Cannatella v. Allstate Insurance , 186 F. App'x 430 ( 2006 )

United States Court of Appeals
Fifth Circuit
F I L E D
IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
June 15, 2006
FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT
Charles R. Fulbruge III
____________________ Clerk
No. 05-30995
Summary Calendar
____________________
KEVIN J CANNATELLA
Plaintiff - Appellee
v.
TIMOTHY D GOLDEN, ET AL
Defendants
ALLSTATE INSURANCE COMPANY, Sued herein as the
Uninsured/Under Insured Motorist Carrier of Plaintiff, Kevin
J Cannatella
Defendant - Appellant
_________________________________________________________________
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Eastern District of Louisiana
No. 2:02-CV-3705
_________________________________________________________________
Before KING, WIENER, and DeMOSS, Circuit Judges.
PER CURIAM:*
Defendant-appellant Allstate Insurance Company appeals the
district court’s denial of its post-judgment Motion for
Determination of Policy Coverage, which argued that plaintiff-
*
Pursuant to 5TH CIR. R. 47.5, the court has determined
that this opinion should not be published and is not precedent
except under the limited circumstances set forth in 5TH CIR.
R. 47.5.4.
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appellee Kevin Cannatella could not recover the $2000 limit for
his medical payments under Allstate’s uninsured/underinsured
motorist policy because the policy excluded coverage if such
payments are “covered under any worker’s compensation law.” For
the following reasons, we REVERSE the order of the district court
denying Allstate’s motion.
I. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
On November 1, 2001, while on duty with the Louisiana State
Police running radar on Interstate 10, plaintiff-appellee Kevin
Cannatella (“Cannatella”) suffered neck and back injuries when a
vehicle driven by Timothy Golden (“Golden”) struck Cannatella’s
police cruiser. At the time of the accident, Cannatella was
working a Local Agency Cops Enforcement (“LACE”) detail, which is
an overtime project available to state police officers through
their employment with the state police department, for the St.
Charles parish.1 On November 1, 2002, Cannatella filed suit in a
1
Under Louisiana law, the sheriff of any parish within the
state may contract with the state police department
for the regular assignment of an agreed number of
employees of the division of state police to the
municipality or parish, as the case may be, so as to
provide police protection therein and to enforce both
state laws and local ordinances, in consideration of the
payment by the municipality, parish, or other unit of
government of a sum agreed upon by them and the
department.
LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 40:1388 (2006). According to Cannatella,
although the local parish actually pays for the service, officers
performing LACE detail receive compensation at the overtime rate in
the check issued to them by the state police department. R. at
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Louisiana state court against Golden, Golden’s liability insurer,
Safeco Insurance Company of America (“Safeco”), and Cannatella’s
own uninsured/underinsured motorist carrier, Allstate Insurance
Company (“Allstate”). The case was removed to the United States
District Court for the Eastern District of Louisiana on December
16, 2002 as a diversity action with an amount in controversy in
excess of $75,000 under 28 U.S.C. § 1332(a).
Following a pretrial conference on January 30, 2004, the
parties stipulated that Safeco’s applicable policy limit was
$100,000, that Allstate’s applicable policy limit was $10,000,
and that Cannatella’s cause of action did not exceed the sum of
the available insurance limits, exclusive of interest and costs.
Prior to trial, Safeco tendered the full $100,000 policy limit to
Cannatella in exchange for dismissal of the suit against them.
On September 20, 2004, the district court granted a joint motion
for partial dismissal with prejudice of all claims against Golden
and Safeco, leaving only the remaining causes of action against
Allstate.
A jury trial took place on May 16, 2005. The jury rendered
its verdict in favor of Cannatella, awarding damages for the
injuries he sustained in the automobile accident in the amount of
275. Moreover, Cannatella testified that he performed his detail
in the same patrol unit and with the same equipment issued to him
by the state police. Id. at 276.
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$117,000.2 The district court entered judgment on the verdict on
May 24, 2005, noting that “[r]ecovery is limited in accordance
with the policy issued to Kevin J. Cannatella by Allstate
Insurance Company.” R. at 202. Allstate subsequently tendered
its $10,000 policy limit to Cannatella in satisfaction of the
judgment.
