Amer Gen Life Ins Co. v. Producers Group Advantage ( 2013 )


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  •      Case: 12-20435       Document: 00512340642         Page: 1     Date Filed: 08/14/2013
    IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
    FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT  United States Court of Appeals
    Fifth Circuit
    FILED
    August 14, 2013
    No. 12-20435                        Lyle W. Cayce
    Clerk
    AMERICAN GENERAL LIFE INSURANCE COMPANY,
    Plaintiff - Appellee
    v.
    SHELDON CARTER BRYAN,
    Defendant - Appellant
    Appeal from the United States District Court
    for the Southern District of Texas
    USDC No. 4:10-CV-1630
    Before HIGGINBOTHAM, CLEMENT, and PRADO, Circuit Judges.
    PER CURIAM:*
    Sheldon Carter Bryan (“Bryan”) appeals from a summary judgment order
    determining a breach of a contract with the American General Life Insurance
    Company (“American General”).              For the following reasons, we AFFIRM.
    *
    Pursuant to 5TH CIR. R. 47.5, the court has determined that this opinion should not
    be published and is not precedent except under the limited circumstances set forth in 5TH CIR.
    R. 47.5.4.
    Case: 12-20435      Document: 00512340642         Page: 2    Date Filed: 08/14/2013
    No. 12-20435
    FACTS AND PROCEEDINGS
    American General is a life insurance company that sells its policies
    through agents, who are paid a commission on sales. Bryan entered into an
    agency contract (the “Agency Agreement”) with American General in 2003. On
    the same day, Bryan executed an assignment (“the Assignment”) that purported
    to transfer “all rights, privileges, duties, and obligations” under the assignor’s
    “Agent Contract” to IMG Capital Management (“IMG Cap.”).                     Neither the
    Agency Agreement nor the Assignment were countersigned by American
    General, though both documents were scanned into American General’s
    computer system a little under a month after they were executed by Bryan.
    This litigation arises from the sale of several life insurance policies in 2006
    (the “Altman Policies”) for which American General paid commissions. The
    Altman Policies were marketed and sold by two sub-agents working under
    Bryan’s jurisdiction. Bryan was accordingly entitled to an override commission
    from the sale of the Altman Policies. American General paid the majority of
    Bryan’s commission arising from the Altman Policies in a single check for
    $185,373.64. The commission check, which was made out to Bryan personally,
    was sent to the offices of IMG Inc.—a separate legal entity from IMG
    Cap.1—where it was endorsed by IMG Inc. and placed in IMG Inc.’s bank
    account. Bryan, who has been CEO of IMG Inc. since at least 2006, is the only
    individual who has authority to withdraw funds from IMG Inc.’s bank account.
    The Altman Policies were eventually rescinded by American General.
    American General returned the paid premiums to the insured, and sought
    1
    Bryan was president of IMG Cap. at the time the Agency Agreement and Assignment
    were executed in 2003; Carter Bryan (Sheldon Bryan’s father) subsequently took over as
    President of IMG Cap. Carter Bryan is, at present, the president and sole shareholder of IMG
    Cap.
    2
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    No. 12-20435
    repayment from Bryan for the commission paid on the policies, arguing Bryan
    was contractually bound under the Agency Agreement to repay the money.
    The district court granted summary judgment for American General,
    concluding that there were no genuine issues of material fact and that Bryan
    was contractually obligated to repay the commissions. Bryan contended there
    was no contractual relationship between the parties because he assigned his
    rights and responsibilities under the Agency Agreement to another party,
    thereby absolving him of any duty to repay the commissions. Moreover, Bryan
    argued that he neither knew of, nor actually received, the disputed commissions.
    STANDARD OF REVIEW
    We review a district court’s grant of summary judgment de novo. Burge
    v. Parish of St. Tammany, 
    187 F.3d 452
    , 464 (5th Cir. 1999).          Summary
    judgment is appropriate when “the pleadings, the discovery and disclosure
    materials on file, and any affidavits show that there is no genuine issue as to
    any material fact and that the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of
    law.” Pustejovsky v. Pliva, Inc., 
    623 F.3d 271
    , 275-76 (5th Cir. 2010). No
    genuine issue of fact exists if the record taken as a whole could not lead a
    rational trier of fact to find for the non-moving party. Matsushita Elec. Indus.
    Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 
    475 U.S. 574
    , 587 (1986). We view the facts in the
    light most favorable to the non-moving party. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc.,
    
    477 U.S. 242
    , 255 (1986). Nonetheless, the non-moving party must do more than
    simply deny the allegations raised by the moving party. Donaghey v. Ocean
    Drilling & Exploration Co., 
    974 F.2d 646
    , 649 (5th Cir. 1992). The non-moving
    party must come forward with competent evidence, such as affidavits or
    depositions, to buttress his claims. 
    Id. We may affirm
    summary judgment on
    any basis raised below and supported by the record. QBE Ins. Corp. v. Brown
    & Mitchell, Inc., 
    591 F.3d 439
    , 443 (5th Cir. 2009).
    3
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    No. 12-20435
    DISCUSSION
    The threshold issue for a Texas breach-of-contract case is determining
    whether there is a valid and enforceable contract between the parties.2 See
    Parker Drilling Co. v. Romfor Supply Co., 
    316 S.W.3d 68
    , 72 (Tex.
    App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2010, pet. denied). A valid and enforceable contract
    exists if there is “(1) an offer, (2) acceptance in strict compliance with the terms
    of the offer, (3) a meeting of the minds, (4) each party’s consent to the terms, and
    (5) execution and delivery of the contract with the intent that it be mutual and
    binding.” 
    Id. The summary judgment
    record contains copies of the Agency
    Agreement between American General and Bryan. American General submitted
    evidence that Bryan executed the standard agreement, returned it to American
    General, operated under its terms, and was paid commissions for his efforts.
    Further, Bryan concedes that the evidence is “clear and indisputable” that he
    entered into the Agency Agreement with American General. We accordingly
    agree with both parties that the Agency Agreement is valid and enforceable.
    Faced with clear record evidence on that point, Bryan instead focuses his
    challenge on appeal on whom the Agency Agreement is presently enforceable
    against. Bryan argues that the district court erred when it found (1) that he
    concluded multiple agency agreements with American General, including one
    that post-dated the Assignment, and (2) the Assignment did not assign away
    Bryan’s liabilities under the contract because the Assignment was unsigned, and
    therefore of no legal effect. In light of two concessions from American General,
    we agree with Bryan that the district court’s determination that the Assignment
    was without effect was in error.
    2
    Paragraph VII.Q of the Agency Agreement specifies the application of Texas law.
    4
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    Both parties have clarified on appeal—despite the confusing and disjointed
    presentation of facts below—that American General is pursuing its breach of
    contract claim on the basis of the Agency Agreement. We therefore examine
    whether the fact that the Assignment was unsigned means that it was
    ineffective in discharging Bryan’s liabilities under the Agency Agreement.
    Here, too, appellate clarifications are dispositive. American General’s
    brief—though it argues extensively that the Assignment was without legal
    effect—also concedes that “uncontroverted evidence submitted by American
    General” establishes that “the Assignment does not assign Mr. Bryan’s
    commission for all purposes as alleged by Mr. Bryan, but instead assigned a
    specific agent code that American General provided to Mr. Bryan.”3 Though the
    parties continue to disagree as to the breadth of the Assignment, in light of the
    record evidence that the Assignment had some legal effect, we do not believe
    that summary judgment can be founded on a determination that the Assignment
    had no legal effect.
    We need not resolve the remaining disagreement between American
    General and Bryan as to the breadth of the Assignment because we believe that
    the doctrine of quasi-estoppel, as American General argued in the summary
    judgment proceedings below, bars Bryan from asserting that he transferred all
    liabilities and responsibilities under the Agency Agreement to IMG Cap. Under
    Texas law, “[q]uasi-estoppel precludes a party from asserting, to another’s
    disadvantage, a right inconsistent with a position previously taken.” Lopez v.
    Munoz, Hockema & Reed, L.L.P., 
    22 S.W.3d 857
    , 864 (Tex. 2000). “The doctrine
    applies when it would be unconscionable to allow a person to maintain a position
    3
    American General assigns its agents “agent codes” that are unique identifying
    numbers that an agent attaches to insurance applications submitted by that agent. The agent
    codes assist American General in processing commission payments. Agents can have multiple
    agent codes from American General.
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    inconsistent with one to which he acquiesced, or from which he accepted a
    benefit.” 
