In re D.T. , 2014 Ohio 4818 ( 2014 )


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  • [Cite as In re D.T., 
    2014-Ohio-4818
    .]
    Court of Appeals of Ohio
    EIGHTH APPELLATE DISTRICT
    COUNTY OF CUYAHOGA
    JOURNAL ENTRY AND OPINION
    Nos. 100970 and 100971
    IN RE: D.T., ET AL.
    Minor Children
    [Appeal By E.J., Mother]
    JUDGMENT:
    AFFIRMED
    Civil Appeal from the
    Cuyahoga County Court of Common Pleas
    Juvenile Division
    Case Nos. AD-11916021 and AD-11916022
    BEFORE: Celebrezze, J., Boyle, A.J., and McCormack, J.
    RELEASED AND JOURNALIZED: October 30, 2014
    ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT
    Betty C. Farley
    17316 Dorchester Drive
    Cleveland, Ohio 44119
    ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEES
    For C.C.D.C.F.S.
    Timothy J. McGinty
    Cuyahoga County Prosecutor
    BY: Timothy D. Smanik
    Assistant Prosecuting Attorney
    C.C.D.C.F.S.
    3955 Euclid Avenue
    Room 307-E
    Cleveland, Ohio 44115
    For Appellee-Father
    Vickie L. Jones
    P.O. Box 110771
    Cleveland, Ohio 44111
    ATTORNEY FOR CHILDREN
    Thomas Robinson
    Law Offices of Thomas B. Robinson
    P.O. Box 110298
    Cleveland, Ohio 44111
    GUARDIAN AD LITEM FOR CHILDREN
    Donald Paul Christman
    6520 Carnegie Avenue
    Cleveland, Ohio 44103
    FRANK D. CELEBREZZE, JR., J.:
    {¶1} Appellant, E.J. (“mother”), appeals the judgment of the Cuyahoga County Court of
    Common Pleas, Juvenile Division, that granted legal custody of her minor children, P.T. and
    D.T., to the children’s father, L.T. (“father”). After a careful review of the record, we affirm the
    juvenile court’s determination.
    I. Procedural History
    {¶2} On September 7, 2011, P.T. and D.T. (“the children”) were removed from their
    mother’s custody pursuant to an exparte telephonic order. The next day, the Cuyahoga County
    Division of Children and Family Services (“CCDCFS”) filed a complaint for temporary custody
    and a motion for pre-dispositional temporary custody of the children. The complaint alleged
    P.T. to be abused, and both P.T. and D.T. to be dependent.              The agency’s motion for
    pre-dispositional temporary custody was granted that day.
    {¶3} On December 14, 2011, P.T. was adjudicated to be abused, and both P.T. and D.T.
    were adjudicated to be dependent. On December 29, 2011, the trial court issued its decision by
    journal entry. On May 14, 2012, the magistrate committed the children to the temporary custody
    of CCDCFS. On May 30, 2012, the trial court issued its decision by judgment entry.
    {¶4} On July 1, 2013, CCDCFS filed a motion to suspend visitation and communication
    between mother and the children.       On July 8, 2013, the magistrate ordered that mother’s
    visitation and communication with the children be suspended until further order of the court.
    {¶5} On August 27, 2013, CCDCFS filed a motion seeking to place the children in the
    legal custody of their father. On September 5, 2013, the trial court held a hearing on the
    agency’s motion where the following testimony was adduced.
    {¶6} The children’s therapists, Lisa Eulinberg and Robin Skolnik, testified at the hearing.
    Collectively, Eulinberg and Skolnik testified that both children love and miss their mother and
    that mother had some positive influences on them. However, Eulinberg and Skolnik each
    expressed concerns with mother’s anger and her effect on the children’s emotional development.
    Eulinberg discussed D.T.’s statements that mother made him feel disloyal for speaking positively
    of his father.   Eulinberg testified that she believed mother’s “alienation of affection” was
    detrimental to D.T.’s mental health. Finally, Eulinberg and Skolnik testified that the children’s
    interaction with father was progressing positively and that they did not have any concerns with
    the children being placed in father’s custody.
    {¶7} CCDCFS social worker, Lauren Shaheed, testified she was assigned to the
    children’s case in February 2012. Shaheed testified that mother’s case plan objectives included
    parenting education, anger management, and a psychological evaluation. Shaheed stated that
    “mother complied with her case plan objectives” but “did not benefit from her case plan.”
    Shaheed testified that mother was uncooperative and that her behavior was the same or even
    worse following her participation in the case plan.            Shaheed testified that mother was
    “manipulative,” frequently rude during her parenting classes, had not completed her anger
    management courses at the time Shaheed was assigned to the case, and made excuses not to
    attend individual therapy.
    {¶8} With respect to father, Shaheed testified that he completed all the objectives of his
    case plan and was cooperative throughout the process. Shaheed stated that she “had never
    experienced a father so dedicated to his children.” Accordingly, Shaheed opined that it was in the
    children’s best interest to be placed in the legal custody of father.
