Spring Garner v. The City of Ozark , 587 F. App'x 515 ( 2014 )


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  •               Case: 13-15080     Date Filed: 09/17/2014   Page: 1 of 7
    [DO NOT PUBLISH]
    IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
    FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT
    ________________________
    No. 13-15080
    Non-Argument Calendar
    ________________________
    D.C. Docket No. 1:13-cv-00090-WKW-TFM
    SPRING GARNER,
    as parent and next friend of Wynter Stokes
    and in her individual capacity,
    Plaintiff - Appellee,
    versus
    THE CITY OF OZARK,
    a municipal corporation,
    PHIL DODSON,
    individually and in his capacity as
    a police officer for the City of Ozark,
    Defendants - Appellants.
    ________________________
    Appeal from the United States District Court
    for the Middle District of Alabama
    ________________________
    (September 17, 2014)
    Case: 13-15080     Date Filed: 09/17/2014   Page: 2 of 7
    Before TJOFLAT, WILSON and COX, Circuit Judges.
    PER CURIAM:
    In this case, the Plaintiff Spring Garner sues Officer Phil Dodson in his
    individual and official capacity and the City of Ozark (the “Defendants”) for
    injuries her son, Wynter Stokes, suffered while Dodson was attempting to
    apprehend him. The Defendants bring this interlocutory appeal contending that the
    district court erred by ignoring a claim of immunity in their motion to dismiss and
    incorrectly granting Garner discovery and denying their immunity-based summary
    judgment motion.
    I. Facts and Procedural History
    According to the allegations of the complaint, Stokes (who is autistic) left
    his residence, wandered down the street, and entered the yard of a private
    residence. The owner of the residence called police. Officer Dodson responded to
    the call. According to the complaint, Dodson arrived on the scene and, without
    provocation or cause, repeatedly instructed his police canine to attack Stokes.
    As a result of these events, Garner (as parent of Stokes) filed this suit
    alleging multiple claims: excessive force in violation of the Fourth Amendment
    (Count I); unreasonable seizure in violation of the Fourth Amendment (Count II);
    unlawful arrest in violation of the Fourth Amendment (Count III); violation of the
    Americans with Disability Act (“ADA”) (Count IV); negligent hiring (Count V);
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    negligence (Count VII);1 assault (Count VIII); and battery (IX). Although the
    complaint is hardly a model of clarity, it appears to assert each claim against every
    Defendant—regardless of whether such assertion is rational.            The Defendants
    moved to dismiss all claims except those of excessive force, assault, and battery
    against Dodson in his individual capacity. The district court granted the motion to
    dismiss on all the counts it considered with the exception of the ADA claim.
    However, the district court did not address the motion to dismiss regarding the
    assault or battery claims against the city.
    The Defendants also moved for summary judgment on all claims.                   In
    response to the summary judgment motion, Garner’s counsel filed an affidavit
    stating that she would need to present several expert witnesses in order to respond
    to the motion. The district court granted Garner discovery under Fed. R. Civ. P.
    56(d) and denied the Defendants’ summary judgment motion, but with leave to
    refile at an appropriate time. The Defendants appeal.
    II. Issues on Appeal
    The Defendants present two issues on appeal. First, Ozark contends that the
    district court erred by not considering its immunity-based motion to dismiss the
    state law assault and battery claims. Second, the Defendants contend that the
    1
    Garner’s complaint mysteriously omits a Count VI and instead proceeds directly to
    Count VII.
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    district court abused its discretion by granting Garner’s Rule 56(d) motion for
    discovery and—in doing so—denying the Defendants’ summary judgment motion.
    III. Standards of Review
    We review de novo a district court’s denial of a motion to dismiss based on
    immunity. Rehberg v. Paulk, 
    611 F.3d 828
    , 837 n.5 (11th Cir. 2010). We review a
    district court’s ruling on a Rule 56(d) motion for abuse of discretion. Carmical v.
    Bell Helicoper Textron, Inc., 
    117 F.3d 490
    , 493 (11th Cir. 1997).
    IV. Discussion
    A. The district court erred by denying Ozark immunity on the Alabama state
    law tort claims.
    Ozark contends that the district court erred by ignoring its immunity-based
    motion to dismiss the state law battery and assault claims (counts VIII and IX). In
    the motion to dismiss, Ozark asserted that it was immune from these claims under
    
