Tracey Gilyard v. Randy Benson , 587 F. App'x 37 ( 2014 )

UNPUBLISHED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
No. 14-1007
TRACEY BERNARD GILYARD; TIFFANY ADAMS,
Plaintiffs - Appellants,
v.
RANDY BENSON, Individually; RICHLAND COUNTY SHERIFF’S
DEPARTMENT; E. SHAW, Individually,
Defendants - Appellees.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the District of
South Carolina, at Columbia. Cameron McGowan Currie, Senior
District Judge. (3:12-cv-01336-CMC)
Submitted: September 17, 2014 Decided: September 29, 2014
Before NIEMEYER and KING, Circuit Judges, and DAVIS, Senior
Circuit Judge.
Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.
Thomas Jefferson Goodwyn, Jr., GOODWYN LAW FIRM, LLC, Columbia,
South Carolina, for Appellants. Andrew F. Lindemann, Robert D.
Garfield, DAVIDSON & LINDEMANN, P.A., Columbia, South Carolina,
for Appellees.
Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
PER CURIAM:
Tracey Bernard Gilyard and Tiffany Adams appeal from
the district court’s orders granting summary judgment in favor
of Defendants and denying their motion to alter or amend
judgment in their civil action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (2012) and
South Carolina law. Appellants argue on appeal that the
district court erred in granting summary judgment to Defendants
on Gilyard’s claim under § 1983 against Defendant Shaw for
excessive force and his claim under state law for battery.
We affirm.
We review de novo the district court’s award of
summary judgment and view the facts in the light most favorable
to the non-moving party. Woollard v. Gallagher, 712 F.3d 865,
873 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 134 S. Ct. 422 (2013). “Summary
judgment is appropriate only if the record shows ‘that there is
no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is
entitled to judgment as a matter of law.’” Id. (quoting Fed. R.
Civ. P. 56(a)).
“The Fourth Amendment’s prohibition on unreasonable
seizures includes the right to be free of seizures effectuated
by excessive force.” Henry v. Purnell, 652 F.3d 524, 531
(4th Cir. 2011) (internal quotation marks omitted). Whether an
officer has used excessive force during an arrest is analyzed
under a standard of objective reasonableness. Graham v. Connor,
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490 U.S. 386, 388, 395-96, 399 (1989). “Fourth Amendment
jurisprudence has long recognized that the right to make an
arrest . . . necessarily carries with it the right to use some
degree of physical coercion or threat thereof to effect it.”
Id. at 396. Determining whether the force used was reasonable
requires the weighing of “the nature and quality of the
intrusion on the individual’s Fourth Amendment interests against
the countervailing governmental interests at stake.” Id.(internal quotation marks omitted).
Factors to be considered include “the severity of the
crime at issue, whether the suspect poses an immediate threat to
the safety of the officers or others, and whether he [wa]s
actively resisting arrest or attempting to evade arrest by
flight.” Id. “[T]he question is whether the officers’ actions
are objectively reasonable in light of the facts and
circumstances confronting them, without regard to their
underlying intent or motivation.” Id. at 397 (internal
quotation marks omitted). Additionally, in considering whether
an offer used reasonable force, courts are to focus on the
moment that the force is employed. Henry, 652 F.3d at 531.
Applying these standards, we conclude after review of
the record and the parties’ briefs that the district court did
not reversibly err in granting summary judgment to Defendants on
Gilyard’s claim against Shaw for excessive force. Gilyard was
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belligerent and uncooperative, refusing to comply with Shaw’s
and Defendant Benson’s verbal efforts to arrest him, positioning
his body in a posture indicating his willingness to fight, and
advancing toward Benson. Accordingly, a degree of force beyond
their verbal commands was necessary to effectuate the arrest.
We reject as without merit and unsupported by the evidence of
record Gilyard’s assertion on appeal that Shaw’s use of a taser
device to effectuate the arrest was unreasonable because Shaw
and Benson had other options available to capture or subdue him.
We also reject as without merit Gilyard’s assertion that Shaw’s
receipt nearly a year before their encounter of a letter of
guidance from the Richland County Sheriff’s Department
concerning his use of a taser device in a separate incident has
any bearing on the constitutionality of the force Shaw employed
in this case. Henry, 652 F.3d at 531; see Elliott v. Leavitt,
99 F.3d 640, 643 (4th Cir. 1996) (“Graham requires us to focus
on the moment force was used; conduct prior to that moment is
not relevant in determining whether an officer used reasonable
force.”).
We further reject as without merit Gilyard’s challenge
to the district court’s disposition of his claim under state law
for battery because the predicate for this challenge—that the
district court reversibly erred in granting summary judgment to
Defendants on his claim under § 1983 against Shaw for excessive
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force—is not established. Finally, we reject as without merit
Gilyard’s remaining extraneous arguments for overturning the
district court’s judgment.
Accordingly, we affirm the district court’s judgment.
We dispense with oral argument because the facts and legal
contentions are adequately presented in the materials before
this court and argument would not aid the decisional process.
AFFIRMED
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