Following the trial, a dispute arose between the parties as
to whether Cannatella was entitled to a $2000 limit in medical
payments coverage under the Allstate policy as part of the
judgment. On July 13, 2005, Allstate filed a post-judgment
Motion for Determination of Policy Coverage, arguing that
Cannatella was not entitled to medical payments because the
policy expressly provided that such coverage “does not apply to
any person to the extent that the treatment is covered under any
workers compensation law.” Def.’s Ex. 1: Allstate Auto Insurance
Policy at 5. Because Cannatella was working in the course and
scope of his employment for the Louisiana State Police at the
time of the accident, Allstate contended that Cannatella was
2
The jury’s damage award was divided into the following
components: (1) $41,500 for physical pain, past and future; (2)
$5000 for mental pain, past and future; (3) $3000 for permanent
disability; (4) $17,500 for loss of earnings, past and future;
and (5) $50,000 for medical expenses, past and future. R. at
193. The jury also found that Allstate had not acted
arbitrarily, capriciously, and without probable cause in failing
to pay Cannatella’s claim after it received satisfactory proof of
loss. Id. at 194. According to the record, although the jury
was aware of Safeco’s settlement before the trial, it was unaware
of the precise amount of that payment to Cannatella while
deliberating and calculating the damage award. Id. at 192.
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covered under Louisiana’s worker’s compensation law. Cannatella
responded that he had no worker’s compensation insurance while
performing LACE detail for the St. Charles parish on the date of
the accident and therefore made no claim to receive any such
benefits. Further, Cannatella argued that Allstate had not
provided any evidence or witnesses to show the St. Charles
District Attorney afforded him a worker’s compensation policy.
On August 12, 2005, the district court issued a brief Order
and Reasons denying Allstate’s motion, which was entered on
August 15, 2005. The district court found that Cannatella was
entitled to the $2000 in medical payments coverage under
Allstate’s policy because “Allstate presents no proof that
[Cannatella’s] medical payments were covered by worker’s
compensation[.]” R. at 212-13. Allstate timely filed its notice
of appeal from the order denying its motion on September 22,
2005.3
3
Cannatella has not submitted a brief on this appeal
despite at least two notices from the clerk’s office to do so.
Nonetheless, this court must examine the basis of its
jurisdiction on its own motion if necessary. See Mosley v.
Cozby, 813 F.2d 659, 660 (5th Cir. 1987) (dismissing appeal for
lack of effective notice of appeal). “‘A timely notice of appeal
is not jurisdictional; however, in this circuit it is a
prerequisite to our exercise of jurisdiction.’” United States v.
Carr, 979 F.2d 51, 55 (5th Cir. 1992) (quoting United States v.
Winn, 948 F.2d 145, 153 (5th Cir. 1991)). A notice of appeal
must be filed with the district court clerk within thirty days
after the judgment or order appealed from is entered. FED. R.
APP. P. 4(a)(1)(A); see also 28 U.S.C. § 2107(a). Allstate did
not file its notice of appeal until September 22, 2005, more than
a week after the original filing deadline of September 14, 2005.
However, the final time for filing a timely notice of appeal was
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II. DISCUSSION
Although not specifically labeled as such, because
Allstate’s motion was filed more than ten days after the entry of
judgment on the jury’s verdict, we shall approach this case as an
appeal from a motion for relief from judgment or order under FED.
R. CIV. P. 60(b). See Shepherd v. Int’l Paper Co., 372 F.3d 326,
327 n.1 (5th Cir. 2004) (“If the motion is filed within ten days
of the judgment or order of which the party complains, it is
considered a Rule 59(e) motion; otherwise, it is treated as a
Rule 60(b) motion.”). We review the district court’s denial of a
Rule 60(b) motion for abuse of discretion. Warfield v. Byron,
436 F.3d 551, 555 (5th Cir. 2006). “It is not enough that the
granting of relief might have been permissible, or even warranted
denial must have been so unwarranted as to constitute an abuse of
discretion.” Seven Elves, Inc. v. Eskenazi, 635 F.2d 396, 402
(5th Cir. 1981).
