Ruiz v. Comm Social Security , 189 F. App'x 112 ( 2006 )


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  •                                                                                                                            Opinions of the United
    2006 Decisions                                                                                                             States Court of Appeals
    for the Third Circuit
    6-27-2006
    Ruiz v. Comm Social Security
    Precedential or Non-Precedential: Non-Precedential
    Docket No. 05-3784
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    Recommended Citation
    "Ruiz v. Comm Social Security" (2006). 2006 Decisions. Paper 832.
    http://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/thirdcircuit_2006/832
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    NOT PRECEDENTIAL
    UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
    FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT
    No. 05-3784
    ROBERTO RUIZ,
    Appellant
    v.
    COMMISSIONER OF SOCIAL SECURITY
    APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
    FOR THE DISTRICT OF NEW JERSEY
    D.C. Civil No. 02-cv-03575
    District Judge: The Honorable Dennis M. Cavanaugh
    Submitted Under Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a)
    June 27, 2006
    Before: BARRY, VAN ANTWERPEN and SILER,* Circuit Judges
    (Opinion Filed: June 27, 2006)
    OPINION
    *
    The Honorable Eugene E. Siler, Senior Circuit Judge, United States Court of Appeals
    for the Sixth Circuit, sitting by designation.
    BARRY, Circuit Judge
    Roberto Ruiz applied for Social Security disability benefits in 1999. He suffered
    from conditions including a disc bulge, hypertrophic changes, and blindness in one eye.
    After several rounds of proceedings and internal appeals, the Appeals Council of the
    Social Security Administration (the “agency”) upheld a decision of an Administrative
    Law Judge (“ALJ”) that these conditions did not render Ruiz disabled. Ruiz filed suit in
    the United States District Court for the District of New Jersey on July 25, 2002, claiming
    that the decision was not supported by substantial evidence. The District Court affirmed
    in an order entered on April 27, 2004. Ruiz appealed. While the case was pending before
    us, on July 29, 2004, a different ALJ awarded Ruiz full disability benefits based on a
    finding of mental retardation. Because this finding affected Ruiz’s eligibility for benefits
    retroactively, he and the government submitted a joint motion to us
    for an Order remanding the within cause of action to the district court, for
    the purpose of remanding the case to the Appellee pursuant to sentence four
    (4) of 42 U.S.C. § 405(g), for the purpose of issuing a fully favorable
    decision pursuant to the attached form of order.
    We granted that motion on November 16, 2004. The District Court remanded the case to
    the agency on June 15, 2005.
    Ruiz filed an application in the District Court on December 1, 2004, pursuant to
    the Equal Access to Justice Act (“EAJA”). Under the EAJA, the “prevailing party” in a
    civil action against the United States is entitled to an award of attorney’s fees and other
    costs, “unless the court finds that the position of the United States was substantially
    2
    justified or that special circumstances make an award unjust.” 28 U.S.C. §
    2412(d)(1)(A). The government replied that Ruiz’s motion was premature, that the
    agency’s position had been substantially justified, and that special circumstances existed
    because Ruiz’s entitlement to benefits was not connected to the agency’s decision in the
    case at bar.
    Instead of addressing these arguments, the District Court sua sponte asked whether
    Ruiz was a “prevailing party.” In Melkonyan v. Sullivan, 
    501 U.S. 89
    (1991), the
    Supreme Court identified two forms of remand from a district court to the agency. The
    first, pursuant to the fourth sentence of 42 U.S.C. § 405(g), consists of “a judgment
    affirming, modifying, or reversing the decision of the [agency], with or without
    remanding the cause for a rehearing.” The second, pursuant to the sixth sentence of §
    405(g), consists of a remand for the taking of new material evidence when “there is good
    cause for the failure to incorporate such evidence into the record in a prior proceeding.”
    While these forms of remand under § 405(g) differ in when they become final, both may
    lead to an award of EAJA fees. 
    Melkonyan, 501 U.S. at 102
    . A district court may also
    enter a voluntary dismissal on the stipulation of the parties pursuant to Federal Rule of
    Civil Procedure 41(a), in which case no EAJA fee award is appropriate, as there is no
    prevailing party. 
    Melkonyan, 501 U.S. at 102
    -03. The District Court here concluded that
    our Order should be “construed as a voluntary dismissal under Fed.R.Civ.P. 41(a)” and
    3
    denied attorney’s fees on that basis on June 28, 2005. Ruiz appealed.1
    The motion we granted by order dated November 16, 2004 specified
    unambiguously that the remand was “for the purpose of remanding the case to the
    Appellee pursuant to sentence four (4) of 42 U.S.C. § 405(g).” (emphasis added)
    Accordingly, this was not a voluntary dismissal under Rule 41(a), and Ruiz was thus a
    “prevailing party” for purposes of EAJA fees. See 
    Melkonyan, 501 U.S. at 103
    . The
    District Court should not have “construed” our order granting a motion that was clear on
    its face.
    We will reverse the judgment of the District Court and remand so that it may
    consider whether the agency’s litigation position was substantially justified or whether
    special circumstances would make an award of fees unjust.
    1
    We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. We review do novo any legal
    determinations underlying an award or denial of fees. Kiareldeen v. Ashcroft, 
    273 F.3d 542
    , 545 (3d Cir. 2001).
    4
    

Document Info

Docket Number: 05-3784

Citation Numbers: 189 F. App'x 112

Filed Date: 6/27/2006

Precedential Status: Non-Precedential

Modified Date: 1/12/2023