Jody Carr v. Stelzer ( 2018 )

NOT FOR PUBLICATION FILED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS MAY 2 2018
MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
JODY R.O. CARR, No. 17-35287
Plaintiff-Appellant, D.C. No. 1:15-cv-00133-CWD
v.
MEMORANDUM*
STELZER, Cpl.; et al.,
Defendants-Appellees.
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the District of Idaho
Candy W. Dale, Magistrate Judge, Presiding
Argued and Submitted April 9, 2018
Pasadena, California
Before: BEA and MURGUIA, Circuit Judges, and KEELEY,** District Judge.
Plaintiff-Appellant Jody Carr, an inmate at the Idaho Department of
Corrections, appeals the district court’s dismissal of his Eighth Amendment and
access-to-court claims, denial of his Motion for Preliminary Injunctive Relief, and
grant of summary judgment in favor of Sergeant Jesse Segadelli and Corporal
*
This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent
except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.
**
The Honorable Irene M. Keeley, United States District Judge for the
Northern District of West Virginia, sitting by designation.
Steve Stelzer on Carr’s 42 U.S.C. § 1983 action. We have jurisdiction pursuant to
28 U.S.C. §§ 1291 and 1331, and we affirm in part, reverse in part and remand.
1. We review a dismissal for failure to state a claim de novo. See Akhtar v.
Mesa, 698 F.3d 1202, 1212 (9th Cir. 2012). To survive dismissal, a plaintiff is
required to plead enough facts to state a claim for “relief that is plausible on its
face.” Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007). The court must
be able to draw a “reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the
misconduct alleged.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009).
Carr asserts that the district court erred in dismissing his Eighth Amendment claim.
In his Original Complaint, Carr alleged generally that defendants “violated his
First, Fourth, Fifth, Sixth, Eighth, Ninth, and Fourteenth Amendment rights.”
Without more, Carr’s threadbare Eighth Amendment allegation is not enough for
the court to infer “that the defendant[s are] liable” for violating Carr’s Eighth
Amendment rights. See Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678. Therefore, the district court did not
err in dismissing Carr’s Eighth Amendment claim in his Original Complaint for
failure to state a claim. Additionally, because Carr failed specifically to identify
facts to support his Eighth Amendment claim in his Amended Complaint, despite
the district court’s instructions to do so, the district court did not abuse its
discretion in denying him leave to amend. See Ghazali v. Moran, 46 F.3d 52, 53
(9th Cir. 1995); Ferdik v. Bonzelet, 963 F.2d 1258, 1260 (9th Cir. 1992).
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Carr also asserts that the district court erred in dismissing his access-to-court
claim. In his Original Complaint, Carr alleged that Corporal Kimes violated his
right to access the courts by stealing some of his legal papers under the guise of
conducting an “inventory.” It is established “beyond doubt that prisoners have a
constitutional right of access to the courts.” Bounds v. Smith, 430 U.S. 817, 821
(1977). The touchstone of an access-to-court claim is that the claimant must have
“meaningful access.” Id. at 824 (internal citations and modifications omitted). This
right extends to prison grievance procedures. Bradley v. Hall, 64 F.3d 1276, 1279
(9th Cir. 1995) overruled on other grounds by Shaw v. Murphy, 532 U.S. 223, 230
n.2 (2001) (citing Valandingham v. Bojorquez, 866 F.2d 1135, 1138 (9th Cir.
1989)). However, in both his Original and Amended Complaints, Carr failed to
allege any specific instances where his ability to bring a lawsuit was compromised.
Therefore, the district court did not err in dismissing his access-to-court claim in
the Original Complaint, and the district court did not abuse its discretion in
denying Carr leave to amend his access-to-court claim. See Sands v. Lewis, 886
F.2d 1166, 1171 (9th Cir. 1989) (plaintiff must allege an “actual injury” to court
access such as a specific instance “in which an inmate was actually denied access
to the courts”) (citing Hudson v. Robinson, 678 F.2d 462, 466 (3d Cir. 1982)
overruled on other grounds by Lewis v. Casey, 518 U.S. 343, 350 (1996)). In sum,
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we affirm the district court’s dismissal of Carr’s Eighth Amendment and access-to-
court claims.
