judges.
    After examining the briefs and appellate record, this panel has determined
    unanimously that oral argument would not materially assist in the determination
    of this appeal. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2); 10th Cir. R. 34.1(G). The case is
    therefore ordered submitted without oral argument.
    *
    This order and judgment is not binding precedent, except under the
    doctrines of law of the case, res judicata, and collateral estoppel. The court
    generally disfavors the citation of orders and judgments; nevertheless, an order
    and judgment may be cited under the terms and conditions of 10th Cir. R. 36.3.
    N.J.Y., a juvenile, was adjudged delinquent under 
    18 U.S.C. §§ 5032
     and
    5037 by having committed sexual abuse and aiding and abetting sexual abuse,
    which acts would have been crimes in violation of 
    18 U.S.C. §§ 2
    , 1153, and
    2242(2)(A). He was sentenced to probation until his twenty-first birthday and
    ordered to remain at a juvenile residential treatment facility where he would
    undergo sexual offender and substance abuse treatment for an indefinite term not
    to exceed his twenty-first birthday. He appeals his adjudication. For the reasons
    set forth below, we affirm.
    BACKGROUND
    N.J.Y. was charged by information in February 2005 under the Federal
    Juvenile Delinquency Act (“FJDA”), 
    18 U.S.C. §§ 5031-5042
    , based on conduct
    that had allegedly occurred in September 2003, when N.J.Y. was fourteen years
    old. He filed a motion to suppress oral and written statements that he had given
    to Federal Bureau of Investigation (“FBI”) and local law enforcement agents two
    days after the incident, when the agents visited the residence where N.J.Y. was
    living with his aunt. He argued in this motion that the statements were obtained
    in violation of the Fifth Amendment because he had not received the warnings
    dictated by Miranda v. Arizona, 
    384 U.S. 436
     (1966), prior to being questioned
    and because the statements were not voluntary. He also filed a demand for a jury
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    trial, arguing that the rule that the right to a jury trial does not apply to juvenile
    delinquency proceedings is no longer valid in light of the Supreme Court’s
    renewed emphasis on the Sixth Amendment as evidenced in the line of cases
    culminating in United States v. Booker, 
    543 U.S. 220
     (2005).
    Following a hearing on the suppression issue, the district court made the
    following oral findings of fact:
    [T]he two officers arrived at the residence where [N.J.Y.] was
    located, unannounced. The . . . officers did speak with [N.J.Y.’s
    aunt] who called [N.J.Y.] to the front door. Officers indicate[d] that
    they c[ould] interview inside the house or inside the[ir] vehicle but
    expressed their preference to do the interview in the vehicle because
    the officers’ experience is that juveniles can often speak more freely
    outside the hearing of an adult and their family. [The aunt]
    indicate[d] it’s okay to interview him in the vehicle, and [N.J.Y.]
    agreed to be interviewed.
    [N.J.Y.] sat in the front seat with [the FBI agent] in the
    driver’s seat, and [the local agent] at some point got in behind him
    after speaking with [the aunt]. [The FBI agent] tells [N.J.Y.] he does
    not have to answer questions; he can open the car door from the
    inside and leave; he can stop the interview at any time; he’s not
    under arrest and won’t be arrested at the end of the interview and
    that the agents only want to hear the truth. The agents’ weapons are
    not visible, although a rifle is hung in the back of the SUV.
    At some point in time, [the aunt] came out of the house, got in
    her car and left, apparently to go to the post office.
    [The FBI agent] asked [N.J.Y.] to tell his side of the story
    regarding the incident. [The FBI agent] tells [N.J.Y.], after he gives
    his story, that he doesn’t believe him. [N.J.Y.] admits he knows
    more, and the agent asks him to tell his story again. Again, he tells a
    story, and again the officer tells him he doesn’t believe it to be
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    truthful. The agent discusses telling the truth, and he tells [N.J.Y.]
    that he thinks he’s doing himself more harm by not telling the truth.