    {¶9} CCDCFS social worker, Bryanta Spencer, testified that she was assigned to the
    children’s case in April 2013. With respect to mother’s case plan, Spencer opined that, although
    mother attended parenting classes and anger management counseling prior to her involvement in
    this case, she did not benefit from those services. Spencer explained that her opinion was based
    on her observation of mother’s visits with the children. Further, Spencer stated that mother
    provided no documentation to verify her completion or progress with individual therapy.
    {¶10} Regarding father, Spencer testified that he was cooperative and completed the
    objectives of his case plan, which included parenting education and a psychological evaluation.
    Spencer testified that she visited father’s home on two occasions and had no concerns.
    Accordingly, Spencer opined that it was in the children’s best interest to be placed in the legal
    custody of father.
    {¶11} After hearing all of the testimony provided at the September 5, 2013 hearing, the
    children’s guardian ad litem recommended that father be granted legal custody of the children.
    {¶12} On September 6, 2013, the magistrate granted legal custody of the children to
    father with protective supervision. On September 24, 2013, the trial court issued its decision by
    judgment entry.
    {¶13} On December 10, 2013, CCDCFS filed a motion to terminate protective
    supervision and requested that custody of the children be granted to father without restriction.
    On December 17, 2013, the magistrate granted the agency’s motion and granted legal custody to
    father without restriction. On January 2, 2014, the trial court issued its decision by judgment
    entry.
    {¶14} Mother now brings this appeal, raising two assignments of error for review.
    I. The trial court’s decision to grant legal custody of the children to the father
    was not based on a preponderance of the evidence and therefore constitutes an
    abuse of discretion.
    II. The trial court’s decision to grant legal custody of the children to the father
    was against the manifest weight of the evidence.
    II. Law and Analysis
    {¶15} In her first assignment of error, mother argues that the trial court’s decision to grant
    legal custody to father was not based on a preponderance of the evidence, and therefore was an
    abuse of discretion. In her second assignment of error, mother argues that the trial court’s
    judgment was against the manifest weight of the evidence. Because mother’s first and second
    assignments of error raise related arguments, we address them together.
    {¶16} Parents have a constitutionally protected interest in raising their children. In re
    M.J.M., 8th Dist. Cuyahoga No. 94130, 
    2010-Ohio-1674
    , ¶ 15, citing Santosky v. Kramer, 
    455 U.S. 745
    , 753, 
    102 S.Ct. 1388
    , 
    71 L.Ed.2d 599
     (1982). That interest, however, is “‘always
    subject to the ultimate welfare of the child.’” 
    Id.,
     quoting In re B.L., 10th Dist. Franklin No.
    04AP-1108, 
    2005-Ohio-1151
    , ¶ 7.
    {¶17} Under R.C. 2151.353(A)(3), the court may award legal custody of a child who has
    been adjudicated abused, neglected, or dependent, to any person who filed a motion requesting
    legal custody of the child prior to the dispositional hearing. Assuming the person seeking legal
    custody has complied with any statutory requirements, the court’s authority to award legal
    custody under this statute “is limited only by the best interest of the child.” Id.; In re W.A.J., 8th
    Dist. Cuyahoga No. 99813, 
    2014-Ohio-604
    , ¶ 3. The best interest of the child is “of paramount
    concern” when making custody determinations. In re M.J.M. at ¶ 14.
    {¶18} Legal custody is defined as follows:
    [A] legal status that vests in the custodian the right to have physical care and
    control of the child and to determine where and with whom the child shall live,
    and the right and duty to protect, train, and discipline the child and to provide the
    child with food, shelter, education, and medical care, all subject to any residual
    parental rights, privileges, and responsibilities.
    R.C. 2151.011(B)(21); In re E.A, 8th Dist. Cuyahoga No. 99065, 
    2013-Ohio-1193
    , ¶ 11.
    {¶19} Legal custody is significantly different than the termination of parental rights in
    that, despite losing legal custody of a child, the parent of the child retains residual parental rights,
    privileges, and responsibilities. In re G.M., 8th Dist. Cuyahoga No. 95410, 
    2011-Ohio-4090
    , ¶
    14, citing R.C. 2151.353(A)(3)(c). In such a case, a parent’s right to regain custody is not
    permanently foreclosed. In re M.J.M. at ¶ 12. For this reason, the standard the trial court uses
    in making its determination is the less restrictive “preponderance of the evidence.” Id. at ¶ 9,
    citing In re Nice, 
    141 Ohio App.3d 445
    , 455, 
    751 N.E.2d 552
     (7th Dist.2001). “Preponderance
    of the evidence” means evidence that is more probable, more persuasive, or of greater probative
    value. In re C.V.M., 8th Dist. Cuyahoga No. 98340, 
    2012-Ohio-5514
    , ¶ 7.
