United States v. Alvino Torres-Zuniga , 433 F. App'x 307 ( 2011 )


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  •      Case: 10-50471     Document: 00511548229         Page: 1     Date Filed: 07/22/2011
    IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
    FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT  United States Court of Appeals
    Fifth Circuit
    FILED
    July 22, 2011
    No. 10-50471
    Summary Calendar                        Lyle W. Cayce
    Clerk
    UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
    Plaintiff–Appellee,
    v.
    ALVINO TORRES-ZUNIGA,
    Defendant–Appellant.
    Appeal from the United States District Court
    for the Western District of Texas
    USDC No. 6:10-CR-45-1
    Before WIENER, PRADO, and OWEN, Circuit Judges.
    PER CURIAM:*
    Alvino Torres-Zuniga (Torres) appeals the 120-month sentence imposed
    following his guilty plea to being an alien illegally present in the United States
    following a conviction for an aggravated felony. Torres argues that the district
    court clearly intended for his sentence to be an upward departure under the
    Sentencing Guidelines and that under Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 32(h),
    he was entitled to notice of the court’s intent to depart prior to the imposition of
    the sentence.
    *
    Pursuant to 5TH CIR. R. 47.5, the court has determined that this opinion should not
    be published and is not precedent except under the limited circumstances set forth in 5TH CIR.
    R. 47.5.4.
    Case: 10-50471   Document: 00511548229      Page: 2   Date Filed: 07/22/2011
    No. 10-50471
    Rule 32(h) provides in pertinent part that “[b]efore the court may depart
    from the applicable sentencing range on a ground not identified for departure
    either in the presentence report or in a party’s prehearing submission, the court
    must give the parties reasonable notice that it is contemplating such a
    departure.” FED. R. CRIM. P. 32(h). Thus, under Rule 32(h), a district court
    cannot impose a departure unless it first notifies the parties that it is
    contemplating doing so. United States v. Jacobs, 
    635 F.3d 778
    , 782 (5th Cir.
    2011).
    A “departure” is a “term of art under the Guidelines and refers only to non-
    Guidelines sentences imposed under the framework set out in the Guidelines.”
    
    Id.
     “The district court’s authority to impose a departure emanates from 
    18 U.S.C. § 3553
    (b)(1) and, in turn, Chapter 5, Part K of the Guidelines.” 
    Id.
    (citation omitted). In contrast, a “variance” is a sentence imposed outside of the
    Guidelines framework. 
    Id.
     The court’s authority to impose a variance is
    discretionary and stems from § 3553(a). Id. “Rule 32(h)’s notice requirement
    does not apply to variances.” Id. (citations omitted); see also United States v.
    Mejia-Huerta, 
    480 F.3d 713
    , 721-22 (5th Cir. 2007) (analyzing the notice
    requirement under the “post-Booker advisory Guidelines regime” and holding
    that Rule 32(h) applies to departures only and not to variances).
    Neither party argues that the district court’s orally pronounced sentence
    conflicts with the court’s written statement of reasons. See United States v.
    Garcia, 
    604 F.3d 186
    , 191 (5th Cir.) (noting that “[w]here the orally-imposed
    sentence conflicts with the written judgment, the oral pronouncement controls”),
    cert. denied, 
    131 S. Ct. 291
     (2010). However, the Government appears to
    acknowledge that there existed some ambiguity in the district court’s oral
    pronouncement as a result of the court’s use of the term departure. In cases
    where there is an ambiguity between the oral and written sentences, this court
    2
    Case: 10-50471     Document: 00511548229     Page: 3   Date Filed: 07/22/2011
    No. 10-50471
    reviews the entire record to determine the court’s intent. Garcia, 
    604 F.3d at 191
    .
    Read as a whole, the record clearly shows that the district court’s intent
    was to impose a variance. Although the court made a single, brief reference to
    a “departure upward from the recommended guideline range” at the sentencing
    hearing, the court did not cite § 3553(b) or Chapter 5 of the Guidelines, and
    instead made reference to a § 3553(a) sentencing factor. In the statement of
    reasons, the court made a definite statement that it was imposing “a sentence
    outside the advisory sentencing guideline system” and again cited the same
    § 3553(a) factor as its justification for a sentence outside the recommended
    guideline range. Because the sentence imposed was a variance, rather than a
    departure, Rule 32(h)’s notice requirement does not apply. See Mejia-Huerta,
    
    480 F.3d at 722
    .
    AFFIRMED.
    3
    

Document Info

Docket Number: 10-50471

Citation Numbers: 433 F. App'x 307

Judges: Owen, Per Curiam, Prado, Wiener

Filed Date: 7/22/2011

Precedential Status: Non-Precedential

Modified Date: 8/3/2023