    [N.J.Y.] gets out of the vehicle, leaves the door open, goes
    back to his own house, leaves the front door of the house open. [The
    FBI agent] follows him to the house threshold and yells into the
    home, telling him his view that [N.J.Y.]’s story is inconsistent with
    the medical evidence that indicates that [the alleged victim] was
    involved in a sexual activity, and it may have been non-consensual
    and that he again expressed his view that [N.J.Y.] was not being
    truthful.
    [N.J.Y.] exited the house and got back into the [agents’]
    vehicle. At some point in time during the interview, he admitted
    having sexual intercourse with [the alleged victim]. [The FBI agent]
    asks if they can take a written statement; and he, during the course of
    the interview of [N.J.Y.], created [the] [e]xhibit . . . which was the
    statement written in the hand of [the FBI agent]. At the end of the
    statement in print are the words “I have R-E-D-I-N-G that,”
    something crossed out and the initials “NJY,” then the word
    “statement,” and “I G-E-I-N W-E-N-T it.” And in parentheses [the
    FBI agent] writes underneath those words “agree with.” And there is
    again the initials of “NJY” underneath “agree with” and to the right
    of it. The statement is witnessed by both [the FBI agent] and [the
    local agent], a two-page statement.
    The testimony in this case . . . has indicated that [N.J.Y.]
    currently operates at a sixth- or seventh- grade level. Earlier testing
    had him operating at the reading level of a second-grader.
    Tr. of Bench Trial at 891-93, R. Vol. VIII (sealed). After issuing these findings,
    the district court denied N.J.Y.’s motion to suppress, holding that Miranda did not
    apply because N.J.Y. was not in custody at the time he made the statements and
    that N.J.Y. made the statements voluntarily. The district court also denied
    N.J.Y.’s demand for a jury trial.
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    Following a bench trial, the district court adjudged N.J.Y. to be a juvenile
    delinquent, as indicated above. On appeal, N.J.Y. challenges the district court’s
    rulings on the suppression and jury trial issues.
    DISCUSSION
    I.       Motion to Suppress
    In asserting that the statements described above should have been
    suppressed, N.J.Y. renews the arguments he made below concerning the agents’
    failure to give Miranda warnings and the involuntariness of the statements. In our
    review of these issues, “this court accepts the district court’s factual findings
    unless clearly erroneous and views the evidence in the light most favorable to the
    prevailing party.” United States v. Erving L., 
    147 F.3d 1240
    , 1242 (10th Cir.
    1998).
    A.    Miranda warnings
    It is undisputed in this case that the agents did not give N.J.Y. Miranda
    warnings before they questioned him. However, Miranda warnings are only
    required “when an individual is subject to ‘custodial interrogation.’” United
    States v. Hudson, 
    210 F.3d 1184
    , 1190 (10th Cir. 2000) (quoting Miranda, 
    384 U.S. at 444
    ). The district court’s conclusion that N.J.Y. was not “in custody” for
    purposes of Miranda is reviewed de novo. Erving L., 
    147 F.3d at 1246
    . In
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    performing this review, we must determine whether a reasonable person in
    N.J.Y.’s position “‘would have understood his situation . . . as the functional
    equivalent of formal arrest.’” Hudson, 
    210 F.3d at 1190
     (quoting Berkemer v.
    McCarty, 
    468 U.S. 420
    , 442 (1984)); see Yarborough v. Alvarado, 
    541 U.S. 652
    ,
    662 (2004) (“[C]ustody must be determined based on how a reasonable person in
    the suspect’s situation would perceive his circumstances.”); see also Erving L.,
    
    147 F.3d at 1248
     (applying standard of “a reasonable juvenile”).
    N.J.Y. does not argue that he was “in custody” during the agents’ initial
    questioning but asserts that the questioning became custodial after he left the
    agents’ vehicle, was followed to his home by the FBI agent, was told by the agent
    that his story so far was inconsistent with the medical evidence, and returned to
    the vehicle. According to N.J.Y., these circumstances “would have caused a
    ‘reasonable’ fourteen[-]year-old to believe that he was not free to leave and that
    he was required to answer further questions.” Appellant’s Br. at 29 (sealed).
