Tomasella v. Kaufman Cty Child Support ( 2022 )

Case: 22-10760 Document: 00516582405 Page: 1 Date Filed: 12/19/2022
United States Court of Appeals
for the Fifth Circuit
United States Court of Appeals
Fifth Circuit
No. 22-10760
Summary Calendar FILED
December 19, 2022
Lyle W. Cayce
Todd Michael Tomasella, on Behalf of the Estate ofClerk
Todd Michael Tomasella,
Plaintiff—Appellant,
versus
Kaufman County Child Support; Ruth Blake,
Defendants—Appellees.
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Northern District of Texas
USDC No. 3:20-476
Before Davis, Duncan, and Engelhardt, Circuit Judges.
Per Curiam:*
Plaintiff-Appellant Todd Michael Tomasella, proceeding pro se,
appeals the district court’s judgment 1 dismissing of his civil rights complaint
*
This opinion is not designated for publication. See 5th Circuit Rule 47.5.
1
The district court issued two judgments in this case. The first judgment
dismissed Plaintiff’s claims against Defendants Casey Blair, Bryan Beavers, Rhonda
Hughey, and Warren Kenneth Paxton. The second judgment dismissed Plaintiff’s claims
against Defendants Ruth Blake and Kaufman County Child Support. On appeal, Plaintiff
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No. 22-10760
against multiple state officials and agencies in connection with his child
support proceedings. For the reasons set forth below, we AFFIRM.
I. BACKGROUND
Tomasella appeals the district court’s dismissal of his civil rights
complaint wherein he alleges that Defendants-Appellees violated the
Racketeer Influence and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO), as well as his
rights under the First, Fourth, Sixth, Eighth, and Fourteenth Amendments.
Tomasella also brings state law claims for invasion of privacy, false arrest,
false imprisonment, intentional infliction of emotional distress, malicious
prosecution, tortious interference, and civil conspiracy. Plaintiff asserts
these claims against the following Defendants in their individual capacities:
(1) Warren Kenneth Paxton, the Texas Attorney General; (2) Judge Casey
Blair, a state court judge; (3) Bryan Beavers, the Sheriff of Kaufman County;
and (4) Rhonda Hughey, the Kaufman County District Clerk.
Tomasella’s filed his complaint in federal district court following his
unsuccessful state court proceedings in which the state court ordered him to
pay child support. Specifically, Tomasella contends that he was ordered to
make “unlawful” child support payments and was “falsely arrested and
incarcerated” after Judge Blair found him in contempt for failing to timely
make those payments. In support of his claims, Tomasella points to a Texas
appellate court decision which vacated his sentence for criminal contempt on
continues to name as defendants both Ruth Blake and Kaufman County Child Support, but
does not argue that the district court erred in dismissing them in its second judgment. Pro
se briefs are afforded liberal construction, see Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 94 (2007) (per
curiam), but pro se litigants are not exempt “from compliance with relevant rules of
procedural and substantive law,” Birl v. Estelle, 660 F.2d 592, 593 (5th Cir. 1981) (per
curiam). Because Tomasella does not sufficiently challenge the district court’s second
judgment dismissing Ruth Blake and Kaufman County Child Support, we deem his claims
against these Defendants abandoned and accordingly do not address them.
2
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No. 22-10760
the grounds that, because he was “sentenced to more than six months in jail,
he was entitled to a trial by jury.”
Defendants moved to dismiss Tomasella’s claims, asserting that the
district court lacked subject-matter jurisdiction under the Rooker-Feldman
doctrine, 2 and that he failed to state claims upon which relief can be granted.
The district court dismissed Tomasella’s claims for invasion of privacy,
intentional infliction of emotional distress, tortious interference, civil
conspiracy, and malicious prosecution (collectively, Plaintiff’s “state-law
claims”) for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction under Rooker-Feldman. The
court also dismissed Tomasella’s 42 U.S.C. § 1983 claim for violation of his
First Amendment rights and his RICO claim for lack of subject-matter
jurisdiction. The district court denied Defendants’ Rule 12(b)(1) motion as
to Tomasella’s § 1983 claims for violations of his Fourth, Sixth, Eighth, and
Fourteenth Amendment rights, and his false arrest and false imprisonment
claims,3 but granted Defendants’ Rule 12(b)(6) motion as to these claims.
Tomasella timely appealed.
II. DISCUSSION
A. Lack of Subject-Matter Jurisdiction
On appeal, Tomasella argues that the Rooker-Feldman doctrine is not
applicable to his state law, RICO, and First Amendment claims because he
2
See Rooker v. Fidelity Trust Co., 263 U.S. 413 (1923); D.C. Court of Appeals v.
