United States v. Hutchinson , 630 F. App'x 805 ( 2015 )

FILED
United States Court of Appeals
Tenth Circuit
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS October 27, 2015
Elisabeth A. Shumaker
TENTH CIRCUIT Clerk of Court
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff - Appellee, No. 14-5133
v. N.D. Oklahoma
ALAN WADE HUTCHINSON, also (D.C. No. 4:14-CR-00080-JHP-1)
known as Wild Wade, also known as
Allen Wade Hutchinson,
Defendant - Appellant.
ORDER AND JUDGMENT *
Before MATHESON, MURPHY, and PHILLIPS, Circuit Judges.
After examining the briefs and appellate record, this panel has determined
unanimously that oral argument would not materially assist in the determination
of this appeal. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2); 10th Cir. R. 34.1(G). The case is
therefore ordered submitted without oral argument.
*
This order and judgment is not binding precedent except under the
doctrines of law of the case, res judicata, and collateral estoppel. It may be cited,
however, for its persuasive value consistent with Fed. R. App. P. 32.1 and 10th
Cir. R. 32.1.
I. Introduction
Appellant Alan Wade Hutchinson was charged by a grand jury with being a
felon in possession of a firearm and ammunition. After the United States
Probation Office advised the parties that Hutchinson possibly qualified to be
sentenced as an armed career criminal, Hutchinson abandoned his plan to plead
guilty, proceeded to trial on the charge, and was convicted. The district court
calculated his advisory guidelines range without applying a reduction in his base
offense level for acceptance of responsibility but granted his request for a
downward variance. Hutchinson appeals his sentence, arguing the district court
committed procedural error by not applying a three-level acceptance of
responsibility adjustment when calculating his offense level. Exercising
jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291 and 18 U.S.C. § 3742(a), we affirm
Hutchinson’s sentence.
II. Background
Hutchinson was arrested in April 2014, in Tulsa, Oklahoma. At the time of
his arrest, officers recovered a semi-automatic pistol and ammunition from a
backpack on the ground next to Hutchinson’s vehicle. A federal grand jury
charged him with being a felon in possession of a firearm, in violation of 18
U.S.C. § 922(g)(1). The charge carried a maximum penalty of ten years’
imprisonment. 18 U.S.C. § 924(a)(2).
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After initially entering a plea of not guilty, Hutchinson informed the
district court he intended to plead guilty. The matter was referred to a magistrate
judge for a change-of-plea hearing. On the morning of the hearing, the United
States Probation Office advised the parties it believed Hutchinson qualified as an
armed career criminal. See 18 U.S.C. § 924(e)(1) (setting out a fifteen-year
minimum mandatory sentence for individuals with three previous convictions for
violent felonies or serious drug offenses). In light of this development,
Hutchinson did not plead guilty at the hearing. The Government then filed a
pretrial notice of its intention to seek an enhanced sentence under the Armed
Career Criminal Act (“ACCA”). See id. The matter proceeded to trial on July 15,
2014.
At trial, the Government called four witnesses, including the passenger in
Hutchinson’s vehicle when he was arrested. This witness testified that the black
backpack belonged to Hutchinson. She also testified that she has never owned a
firearm. During cross-examination, Hutchinson questioned the witness about the
fact her clothing was found in the backpack next to the firearm. He also pursued
testimony that the witness and Hutchinson had recently argued over Hutchinson
dating other women. During closing argument, Hutchinson not only attempted to
impeach the credibility of this witness, but also suggested she had framed
Hutchinson out of jealousy. He argued the Government’s case was supported
only by the testimony of “a girl that has vengeance because of an unfaithful man,
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and has ability to carry it out because she tried to run over somebody in the past,
and has been guilty of three or four different con games.” Hutchinson referred to
his theory as his “version of the facts” and asserted it was supported by the
evidence.