    N.J.Y. also points to expert testimony of a psychologist that was offered during
    the evidentiary hearing below. The expert stated that based on his examination of
    N.J.Y., he “believe[d] that [N.J.Y.] didn’t perceive a realistic choice” in regard to
    whether he had to return to the agents’ vehicle because “the mechanism that [the
    FBI agent] had given [N.J.Y.] to interrupt the interview was to leave the vehicle,
    which [N.J.Y.] exercised; and at that point the interview was not terminated, but
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    instead [the FBI agent] followed [N.J.Y.] to the home.” Tr. of Bench Trial at
    773, R. Vol. VII (sealed).
    Based on our careful review of the record, we do not agree that a
    reasonable juvenile in N.J.Y.’s position would have believed himself to be in the
    functional equivalent of a formal arrest at the point he returned to the agents’
    vehicle. Although the agents did not leave when N.J.Y. exited the vehicle the
    first time, the FBI agent’s further statements to N.J.Y. at the threshold of his
    home were in the manner of attempting to persuade N.J.Y. that it was in his best
    interests to return to the car and tell the truth and did not appear to change the
    environment in which the interrogation was taking place. Specifically, the FBI
    agent testified that
    [b]asically my message at that point in time was that I had crystal
    clear evidence from a doctor that [the alleged victim] had been
    involved in sexual activity the previous Saturday night and that it
    was very likely that that sexual activity may have been non-
    consensual or even rise to the level of a sexual assault and that I felt
    that [N.J.Y.] had . . . not helped himself any by telling me the stories
    he had told me.
    Id. at 608, R. Vol. VI. According to the agent, after he “continued to relate that
    same message,” N.J.Y. “agreed to come back and continue the interview.” Id. at
    609. Moreover, as indicated by the district court’s findings, which are not clearly
    erroneous, the agents clearly stated to N.J.Y. at the outset that he was free to
    leave and would not be arrested. The FBI agent further testified that he told
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    N.J.Y. that these “ground rules” still applied when they returned to the vehicle.
    Id. at 697, 701, R. Vol. VII. We therefore conclude that N.J.Y. was not in
    custody for purposes of Miranda and that the agents therefore were not required
    to give him Miranda warnings.
    B.     Voluntariness
    As stated, N.J.Y. also asserts that, regardless of Miranda’s applicability, his
    statements to the agents should have been suppressed as involuntary. In
    reviewing the district court’s conclusion to the contrary, we must “examine the
    entire record and make an independent determination of the ultimate issue of
    voluntariness.” Erving L., 
    147 F.3d at 1248
     (internal quotation omitted). This
    determination rests on “whether, considering the totality of the circumstances, the
    government obtained the statements by physical or psychological coercion or by
    improper inducement so that the suspect’s will was overborne.” 
    Id. at 1248-49
    ;
    see also United States v. Toles, 
    297 F.3d 959
    , 965 (10th Cir. 2002).
    In particular, we examine “both the characteristics of the accused and the
    details of the interrogation,” including “(1) the age, intelligence, and education of
    the defendant; (2) the length of detention; (3) the length and nature of the
    questioning; (4) whether the defendant was advised of his constitutional rights;
    and (5) whether the defendant was subject to physical punishment.” United States
    v. Lopez, 
    437 F.3d 1059
    , 1063-64 (10th Cir. 2006) (internal quotation omitted).
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    The government bears the burden of proving voluntariness by a preponderance of
    the evidence. 
    Id.
     at 1063 (citing Missouri v. Seibert, 
    542 U.S. 600
    , 608 n.1
    (2004)). However, in order for suppression of statements to be appropriate, there
    must be some evidence of coercion, either through physical force or through some
    other form of manipulation. See Erving L., 
    147 F.3d at 1251
     (holding confession
    by thirteen-year-old voluntary where “none of the actions of the officers were
    coercive”); United States v. Guerro, 
    983 F.2d 1001
    , 1004 (10th Cir. 1993) (“[T]o
    find a statement involuntary, the police must somehow overreach by exploiting a
    weakness or condition known to exist.”).