Feldman, 460 U.S. 462 (1983).
3
The Magistrate Judge noted that to the extent Tomasella’s false arrest and
imprisonment claims are “related to the civil contempt proceedings, he seeks an
impermissible review of the validity of the state court judgment,” but that to the extent he
seeks damages for his “alleged injury based on the vacated criminal contempt portion of a
state court order that resulted in his imprisonment for more than six months without a jury
trial, [these] claims can be reviewed without calling [into question] the validity of the state
court’s determination.”
3
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was a “State Court winner” 4 and is not asking for relief from a state court
order. We disagree.
Under the Rooker-Feldman doctrine, federal district courts lack
subject matter jurisdiction to consider cases where: (1) the federal court
plaintiff lost in state court; (2) the plaintiff’s alleged injuries were caused by
the state court judgment; (3) plaintiff’s claims invite the federal court to
review and reject the state court judgment; and (4) the state court judgment
was rendered before plaintiff filed proceedings in federal district court. 5
“[I]n addition to the precise claims presented to the state court, Rooker-
Feldman prohibits federal court review of claims that are ‘inextricably
intertwined’ with a state court decision.” 6 We have previously held that
“issues are ‘inextricably intertwined’ when a plaintiff casts a complaint in
the form of a civil rights action simply to circumvent the Rooker-Feldman
rule.” 7
Here, Tomasella’s state-law claims center on his allegation that
Defendants conspired to maliciously prosecute him “even when he timely
paid child support.” He contends that Defendants’ “malice and disdain” is
underscored by their continued “unlawful[] stalking” in an effort to force
4
Plaintiff is incorrect that he was the “winner” in his state court proceedings.
Although the state appellate court vacated Tomasella’s sentence for criminal contempt,
the appellate court’s order specifically noted that it did “not disturb the trial court’s
findings or sentence related to civil contempt.” Accordingly, Tomasella did not prevail on
his challenge to his two arrests related to his civil contempt proceedings for failure to make
timely child support payments.
5
Exxon Mobil Corp. v. Saudi Basic Indus. Corp., 544 U.S. 280, 291 (2005).
6
Burciaga v. Deutsche Bank Nat’l Trust Co., 871 F.3d 380, 384-85 (5th Cir. 2017)
(citation omitted).
7
Richard v. Hoechst Celanese Chem. Grp., Inc., 355 F.3d 345, 351 (5th Cir. 2003)
(citing Liedtke v. State Bar of Tex., 18 F.3d 315, 317 (5th Cir. 1994)).
4
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him “to pay them approximately twice as much child [support] as he should
have ever been charged.” Tomasella further asserts that his child support
obligation has “compelled [him] to be a customer of the [Child Support
Division] CSD against his will,” which has caused him “a great deal of
emotional stress, significant financial losses, as well as damages to his
reputation.” These factual allegations and alleged injuries 8 all stem from
Tomasella’s challenge to the state court’s child support judgment and
Defendants’ efforts to enforce that judgment. Thus, because Tomasella’s
state-law tort claims are “inextricably intertwined” with the validity of the
state court’s child support judgment, the district court correctly held that it
lacked subject-matter jurisdiction over his state-law claims. 9
The district court also correctly held that the Rooker-Feldman doctrine
bars Tomasella’s RICO and § 1983 First Amendment claims. Although the
district court noted that Tomasella failed to allege a “pattern of racketeering
activity,” it liberally construed Tomasella’s assertion that “CSD is a for-
profit business” that gains “substantial profits” from compelling individuals
to be “customers” as an alleged pattern of racketeering activity. Assuming
8
See Truong v. Bank of Am., N.A., 717 F.3d 377, 382 (5th Cir. 2013) (noting that
one of the “hallmark[s] of the Rooker-Feldman inquiry is the source of the federal plaintiff’s
alleged injury” (citing Exxon, 544 U.S. at 284)).
9
See Glatzer v. Chase Manhattan Bank, 108 F. App’x 204, 205 (5th Cir. 2004) (per
curiam) (unpublished) (affirming the district court’s dismissal for lack of jurisdiction of
plaintiff’s claims that defendants “conspired to deprive him of his parental rights” and
“improperly seized his assets”); Sookman v. Millard, 151 F. App’x 299, 300 (5th Cir. 2005)
(per curiam) (unpublished) (affirming the district court’s holding that it lacked jurisdiction
under Rooker-Feldman to hear plaintiff’s claim that “defendants conspired with each other
and state court judges presiding over divorce and custody proceedings between [plaintiff]
and her ex-husband . . . to deprive her of various civil rights”). Unpublished opinions
issued in or after 1996 are “not controlling precedent” except in limited circumstances, but
they “may be persuasive authority.” Ballard v. Burton, 444 F.3d 391, 401 n.7 (5th Cir.