    {¶20} Unlike permanent custody cases in which the trial court is guided by the factors
    outlined in R.C. 2151.414(D) before terminating parental rights and granting permanent custody,
    R.C. 2151.353(A)(3) does not provide factors the court should consider in determining the
    child’s best interest in a motion for legal custody. In re G.M. at ¶ 15. We must presume that, in
    the absence of best interest factors in a legal custody case, “the legislature did not intend to
    require the consideration of certain factors as a predicate for granting legal custody.” Id. at ¶ 16.
    Such factors, however, are instructive when making a determination as to the child’s best
    interest. In re E.A. at ¶ 13.
    {¶21} The best interest factors include, for example, the interaction of the child with the
    child’s parents, relatives, and caregivers; the custodial history of the child; the child’s need for a
    legally secure permanent placement; and whether a parent has continuously and repeatedly failed
    to substantially remedy the conditions causing the child to be placed outside the child’s home.
    R.C. 2151.414(D).
    {¶22} Because custody determinations “‘are some of the most difficult and agonizing
    decisions a trial judge must make,’” a trial judge must have broad discretion in considering all of
    the evidence. In re E.A. at ¶ 10, quoting Davis v. Flickinger, 
    77 Ohio St.3d 415
    , 418, 
    674 N.E.2d 1159
     (1997). We therefore review a trial court’s determination of legal custody for an
    abuse of discretion. Miller v. Miller, 
    37 Ohio St.3d 71
    , 74, 
    523 N.E.2d 846
     (1988). An abuse
    of discretion implies that the court’s attitude is unreasonable, arbitrary, or unconscionable.
    Blakemore v. Blakemore, 
    5 Ohio St.3d 217
    , 219, 
    450 N.E.2d 1140
     (1983).
    {¶23} In the case at hand, mother argues that the trial court’s decision was an abuse of
    discretion because she had successfully completed her case plan. However, we are mindful that
    in making custody determinations, the trial court’s principal concern is the children’s best
    interest. While completing her case plan may be in mother’s best interest, this is not a factor in
    determining what is in the children’s best interest. In re M.J.M., 8th Dist. Cuyahoga No. 94130,
    
    2010-Ohio-1674
    , at ¶ 14. The successful completion of a case plan, “‘is not dispositive on the
    issue of reunification.’” In re W.A.J., 8th Dist. Cuyahoga No. 99813, 
    2014-Ohio-604
    , at ¶ 19,
    quoting In re C.C., 
    187 Ohio App.3d 365
    , 
    2010-Ohio-780
    , 
    932 N.E.2d 360
    , ¶ 25 (8th Dist). “A
    parent can successfully complete the terms of a case plan yet not substantially remedy the
    conditions that caused the children to be removed — the case plan is simply a means to a goal,
    but not the goal itself.” 
    Id.
    {¶24} Moreover, the record does not support mother’s position that she successfully
    completed her case plan. Here, case worker Spencer testified that mother failed to provide the
    agency with documentation that she completed the psychological evaluation objective of her case
    plan.   Further, Shaheed and       Spencer both testified that although mother completed her
    parenting classes and attended anger management counseling, they did not believe mother
    showed any benefit from having done so based on her interactions with the children during
    visitations. Shaheed and Spencer testified that mother was uncooperative and did not take her
    case plan seriously, often referring to it as “a waste of time.” Moreover, Shaheed, Spencer,
    Eulinberg, and Skolnik each testified that mother continued to manipulate the children’s
    relationship with father and their progress in therapy. Ultimately, the magistrate agreed, finding
    that mother had not benefitted from the case plan services, including counseling and anger
    management.
    {¶25} Given the evidence presented at the September 5, 2013 hearing, we cannot say that
    the trial court’s determination that it would be in the best interest of the children to be placed in
    the legal custody of father was arbitrary or unreasonable. The evidence shows that mother has
    failed to remedy the conditions that initially caused the children to be removed from her home.
    In contrast, the evidence shows that father has taken his obligations under the case plan seriously
    and has made a substantial effort to provide his children with a safe and stable home.
    III. Conclusion
    {¶26} In light of the above, we find that the trial court’s decision was supported by a
    preponderance of the evidence and was not against the manifest weight of the evidence. We
    therefore find that the trial court’s award of legal custody to father was in the best interest of the
    children and was not an abuse of discretion.
    {¶27} Mother’s first and second assignments of error are overruled.
    {¶28} Judgment affirmed.
    It is ordered that appellees recover from appellant costs herein taxed.
    The court finds there were reasonable grounds for this appeal.
    It is ordered that a special mandate be sent to said court to carry this judgment into
    execution.
    A certified copy of this entry shall constitute the mandate pursuant to Rule 27 of the
    Rules of Appellate Procedure.
    FRANK D. CELEBREZZE, JR., JUDGE
    MARY J. BOYLE, A.J., and
    TIM McCORMACK, J., CONCUR