Synoground v. Morvan , 205 F. App'x 294 ( 2006 )

United States Court of Appeals
Fifth Circuit
F I L E D
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT November 14, 2006
_______________________ Charles R. Fulbruge III
Clerk
No. 06-40541
Summary Calendar
_______________________
LARRY J. SYNOGROUND, JR.,
Plaintiff - Counter Claimant - Appellant,
versus
GREGORY LOUIS MORVAN, ET AL.,
Defendants,
GREGORY LOUIS MORVAN,
Defendant-Appellee
HIGHLANDS INSURANCE CO.,
Intervenor Defendant - Counter Defendant - Appellee
On Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Eastern District of Texas
Docket No. 2:03-CV-68
Before JONES, Chief Judge, and HIGGINBOTHAM and SMITH, Circuit
Judges.
PER CURIAM:*
Appellant Larry Synoground appeals the district court’s
grant of summary judgment to Appellee Gregory Morvan. He argues
that the district court erred in holding that the exclusive remedy
provision of the Texas Workers’ Compensation Act bars his tort case
*
Pursuant to 5TH CIR. R. 47.5, the court has determined that this
opinion should not be published and is not precedent except under the limited
circumstances set forth in 5TH CIR. R. 47.5.4.
against Morvan. Synoground also challenges the district court’s
conclusion that his acceptance of workers’ compensation benefits
barred his suit against Morvan. Because Synoground’s collection of
workers’ compensation benefits precludes him from maintaining an
action at common law for damages, the district court’s grant of
summary judgment is AFFIRMED.
I. BACKGROUND
Synoground was injured while riding as a passenger in a
vehicle driven by his co-worker, Appellee Gregory Morvan. Both
Synoground and Morvan were employees of Key Energy Services, and
both were traveling away from the work site to eat lunch. Morvan
allegedly caused the car to collide with another vehicle, severely
injuring Synoground. Synoground subsequently claimed and accepted
workers’ compensation benefits from Key Energy, but he then brought
a common law tort suit against Morvan. The district court granted
summary judgment to Morvan because the exclusive remedy provision
of the Texas Workers’ Compensation Act prevented Synoground from
pursuing his tort action and because Morvan, like Synoground, was
in the course and scope of his employment at the time of the
accident. Synoground appeals.
II. DISCUSSION
An employee who claims and collects workers’ compensation
benefits is “precluded from maintaining an action at common law
against his employer or fellow employees.” Berry v. Gregg Indus.
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Servs., Inc., 907 S.W.2d 4, 5 (Tex. App. 1994); see also Moore v.
Means, 549 S.W.2d 417 (Tex. Civ. App. 1977) (“We are of the view
that appellants, by proceeding to claim and collect benefits
provided under workmens’ compensation policy of insurance provided
by the employer . . . are as a matter of law precluded from
maintaining an action at common law for damages . . . against a
fellow employee.”) (quoting Heibel v. Bermann, 407 S.W.2d 945, 946
(Tex. Civ. App. 1966)); Jones v. Jeffreys, 244 S.W.2d 924, 926
(Tex. Civ. App. 1951). Berry is squarely on point. The plaintiff
was injured while returning from a lunch break and riding in the
passenger’s seat of a vehicle driven by his co-employee. 907
S.W.2d at 5. After the plaintiff claimed workers’ compensation
benefits, he sued his co-worker who was driving the vehicle. The
Texas court of appeals held that the plaintiff had “waived his
right to proceed at common law for injuries” because he had
collected and claimed workers’ compensation benefits. Id.Synoground’s acceptance of workers’ compensation benefits
establishes that both he and Morvan were acting within the course
and scope of their employment at the time of the accident. See
TEX. LAB. CODE ANN. §§ 406.031, 401.011(12). To avoid the preclusive
effect of the Texas Workers’ Compensation Act,1 however, Synoground
now argues that Morvan acted outside the course and scope of his
1
The Act states that the “[r]ecovery of workers’ compensation benefits
is the exclusive remedy of an employee . . . against the employer or an agent or
employee of the employer for the death or work-related injury sustained by the
employee.” TEX. LAB. CODE ANN. § 408.001(a).
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employment, even though both he and Morvan were engaged in the same
conduct when the accident occurred. See Darensburg v. Tobey,
887 S.W.2d 84, 87 (Tex. App. 1994). We agree with the district
court that Texas law prevents his assertion of these inconsistent
positions because his collection of workers’ compensation benefits
precludes his common law action against Morvan. See Moore,
549 S.W.2d at 418-19.
Accordingly, the district court’s grant of summary
judgment is AFFIRMED.
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