    Ala. Code § 11-47-190
    . 2
    The Alabama Supreme Court has held that under § 11-47-190, a
    municipality is immune from liability for the intentional torts of its agents. Ex
    parte City of Tuskegee, 
    932 So. 2d 895
    , 911 (Ala. 2005). We have previously
    2
    “No city or town shall be liable for damages for injury done to or wrong suffered by any
    person or corporation, unless such injury or wrong was done or suffered through the neglect,
    carelessness, or unskillfulness of some agent, officer, or employee of the municipality engaged in
    work therefor and while acting in the line of his or her duty . . .” 
    Ala. Code § 11-47-190
    .
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    recognized this immunity under Alabama law. See Brown v. City of Hunstville,
    
    608 F.3d 724
    , 743 (11th Cir. 2010).
    Accordingly, Ozark is entitled to a ruling on its motion to dismiss based on
    immunity grounds. We remand and instruct the district court to provide such a
    ruling.
    B. The district court erred by denying the Defendants’ summary judgment
    motion.
    The Defendants contend that the district court erred by granting Garner’s
    Rule 56(d) motion and—in doing so—denying their immunity-based summary
    judgment motion.
    Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(d) allows a district court to deny a summary judgment
    motion when “a nonmovant shows by affidavit or declaration that, for specified
    reasons, it cannot present facts essential to justify its opposition.” “A [Rule 56(d)]3
    motion must be supported by an affidavit which sets forth with particularity the
    facts the moving party expects to discover and how those facts would create a
    genuine issue of material fact precluding summary judgment.” Harbert Int'l, Inc.
    v. James, 
    157 F.3d 1271
    , 1280 (11th Cir. 1998). “Whether to grant or deny a [Rule
    56(d)] motion for discovery requires the court to balance the movant's
    demonstrated need for discovery against the burden such discovery will place on
    3
    The original text references “Rule 56(f).” Effective December 1, 2010, Rule 56(f) was
    reclassified as Rule 56(d) with no substantial change. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 56 Advisory
    Committee Notes to the 2010 amendments.
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    the opposing party.” 
    Id.
     “In qualified immunity cases, the [Rule 56(d)] balancing
    is done with a thumb on the side of the scale weighing against discovery.” Id.; see
    also Anderson v. Creighton, 
    483 U.S. 635
    , 646 n.6, 
    107 S. Ct. 3034
    , 3042 n.6
    (1987) (cautioning that district courts should be especially careful in allowing Rule
    56(d) discovery before considering a qualified-immunity based summary judgment
    motion). “The basic thrust of the qualified-immunity doctrine is to free officials
    from the concerns of litigation, including avoidance of disruptive discovery.”
    Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 
    556 U.S. 662
    , 685, 
    129 S. Ct. 1937
    , 1953 (2009) (quotation
    omitted). And, the city’s immunity claim in this case warrants a ruling on the
    city’s motion for summary judgment without further discovery.
    In this case, Garner has not shown that she meets the requirements of Rule
    56(d). Garner has not articulated what particular facts she expects to discover.
    Neither has she provided any explanation of how those facts would be relevant to
    the issue of immunity. Garner’s counsel submitted an affidavit stating that she
    would like to present expert witnesses on recognition of individuals with autism,
    proper handling of police dogs, and the nature of Stokes’s capacity and propensity
    for physical violence. (R. 19-1 at 1.) Garner does not explain what facts these
    expert witnesses would provide. Instead, Garner seems to desire the experts for
    their opinions on the case.     Rule 56(d) provides a remedy “when facts are
    unavailable to the nonmovant.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(d) (emphasis added). Even
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    assuming Garner’s request for expert opinions was proper under Rule 56(d), she
    does not explain how these experts’ opinions would be relevant to the issue of
    immunity. Accordingly, Garner has not particularly identified any relevant facts
    she needs to oppose the summary judgment motion.
    The district court’s order provides no analysis demonstrating that Garner
    met the requirements of Rule 56(d). Neither does Garner provide any analysis on
    appeal. Accordingly, we hold that Garner did not meet the requirements of Rule
    56(d) and that the district court abused its discretion in granting Garner discovery.
    It follows then, that the district court also erred by denying the Defendants’
    summary judgment motion on the basis that Garner needed additional discovery.
    V. Conclusion
    The district court erred by not addressing Ozark’s immunity-based motion to
    dismiss. Accordingly, we remand and instruct the district court to consider this
    issue. The district court also abused its discretion by granting Garner’s 56(d)
    motion. Accordingly, we reverse the district court’s order on the Rule 56(d)
    motion, vacate the district court’s denial of the Defendants’ summary judgment
    motion, and remand and instruct the court to consider the merits of the Defendants’
    summary judgment motion.
    REVERSED IN PART AND REMANDED WITH INSTRUCTIONS.
    7