We first turn to the language of the policy itself to
determine whether the district court abused its discretion in
concluding that Cannatella was entitled to the $2000 in medical
payments coverage. The parties do not dispute that Louisiana law
governs this action. “Under Louisiana law, a court should
interpret an insurance policy under ordinary principles for the
extended by court order to November 25, 2005, because the
district clerk’s office was closed temporarily due to the effects
of Hurricane Katrina. Accordingly, Allstate’s notice of appeal
is deemed timely for the purposes of this appeal.
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interpretation of a contract. The intentions of the parties, as
reflected by the words of the policy, should determine the extent
of coverage.” Trinity Indus., Inc. v. Ins. Co. of N. Am., 916
F.2d 267, 269 (5th Cir. 1990). Part II of Allstate’s Auto
Insurance Policy provides coverage for “all reasonable expenses
incurred for medical treatment, services, or products actually
rendered.” Def.’s Ex. 1: Allstate Auto Insurance Policy at 5.
However, the policy also includes an exclusionary provision,
expressly stating that “[t]his coverage does not apply to any
person to the extent that the treatment is covered under any
workers compensation law.” Id.The sole point of contention on this appeal is whether
Canatella was covered under any worker’s compensation policy
during his LACE detail for the St. Charles parish and, thus,
excluded from the $2000 limit for medical payments under the
plain language of the policy.4 Cannatella insisted below that
there was no evidence adduced during the trial to substantiate
Allstate’s claim that Cannatella was in fact covered under
Louisiana’s worker’s compensation law on the date of the
accident. Allstate contends, however, that Cannatella’s
undisputed employment as a state trooper while performing his
4
The record demonstrates that Cannatella actually received
medical treatment following the accident on November 1, 2001, in
excess of $2000. Moreover, Allstate does not dispute
Cannatella’s testimony that he never filed a worker’s
compensation claim to seek reimbursement of the medical payments.
R. at 259.
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LACE detail entitled him to worker’s compensation coverage under
the governing statutes in Louisiana and therefore falls within
the ambit of Allstate’s exclusionary provision.5 In its Order
5
During cross-examination, Cannatella conceded that he was
working within the course and scope of his employment as a state
trooper on the date of the accident, even though he was unsure
about the effect of his LACE detail assignment on any worker’s
compensation benefits.
Q. Well, at the time of the November 1, ‘01, accident
on the Bonne Carre spillway, you were within the
course and scope of your work as a state trooper;
isn’t that right?
A. Yes, sir.
Q. And among your benefits through your employment
with the state police, you are able to make a
Workers’ Compensation claim because you were in the
course and scope of your employment; is that right?
A. Yes, sir.
Q. And your Workers’ Compensation claim would extend
to payment of any medical bills that you might
incur which were caused by you being involved in
this automobile accident, right?
A. I’m not quite sure what Workmen’s Comp would cover.
. . . .
A. I’m not fully up to date on what the Workmen’s Comp
law is, but also due to the fact that although I
was representing the state police, I was not
actually working because I was being paid by -- at
the time, which was the District Attorney’s Office,
so I’m not sure what, if any, that would have fell
[sic] under.
R. at 298-99. The testimony of Lieutenant William Dorris at
trial further clarified this arrangement during cross-examination
by Cannatella’s attorney.
Q. Now, Trooper, when you are running LACE, while
you’re in a state police uniform and a state police
vehicle, you are actually working for the district
attorney of whatever parish has requested your
services, correct? They are the ones who paid you
through the state police.
A. You’re paid through them. You’re actually working
for the state police, but all monetary
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and Reasons, the district court treated the issue as a matter of
proof in concluding that Cannatella was entitled to the $2000
limit under Allstate’s policy. Upon review of the applicable
Louisiana statutory and case law, however, we conclude that this
dispute is more properly characterized as an issue of law.
Under Louisiana law, the state’s worker’s compensation
scheme generally affords coverage to police officers like
Cannatella. See LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 23:1034(A) (providing
coverage under Louisiana’s worker’s compensation law “to every
person in the service of the state or a political subdivision
thereof[,]” including “members of the police department, or
municipal employees performing police services for any
municipality who are not elected officials”); see also LA. REV.