2. Carr next asserts that the district court erred in denying his motion for
Preliminary Injunctive Relief. On January 8, 2016, Carr filed a motion requesting
that he be transferred to a minimum security prison in Orofino, Idaho. “[T]he
proper legal standard for preliminary injunctive relief requires a party to
demonstrate ‘that he is likely to succeed on the merits, that he is likely to suffer
irreparable harm in the absence of preliminary relief, that the balance of equities
tips in his favor, and that an injunction is in the public interest.” Stormans, Inc. v.
Selecky, 571 F.3d 960, 978 (9th Cir. 2009) vacated and superseded on other
grounds, Stormans, Inc. v. Selecky, 586 F.3d 1109 (9th Cir. 2009). On appeal, our
review is for abuse of discretion, “generally limited to whether the district court [1]
employed the proper preliminary injunction standard and [2] whether the court
correctly apprehended the underlying legal issues in the case.” Guzman v. Shewry,
552 F.3d 941, 948 (9th Cir. 2009).
Here, the district court applied the proper preliminary injunction standard to
Carr’s Motion and identified the correct legal issues. Therefore, we affirm the
district court’s denial of Carr’s motion for preliminary injunction.
3. Finally, Carr contends that the district court erred in granting summary
judgment for defendants on his First Amendment retaliation claim. “Prisoners have
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a First Amendment right to file grievances against prison officials and be free from
retaliation for doing so.” Watison v. Carter, 668 F.3d 1108, 1114 (9th Cir. 2012).
A First Amendment retaliation claim has five elements. Id. First, “the plaintiff
must allege that the retaliated-against conduct is protected.” Id. Second, the
plaintiff must claim the defendant took an adverse action against the plaintiff. Id.Third, the plaintiff must allege a causal connection between the adverse action and
the protected conduct. Id. Fourth, plaintiff must allege that the “official’s acts
would chill or silence a person of ordinary firmness from future First Amendment
activities.” Id. (citation omitted). Finally, the plaintiff must allege that the prison
official’s retaliatory action did not “advance legitimate goals of the correctional
institution.” Id.At the hearing on motion for summary judgment, defendants argued that
they lacked the necessary retaliatory motive, and that none of the alleged adverse
actions against Carr, such as threatening Carr and other inmates, were taken
because Carr filed grievances with the American Civil Liberties Union (“ACLU”).
Indeed, the defendants asserted that they did not know the inmates were
corresponding with the ACLU, and that their alleged threats to the inmates served
a legitimate penological purpose. However, in addition to his verified complaint,
Carr filed 17 affidavits from other inmates in opposition to defendants’ summary
judgment motion, and most of those affidavits state that defendants threatened Carr
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and other inmates that they would be stripped of their protective custody if they
continued to file grievances or correspond with the ACLU. Viewing the evidence
in the light most favorable to Carr, the inmates’ affidavits and Carr’s verified
complaint, which assert that defendants threatened them because of their
correspondence with the ACLU, create a genuine issue of material fact about
whether the defendants threatened Carr in retaliation for Carr’s exercise of his First
Amendment rights. Valandingham v. Bojorquez, 866 F.2d 1135, 1139 (9th Cir.
1989) (reversing the district court’s grant of summary judgment on a prisoner’s
retaliation claim where the prisoner had supported his account of events with
affidavits to “present[] specific facts which controvert the facts defendants
asserted.”); see also Lopez v. Smith, 203 F.3d 1122, 1132 n.14 (9th Cir. 2000) (en
banc) (“A plaintiff’s verified complaint may be considered as an affidavit in
opposition to summary judgment if it is based on personal knowledge and sets
forth specific facts admissible in evidence.”). Therefore, we reverse the district
court’s decision granting summary judgment for defendants on Carr’s First
Amendment Retaliation claim and remand for further proceedings.
Each party shall bear their own costs on appeal.
AFFIRMED IN PART, REVERSED IN PART, AND REMANDED.
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