The jury found Hutchinson guilty and a presentence investigation report
(“PSR”) was prepared. The PSR concluded Hutchinson’s prior offenses placed
him in Criminal History Category V. Applying USSG § 2K2.21(a)(4)(A), the
PSR applied a base offense level of twenty and did not recommend any reduction
in the offense level for acceptance of responsibility. Contrary to the earlier
position taken by the Probation Office, the PSR did not apply the ACCA because
Hutchinson had only two predicate felony convictions.
Hutchinson filed a written objection to the PSR. Relying on the
commentary to § 3E1.1 of the Sentencing Guidelines, Hutchinson argued he was
entitled to three-point adjustment for acceptance of responsibility because he
never denied possessing the firearm and proceeded to trial only to preserve issues
that did not relate to his factual guilt, i.e., application of the ACCA. See USSG
§ 3E1.1 cmt. n.2. (“In rare situations a defendant may clearly demonstrate an
acceptance of responsibility for his criminal conduct even though he exercises his
constitutional right to a trial. This may occur, for example, where a defendant
goes to trial to assert and preserve issues that do not relate to factual guilt (e.g., to
make a constitutional challenge to a statute or a challenge to the applicability of a
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statute to his conduct.)”). At sentencing, the district court stated the following
with respect to Hutchinson’s request for the acceptance-of-responsibility
adjustment:
While the Court recognizes the defendant’s pretrial conduct
included the defendant initially announcing his intention to plead
guilty, his conduct is not dispositive. Subsequent to the decision to
proceed to trial, the defendant persisted in his plea of not guilty.
Furthermore, counsel for the defendant presented a theory at trial of
the possibility that another individual found with the defendant
placed the gun in the defendant’s backpack, thereby contesting the
essential elements of the intent to possess the firearm.
The defendant has not clearly demonstrated acceptance of his
guilt, thus the defendant is not entitled to receive a reduction for
acceptance of responsibility.
Notwithstanding its conclusion that Hutchinson was not entitled to the § 3E1.1
adjustment, the district court granted his motion for a three-level variance, citing
the “unique progression and factual circumstances” of the case. With the
variance, the court calculated Hutchinson’s advisory guidelines range as forty-six
to fifty-seven months. The court sentenced Hutchinson to forty-eight months’
imprisonment. It is from this sentence Hutchinson appeals.
III. Discussion
Hutchinson argues his sentence is procedurally unreasonable because the
district court erred when it calculated his advisory guidelines range. Specifically,
he asserts the court erred by not applying the three-level reduction for acceptance
of responsibility. This court evaluates a sentence for procedural reasonableness
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by “review[ing] the district court’s legal conclusions regarding the Guidelines de
novo and its factual findings for clear error.” United States v. Muñoz-Nava, 524
F.3d 1137, 1146 (10th Cir. 2008). Whether Hutchinson accepted responsibility
for his actions is a factual determination reviewed for clear error. United States
v. Gauvin, 173 F.3d 798, 805 (10th Cir. 1999). “To constitute clear error, we
must be convinced that the sentencing court’s finding is simply not plausible or
permissible in light of the entire record on appeal, remembering that we are not
free to substitute our judgment for that of the district judge.” United States v.
Torres, 53 F.3d 1129, 1144 (10th Cir. 1995).
Although Hutchinson proceeded to trial, the commentary to § 3E1.1
acknowledges he is not precluded from receiving an offense-level reduction for
acceptance of responsibility. See USSG § 3E1.1 cmt. n.2. But the district court
did not deny the § 3E1.1 reduction because Hutchinson proceeded to trial. The
court denied the reduction because it found that Hutchinson contested the mens
rea element of the charged offense by arguing the passenger in his vehicle placed
the firearm in his backpack without his knowledge. See United States v. Tom, 494
F.3d 1277, 1281-82 (10th Cir. 2007) (affirming the denial of a § 3E1.1 reduction
because the defendant proceeded to trial and claimed he lacked the requisite mens
rea for guilt). The record fully supports this finding and, thus, there is no clear
error.
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IV. Conclusion
The sentence imposed by the district court is affirmed.
ENTERED FOR THE COURT
Michael R. Murphy
Circuit Judge
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