Mirabile v. Life Insurance Co. of North America , 293 F. App'x 213 ( 2008 )

UNPUBLISHED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
No. 07-1656
DONNA MIRABILE,
Plaintiff - Appellant,
v.
LIFE INSURANCE COMPANY OF NORTH AMERICA,
Defendant - Appellee.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the Eastern
District of Virginia, at Norfolk. Raymond A. Jackson, District
Judge. (2:06-cv-00573-RAJ)
Submitted: August 11, 2008 Decided: August 21, 2008
Before TRAXLER and GREGORY, Circuit Judges, and WILKINS, Senior
Circuit Judge.
Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.
Michael F. Leban, LEBAN AND ASSOCIATES, P.C., Virginia Beach,
Virginia, for Appellant. John C. Lynch, TROUTMAN SANDERS LLP,
Virginia Beach, Virginia; Jon S. Hubbard, TROUTMAN SANDERS LLP,
Richmond, Virginia, for Appellee.
Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
PER CURIAM:
Donna Mirabile appeals the district court’s order
granting a motion for summary judgment filed by Life Insurance
Company of North America (“LINA”) and dismissing Mirabile’s action
challenging termination of her disability benefits. Because the
policy at issue is an employee welfare benefit plan, the action is
governed by the Employee Retirement Income Security Act (“ERISA”),
29 U.S.C. §§ 1001 - 1461 (2000). We have reviewed the record and
find no reversible error.
Mirabile claims the district court erred when it
dismissed her case as time—barred. We review de novo a district
court’s order granting summary judgment, viewing the facts in the
light most favorable to the nonmoving party. Holland v. Washington
Homes, Inc., 487 F.3d 208, 213 (4th Cir. 2007), cert. denied, 128
S. Ct. 955 (2008). As ERISA does not contain a statute of
limitations governing private causes of action for benefits, courts
must look to the most analogous state statute of limitations. See
White v. Sun Life Assur. Co. of Canada, 488 F.3d 240, 245 (4th Cir.
2007) (citing Wilson v. Garcia, 471 U.S. 261, 266-67 (1985)).
The district court applied Va. Code Ann. § 38.2-314(2007), which invalidates any provision in any insurance policy
limiting the time within which to bring an action on the policy to
a period of less than one year. Mirabile’s long-term disability
policy with LINA (“the Policy”) stated that any legal action had to
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be brought within three years of accrual of the claim. The Policy
also contained a clause that extended any time limit to agree with
the minimum limitations period permitted by the law of the state of
residence.
Mirabile argues the district court should have applied
the five-year statute of limitations for actions under a written
contract in Va. Code Ann. § 8.01-246(2) (2007). She contends that
because the Policy’s three-year period is less than the five—year
period permitted by § 8.01-246(2), the Policy’s extension clause
should extend the limitations period to agree with § 8.01-246(2).
We find, however, that § 38.2-314, not § 8.01-246(2), dictates the
appropriate limitations period for insurance contracts. Section
38.2-314 sets the minimum limitations period allowed in Virginia
for filing suit on an insurance contract at one year. See Ramsey
v. Home Ins. Co., 125 S.E.2d 201, 202 (Va. 1982) (purpose of
predecessor to § 38.2-314 is “to provide a limitation upon the
minimum time for bringing suit” to one year). As the Policy’s
three—year limitation period is greater than the one—year minimum
in Virginia, the extension clause did not apply; consequently the
applicable limitations period is the three—year period set forth in
the Policy.
“‘An ERISA cause of action does not accrue until a claim
of benefits has been made and formally denied.’” White, 488 F.3d
at 246 (quoting Rodriguez v. MEBA Pension Trust, 872 F.2d 69, 72
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(4th Cir. 1989)). Mirabile’s claim accrued on May 31, 2002, when
LINA upheld its earlier decision to terminate her benefits.
Mirabile filed suit on September 11, 2006, over four years after
the accrual of her claim and beyond the applicable three-year
limitations provision contained in the Policy. Therefore, the
district court did not err when it granted LINA’s motion for
summary judgment and dismissed Mirabile’s claim as time—barred.
Accordingly, we affirm the judgment of the district
court. We dispense with oral argument because the facts and legal
contentions are adequately presented in the materials before the
court and argument would not aid the decisional process.
AFFIRMED
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