United States v. Elias Vega, Jr. ( 2014 )


Menu:
  •      Case: 13-40681      Document: 00512768771         Page: 1    Date Filed: 09/15/2014
    IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
    FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT     United States Court of Appeals
    Fifth Circuit
    FILED
    September 15, 2014
    No. 13-40681
    Lyle W. Cayce
    Summary Calendar
    Clerk
    UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
    Plaintiff-Appellee
    v.
    ELIAS FIDEL VEGA, JR.,
    Defendant-Appellant
    Appeal from the United States District Court
    for the Southern District of Texas
    USDC No. 5:12-CR-841-1
    Before DAVIS, CLEMENT, and COSTA, Circuit Judges.
    PER CURIAM: *
    Elias Fidel Vega, Jr., appeals the conditions of supervised release
    imposed for his offenses of possession of firearms by a convicted felon, illegal
    possession of a machine gun, and possession of unregistered firearms. He
    contends that the written conditions requiring him to provide his probation
    officer with access to his financial information and prohibiting him from
    incurring new credit charges or opening additional lines of credit without prior
    * Pursuant to 5TH CIR. R. 47.5, the court has determined that this opinion should not
    be published and is not precedent except under the limited circumstances set forth in 5TH
    CIR. R. 47.5.4.
    Case: 13-40681     Document: 00512768771     Page: 2   Date Filed: 09/15/2014
    No. 13-40681
    approval should be stricken from the judgment because they conflict with the
    oral pronouncement of his sentence. He also challenges the two conditions on
    grounds that they are not reasonably related to the applicable 18 U.S.C.
    § 3553(a) factors and that they involve a greater deprivation of liberty than
    necessary to effectuate the sentencing goals. He argues that the conditions are
    unrelated to his firearm offenses and prior convictions. Because the district
    court did not announce the conditions at sentencing and Vega had no
    opportunity to object, we review for abuse of discretion. See United States v.
    Mudd, 
    685 F.3d 473
    , 480 (5th Cir. 2012); United States v. Warden, 
    291 F.3d 363
    , 364-65 & n.1 (5th Cir. 2002).
    The conditions at issue are not mandatory conditions required by
    18 U.S.C. § 3583(d) or standard conditions of supervised release in the
    Southern District of Texas. However, the policy statement in United States
    Sentencing Guidelines § 5D1.3(d) recommends including a condition requiring
    the defendant to provide access to any requested financial information “[i]f the
    court . . . orders the defendant to pay a fine.” § 5D1.3(d)(3) (p.s.). Because the
    district court ordered Vega to pay a $2,500 fine, the prerequisite for including
    the condition under § 5D1.3(d)(3) was satisfied, and the district court did not
    abuse its discretion by including the condition in the written judgment. See
    § 5D1.3(d)(3); United States v. Torres-Aguilar, 
    352 F.3d 934
    , 937-38 (5th Cir.
    2003).
    In contrast, the circumstances of Vega’s case do not meet the express
    prerequisites enumerated in § 5D1.3(d)(2) of the Sentencing Guidelines for
    debt obligations, as the district court did not impose an installment schedule
    for payment of the fine or limit the application of the condition to instances
    when Vega is in noncompliance with any installment plan. See § 5D1.3(d)(2)
    (p.s.). Therefore, imposition of the special condition requiring him to obtain
    2
    Case: 13-40681    Document: 00512768771     Page: 3   Date Filed: 09/15/2014
    No. 13-40681
    the probation officer’s approval before incurring new credit charges or opening
    new lines of credit was not recommended by the Guidelines.          See Torres-
    
    Aguilar, 352 F.3d at 937-38
    . Additionally, the condition actually imposed in
    the written judgment is more restrictive than the condition found in
    § 5D1.3(d)(2), as it applies without regard to the defendant’s compliance with
    any payment schedule. For these reasons, inclusion of this condition in the
    written judgment created a conflict between the judgment and the oral
    sentence, and the oral pronouncement controls. See United States v. Mudd,
    
    685 F.3d 473
    , 480 (5th Cir. 2012); United States v. Bigelow, 
    462 F.3d 378
    , 383-
    84 (5th Cir. 2006); 
    Torres-Aguilar, 352 F.3d at 938
    . We thus remand the case
    to the district court to conform the judgment to the oral sentence. In light of
    this determination, we do not reach Vega’s argument that imposition of the
    condition was substantively unreasonable.
    With respect to the condition requiring Vega to provide access to any
    requested financial information, the record shows that it was reasonably
    related to several of the relevant § 3553(a) factors. Vega’s sentence, which
    included the $2,500 fine, was imposed in part to further the sentencing goals
    of deterrence and protection of the public. The condition is related to ensuring
    payment of the fine, see § 5D1.3(d)(3), thus effectuating those goals.
    Additionally, Vega’s violent offense conduct apparently stemmed from a
    dispute over a heroin transaction, and the district court concluded that the
    evidence suggested that he was a drug dealer.        Although Vega had been
    without a job for several years, police seized large sums of cash from his home.
    Allowing the probation officer to access Vega’s financial information will help
    the officer to monitor whether Vega obtains legitimate employment and to
    detect if he begins to obtain funds illegally, thereby deterring further criminal
    conduct and protecting the public. See United States v. Behler, 
    187 F.3d 772
    ,
    3
    Case: 13-40681    Document: 00512768771        Page: 4   Date Filed: 09/15/2014
    No. 13-40681
    780 (8th Cir. 1999) (affirming imposition of condition requiring access to
    financial information where district court “believed that monitoring [the
    defendant’s] financial situation would aid in detecting any return to his former
    lifestyle of drug distribution”).    Although Vega asserts that the condition
    imposes a greater deprivation of liberty than is necessary to advance the goals
    of deterrence and protecting the public, he offers no explanation of any liberty
    interest that will be impinged or any legal activities that will be affected. We
    defer to the district court’s determination that it was an appropriate condition
    of supervised release. See United States v. Rodriguez, 
    558 F.3d 408
    , 412 & n.3
    (5th Cir. 2009); United States v. Weatherton, 
    567 F.3d 149
    , 153 (5th Cir. 2009).
    Vega’s conviction is AFFIRMED. The sentence is VACATED in part and
    the case REMANDED to the district court to conform the written judgment
    consistent with this opinion.
    4