    N.J.Y. points to the following in support of his claim that his statements
    were involuntary: that he was fourteen years old at the time of the interrogation;
    that he had a “reduced intellectual ability”; that the questioning occurred in the
    agents’ car; that his parents or legal guardian were not present; that “the
    questioning took approximately two hours and N.J.Y. was never fully advised of
    his constitutional rights”; that the FBI agent followed him after he left the vehicle
    “and induced him to reenter”; and that the FBI agent accused N.J.Y. of not telling
    the truth. Appellant’s Br. at 25-26.
    We recognize that “admissions and confessions of juveniles require special
    caution.” In re Gault, 
    387 U.S. 1
    , 45 (1967); see also A.M. v. Butler, 
    360 F.3d 787
    , 800 (7th Cir. 2004). However, as stated above, N.J.Y. was not in custody
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    during his questioning. Although no parent or guardian was present, the
    questioning took place in a vehicle a short distance away from his home, and he
    was told he was free to leave at any time and at one point did so. While the FBI
    agent testified that the entire interrogation lasted between one and one-half to two
    hours, he stated that most of this time was spent composing N.J.Y.’s written
    statement after he had admitted having sexual contact with the alleged victim. Tr.
    of Bench Trial at 890, R. Vol. VIII (sealed). The record does not indicate that the
    agents pressed for a particular story from N.J.Y. but that they repeatedly told him
    they wanted the truth. Under these circumstances, the agents’ assertions at
    several points during the initial interview that N.J.Y. was not telling the truth, and
    that his story was inconsistent with medical evidence, did not amount to coercion.
    Moreover, though the FBI agent wrote N.J.Y.’s written statement after N.J.Y.
    indicated he could not write well, there is no indication that the agents were
    aware that N.J.Y. had a “reduced intellectual ability” or made efforts to exploit
    any such reduced ability.
    Thus, based on our review of the totality of the circumstances as indicated
    by the record and the district court’s findings, we cannot conclude that the agents
    engaged in any form of coercion, either through force or through manipulation of
    N.J.Y.’s youth or other personal characteristics. We therefore affirm the district
    court’s ruling that N.J.Y.’s statements were voluntary.
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    Accordingly, we affirm the district court’s denial of N.J.Y.’s motion to
    suppress.
    II.   Jury Trial
    In regard to N.J.Y.’s demand for a jury trial, N.J.Y. acknowledges that it is
    established law in this circuit that juveniles are not entitled to a jury trial in
    delinquency proceedings conducted pursuant to the FJDA. See McKeiver v.
    Pennsylvania, 
    403 U.S. 528
    , 550 (1971) (rejecting right to jury trial in state court
    juvenile proceedings); United States v. Duboise, 
    604 F.2d 648
    , 652 (10th Cir.
    1979) (rejecting right to jury trial in FJDA proceedings); see also United States v.
    Brian N., 
    900 F.2d 218
    , 220 (10th Cir. 1990) (explaining that FJDA proceedings
    “result[] in an adjudication of status—not a criminal conviction” and that the
    purpose of such proceedings “is to remove juveniles from the ordinary criminal
    process in order to avoid the stigma of a prior criminal conviction and to
    encourage treatment and rehabilitation”). However, N.J.Y. contends that “[t]he
    continuing validity of [these cases] is questionable given the U.S. Supreme
    Court’s recent emphasis on a defendant’s right to a jury” in Booker and the line of
    cases preceding it. Appellant’s Br. at 34.
    The cases to which N.J.Y. refers concern the requirement that a jury make
    all factual findings that serve to increase a criminal defendant’s sentence under a
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    mandatory sentencing scheme. See, e.g., Booker, 543 U.S. at 244. We do not
    perceive a direct connection between the Supreme Court’s rulings in those cases
    and the right to a jury trial in noncriminal juvenile delinquency proceedings. We
    must therefore adhere to this circuit’s precedent on the issue. See United States
    v. Brothers, 
    438 F.3d 1068
    , 1074 (10th Cir. 2006). Accordingly, we affirm the
    district court’s denial of a jury trial in this case.
    CONCLUSION
    For the foregoing reasons, the judgment of the district court is AFFIRMED.
    ENTERED FOR THE COURT
    Stephen H. Anderson
    Circuit Judge
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