Veloz-Ramirez v. Gonzales , 205 F. App'x 300 ( 2006 )

United States Court of Appeals
Fifth Circuit
F I L E D
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT November 14, 2006
Charles R. Fulbruge III
Clerk
No. 05-60922
Summary Calendar
APOLONIO VELOZ-RAMIREZ,
Petitioner,
versus
ALBERTO R. GONZALES, U.S. ATTORNEY GENERAL,
Respondent.
Petition for Review of an Order of the
Board of Immigration Appeals
(A91 471 567)
Before DAVIS, BARKSDALE and BENAVIDES, Circuit Judges.
PER CURIAM:*
Apolonio Veloz-Ramirez pleaded guilty in 1993 to aggravated
assault with a deadly weapon, a firearm. He seeks review of the
BIA’s removal order and denial of his waiver-of-removal and
cancellation-of-removal applications under former 8 U.S.C. §
1182(c) and 8 U.S.C. § 1229b.
Under the REAL ID Act, because Veloz-Ramirez’s 1993 conviction
was a firearm offense under 8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(2)(C), our
jurisdiction is limited by § 1252(a)(2)(C) to review of his
*
Pursuant to 5TH CIR. R. 47.5, the court has determined that
this opinion should not be published and is not precedent except
under the limited circumstances set forth in 5TH CIR. R. 47.5.4.
constitutional claims and questions of law. See 8 U.S.C. §
1252(a)(2)(D); Hernandez-Castillo v. Moore, 436 F.3d 516, 519 (5th
Cir.), cert. denied, ___ S. Ct. ____, 2006 WL 849672 (2 Oct. 2006).
We review only the BIA’s decision, except to the extent it was
influenced by the IJ’s decision. See Carbajal-Gonzalez v. INS, 78
F.3d 194, 197 (5th Cir. 1996). Although we review de novo the
BIA’s conclusions of law, we defer to its interpretation of
immigration regulations if such interpretation is reasonable.
Hernandez-Castillo, 436 F.3d at 519.
Veloz-Ramirez first contends the BIA erred in finding him
ineligible for waiver of removal under former 8 U.S.C. § 1182(c).
Veloz-Ramirez was charged with being removable based on his 1993
conviction, which, in addition to constituting a § 1227(a)(2)(C)
firearm offense, constituted a crime involving moral turpitude
under § 1227(a)(2)(A)(i). Because there was a directly comparable
ground of inadmissibility under 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a), Veloz-Ramirez
was eligible for former § 1182(c) waiver of removability for his
crime as involving moral turpitude. Nevertheless, he was not
similarly eligible for his crime as a firearm offense because there
was no such directly comparable inadmissibility ground. Chow v.
INS, 12 F.3d 34, 38 (5th Cir. 1993).
Veloz-Ramirez next maintains the BIA erred in finding him
ineligible for cancellation of removal under 8 U.S.C. § 1229b(a).
He maintains the BIA erred in retroactively applying the Illegal
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Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act’s “stop-time”
provision to pretermit his application. As noted, Veloz-Ramirez’s
1993 conviction was a § 1227(a)(2)(A)(i) moral-turpitude crime,
which is referred to in 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(2). Therefore, when
Veloz-Ramirez committed the underlying aggravated assault on 1
January 1992, his period of continuous United States residence
terminated pursuant to 8 U.S.C. § 1229b(d)(1). At that time, he
had not yet accrued the seven years of continuous United States
residence required for § 1229b(a) cancellation-of-removal
eligibility. Further, retroactive application of the stop-time
rule does not violate aliens’ due process rights. See Gonzalez-
Torres v. INS, 213 F.3d 899, 903 (5th Cir. 2000). Therefore,
Veloz-Ramirez has again failed to show BIA error.
DENIED
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