    Id. Quasi-estoppel can, in
    some circumstances, bar parties from
    raising certain defenses in breach-of-contract actions, see, e.g., Eckland
    Consultants, Inc. v. Ryder, Stilwell Inc., 
    176 S.W.3d 80
    , 87 (Tex. App.—Houston
    [1st Dist.] 2004, no pet.), and courts are allowed to look past the parol evidence
    rule in determining whether a party should be estopped, 
    id. at 88. All
    parties agree that the commission for the Altman Policies neither was
    sent to, nor ended up in, IMG Cap.’s bank account.           The record evidence
    indicates that the commission was sent in Bryan’s name to the address
    American General had for IMG Inc., was endorsed by IMG Inc., and was
    deposited in IMG Inc.’s bank account. American General presented evidence
    showing that Bryan, as IMG Inc.’s CEO, was the only individual authorized to
    withdraw funds from the IMG Inc. account into which the commission was
    deposited. Moreover, American General presented evidence indicating that,
    from October 2004 to June 2006, IMG Inc. endorsed and deposited 271 checks
    made payable to Bryan personally from a variety of insurers—including at least
    twenty from American General—into the IMG Inc. bank account. The total value
    of the checks to Bryan from all insurers exceeded 2.5 million dollars, and the
    value of checks from American General to Bryan alone was measurable in the
    hundreds of thousands of dollars.
    Bryan’s arguments against the invocation of quasi-estoppel are unavailing.
    Bryan first argues that he is not IMG Inc., and IMG Inc. receiving the
    commission check for the Altman Policies is not the same as Bryan receiving the
    commission check. Bryan points here to an affidavit from Bryan in the record
    that (i) denies knowledge of, or ever having received, the check, and (ii) indicates
    that the American General check was sent to IMG Inc. at the request of someone
    other than Bryan to an address provided to American General by someone other
    than Bryan. But Bryan has neither denied that he was the only person with
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    authority to withdraw funds, nor provided any rebuttal to the evidence
    regarding the extremely large sums that were payable to Bryan and handled in
    the same way as this check. Bryan’s mere speculation that other individuals
    may have had access to the funds in the account, even when combined with his
    observation that cash withdrawals are not the only way money is moved out of
    business bank accounts, does not constitute controverting evidence about such
    other individuals or other ways “money is moved” from this account. At the
    summary judgment stage, the non-moving party “may not rest upon the mere
    allegations or denials of his pleading,” but rather “must set forth specific facts
    showing that there is a genuine issue for trial.” 
    Anderson, 477 U.S. at 248
    .
    Bryan finally argues that quasi-estoppel does not apply because Bryan has
    never previously taken a position that he had a contractual relationship with
    American General, or that the Agency Agreement had not been assigned to IMG
    Cap. Bryan’s argument here neglects that Bryan is estopped not because of his
    arguments in litigation (judicial estoppel), but rather the acceptance and
    retention of funds that he received because of a relationship that he is now
    attempting to persuade the courts did not exist.
    We conclude the summary judgment record proves that Bryan received the
    benefit of the commission on the Altman Policies, even if he did not physically
    receive the check that was deposited in IMG Inc.’s account. Given Bryan’s
    acceptance of hundreds of thousands of dollars from American General, and the
    lack of any evidence in the record that Bryan made any effort to send the funds
    to IMG Cap.—the entity he now alleges should have received that money in the
    first place—we believe that it would be unconscionable to allow Bryan to hide
    behind the assignment to avoid liability on the Agency Agreement when his
    behavior over a multiple-year period was flagrantly inconsistent with the legal
    arguments he now urges us to adopt on appeal. The record is clear that Bryan
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    has continuously received the benefits from his relationship with American
    General; he can not now deny that that relationship exists.
    Having concluded that Bryan is blocked by quasi-estoppel from asserting
    that he transferred all liabilities and responsibilities under the Agency
    Agreement to IMG Cap., we can affirm the grant of summary judgment on
    American General’s breach of contract claim. The summary judgment record
    establishes that (1) Bryan entered into a valid contract with American General
    with the Agency Agreement, (2) the Assignment did not transfer away his
    liabilities and responsibilities under the Agency Agreement, and (3) he breached
    the Agency Agreement by failing to return the commissions after the policies
    were rescinded.
    CONCLUSION
    We AFFIRM the district court’s grant of summary judgment.
    8