STAT. ANN. § 40:1374 (“Every employee of the division of state
police, except the head thereof, shall be considered an employee
of the state within the meaning of the worker’s compensation law
of this state and entitled to the benefits of all the provisions
of that law applicable to state employees.”). Further, the LACE
detail assignment in this case appears to be an example of how
local municipalities and parishes may contract with the state
police at their own expense for local enforcement of both state
laws and local ordinances. See LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 40:1388.
reimbursements is [sic] through the District
Attorney’s Office.
Id. at 470-71.
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Cannatella failed to identify any authority, statutory or
otherwise, that demonstrated how his assignment to LACE detail in
the St. Charles parish on the date of the accident resulted in
any forfeiture of his statutory entitlement to worker’s
compensation coverage. Therefore, in light of the applicable
statutory authority, the plain language of Allstate’s policy, and
the factual circumstances of this case, we conclude that
Cannatella was covered under the state’s worker’s compensation
scheme as a matter of law and, consequently, not entitled to the
$2000 medical payment limit.6
Moreover, we note that this case is directly controlled by
the decision of the Supreme Court of Louisiana in Bentley v.
Allstate Insurance Co., 715 So. 2d 1195 (La. 1998). The question
presented in Bentley concerned the application of precisely the
same exclusionary provision in an Allstate auto insurance policy
to a similar factual scenario in which the insured was injured
6
Indeed, even if his worker’s compensation benefits were
ultimately paid by the St. Charles parish pursuant to the LACE
detail assignment, Cannatella’s performance of law enforcement
duties would nonetheless entitle him to such coverage under
Louisiana law. See LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 23:1034.1 (“Any law
enforcement officer employed by any municipality, who, while on
or off duty, and outside his jurisdiction, but within the State
of Louisiana, performs any law enforcement action and is injured
shall be entitled to the provisions for compensation as provided
herein and shall be paid such workers’ compensation benefits by
the municipality by which he is employed.”). Moreover,
Allstate’s policy plainly excludes medical payments to the extent
“treatment is covered under any workers compensation law[,]”
regardless of the precise source of those benefits. Def.’s Ex.
1: Allstate Auto Insurance Policy at 5 (emphasis added).
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while in the course and scope of her employment with the state of
Louisiana. Like the district court’s reasoning in the case at
bar, the court of appeal determined that Allstate had “failed to
discharge its burden of proving the exclusion applies” and
accordingly affirmed the trial court’s denial of Allstate’s
motion for summary judgment. Bentley v. Allstate Ins. Co., 701
So. 2d 257, 260 (La. Ct. App. 1997).
In dissent, Judge Plotkin reasoned that the case was
controlled by Pinnell v. Patterson Services, Inc., 491 So. 2d 637(La. 1986), which dictated that the trial court judgment be
reversed and summary judgment granted in favor of Allstate.
Unquestionably, Bentley’s injuries were covered under
workers’ compensation. Moreover, contrary to the
majority’s conclusion, the Allstate policy exclusion at
question unambiguously excludes medical coverage “to any
person to the extent that treatment is covered under any
workers compensation law.”
. . . .
The Pinell case is correctly based on pure contract
interpretation, which requires that this court interpret
insurance policies, like other contracts, according to
the clear, unambiguous language of the policy. The
majority’s interpretation nullifies important contract
language without reason.
Bentley, 701 So.2d at 260 (Plotkin, J., dissenting). The Supreme
Court of Louisiana subsequently reversed the judgment of the
court of appeal “for the reasons assigned by Judge Steven R.
Plotkin in his dissenting opinion” and granted summary judgment
to Allstate. Bentley, 715 So. 2d at 1195-96; see also Pinell v.
Patterson Servs., Inc., 491 So. 2d at 640 (“The exclusionary
clause does not preclude benefits under the policy only in the
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event workmen’s compensation was actually paid to the insured and
retained by him. The clause operates as an exclusion when one
‘had a right to compensation,’ as opposed to when one received
compensation.”). Therefore, as a federal court deciding the case
pursuant to its diversity jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1332(a),
we conclude that the district court abused its discretion in
failing to apply directly controlling precedent from the Supreme
Court of Louisiana to this case.
III. CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, we REVERSE the order of the
district court holding Cannatella entitled to the $2000 in
medical payments coverage under Allstate’s auto insurance policy.
Costs shall be borne by Cannatella.
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