2006). We cited both Glatzer and Sookman with approval in Truong, 717 F.3d at 373 n.3.
5
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that Tomasella has stated a RICO claim, 10 we find that it is barred by the
Rooker-Feldman doctrine because his alleged injury is the state court’s child
support judgment. 11 And for the same reason, Tomasella’s First
Amendment claim—that he was forced to be a “customer” of the CSD in
violation of his right to freedom of association—is similarly barred under
Rooker-Feldman.
Accordingly, the district court committed no error in granting
Defendants’ Rule 12(b)(1) motion to dismiss for lack of subject-matter
jurisdiction Tomasella’s state-law tort claims, as well as his RICO and First
Amendment claims.
B. Failure to State a Claim
Tomasella also challenges the district court’s dismissal of his false
arrest and imprisonment claims and his § 1983 claims for alleged violations
of his Fourth, Sixth, Eighth, and Fourteenth Amendment rights.
As to Tomasella’s claims against the state court judge, we agree with
the district court that Tomasella cannot overcome the hurdle of judicial
immunity. On appeal, he contends that Judge Blair is not entitled to judicial
immunity because he “lost his jurisdiction” by entering an “illegal order.”
Tomasella’s argument is without merit. Although Tomasella is correct that
a judge is not immune from liability for actions “taken in the complete
10
This Court has previously held that dismissal is appropriate when appellants
have asserted no facts that would support a pattern of racketeering activity. See Abraham
v. Singh, 480 F.3d 351, 355 (5th Cir. 2007).
11
See Larrew v. Barnes, No. 02-1585, 2003 WL 21458754 (N.D. Tex. May 7, 2003),
aff’d 87 F. App’x 407, 408 (5th Cir. 2004) (per curiam) (unpublished) (noting that the
district court held that plaintiff’s “RICO claim was inextricably intertwined with his claim
alleging that his divorce decree was invalid”).
6
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absence of all jurisdiction,” 12 he is incorrect that the fact Judge Blair’s
criminal contempt order was ultimately vacated in part on appeal means that
he lacked jurisdiction to enter such an order. As explained by the Supreme
Court, “[a] judge will not be deprived of immunity because the action he took
was in error, was done maliciously, or was in excess of his authority; rather,
he will be subject to liability only when he has acted in the ‘clear absence of
all jurisdiction.’” 13 Accordingly, Judge Blair did not lose his judicial
immunity for issuing an order that was ultimately reversed in part on appeal.
Likewise, the district court did not err in dismissing Tomasella’s
claims against the Attorney General, Sheriff, and Clerk for failure to state a
claim. “In order to state a cause of action under section 1983, the plaintiff
must identify defendants who were either personally involved in the
constitutional violation or whose acts are causally connected to the
constitutional violation alleged.” 14 Moreover, a defendant cannot be held
liable under § 1983 under a theory of respondeat superior. 15 Tomasella’s
conclusory assertions that the Sheriff and Clerk continued his “illegal
incarceration,” and that the Office of the Attorney General failed to provide
him with an attorney and jury trial, are insufficient to tie his civil rights claims
to the specific actions of these Defendants. Accordingly, Tomasella’s claims
12
Mireles v. Waco, 502 U.S. 9, 13 (1991).
13
Stump v. Sparkman, 435 U.S. 349, 356 (1978) (quoting Bradley v. Fisher, 13 Wall.
335, 351 (1872)); see also Adams v. Mcllhany, 764 F.2d 294, 298-99 (5th Cir. 1985) (finding
that a state criminal court judge had “some subject-matter jurisdiction,” and thus
maintained his judicial immunity, even though the judge improperly imprisoned the
plaintiff for “constructive contempt” and sentenced her to thirty days in jail).
14
Woods v. Edwards, 51 F.3d 577, 583 (5th Cir. 1995) (citing Lozano v. Smith, 718
F.2d 756, 768 (5th Cir. 1983)).
15
Stewart v. Murphy, 174 F.3d 530, 536 (5th Cir. 1999).
7
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against the Attorney General, Sheriff, and Clerk in their individual capacities
were properly dismissed.
For these reasons and those outlined in the detailed, careful Report
and Recommendation issued by the Magistrate Judge and adopted by the
district court, the judgment is AFFIRMED.
8