United States v. Bentley Jenkins , 592 F. App'x 311 ( 2015 )


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  •      Case: 14-10089      Document: 00512925239         Page: 1    Date Filed: 02/03/2015
    IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
    FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT
    United States Court of Appeals
    Fifth Circuit
    No. 14-10089                               FILED
    c/w No. 14-10091                      February 3, 2015
    Summary Calendar
    Lyle W. Cayce
    Clerk
    UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
    Plaintiff-Appellee
    v.
    BENTLEY MARK JENKINS,
    Defendant-Appellant
    Appeals from the United States District Court
    for the Northern District of Texas
    USDC No. 4:06-CR-18
    USDC No. 4:13-CR-32
    Before BENAVIDES, SOUTHWICK, and COSTA, Circuit Judges.
    PER CURIAM: *
    Following a jury trial, Bentley Mark Jenkins was convicted of bank
    robbery and sentenced to 240 months of imprisonment. Jenkins’s term of
    supervised release for a prior bank robbery conviction was also revoked and a
    24-month consecutive sentence was imposed. In these consolidated appeals,
    the only issue raised by Jenkins concerns the district court’s decision not to
    * Pursuant to 5TH CIR. R. 47.5, the court has determined that this opinion should not
    be published and is not precedent except under the limited circumstances set forth in 5TH
    CIR. R. 47.5.4.
    Case: 14-10089     Document: 00512925239     Page: 2   Date Filed: 02/03/2015
    instruct the jury on the insanity defense at his most recent trial. Jenkins
    contends that, in accordance with 
    18 U.S.C. § 4242
    , the district court was
    required to instruct the jury on the insanity defense because he timely gave
    notice to raise the defense pursuant to Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure
    12.2(a).
    We review the district court’s refusal to give a jury instruction on
    insanity as a question of law de novo. United States v. Dixon, 
    185 F.3d 393
    ,
    403 (5th Cir. 1999). As the Government asserts, Jenkins’s argument ignores
    our precedent. In Dixon, 
    185 F.3d at 402-07
    , we outlined the quantum of
    evidence necessary for submission of an insanity instruction. Noting that a
    defendant had to prove an insanity defense by “clear and convincing evidence,”
    we determined that a district court must give an insanity instruction “when
    the evidence would allow a reasonable jury to find that insanity has been
    shown with convincing clarity.” 
    Id. at 404
     (quoting United States v. Owens,
    
    854 F.2d 432
    , 435 (11th Cir. 1988)). This threshold standard set forth in Dixon
    was reaffirmed in United States v. Long, 
    562 F.3d 325
    , 332 (5th Cir. 2009).
    Accordingly, Jenkins’s argument that § 4242 required the district court to
    instruct the jury on the insanity defense solely on the basis of his timely notice
    of raising the defense pursuant to Rule 12.2 is unavailing. See Dixon, 
    185 F.3d at 404
    ; see also Owens, 
    854 F.2d at
    436 n.7.
    Jenkins also argues that he satisfied the above threshold standard to
    warrant the insanity instruction.     Viewing the evidence in the light most
    favorable to Jenkins, the district court did not err in concluding that there was
    insufficient evidence to warrant the instruction on the defense of insanity. See
    Dixon, 
    185 F.3d at 404
    . While Ray McClung’s testimony established that
    Jenkins suffered from mild depression and a paranoid personality disorder,
    which McClung classified as severe, these facts alone are not sufficient to
    Case: 14-10089    Document: 00512925239      Page: 3   Date Filed: 02/03/2015
    warrant an instruction. See 
    id. at 406
    . As the district court noted, there was
    no evidence that Jenkins’s paranoid personality disorder had elapsed into a
    psychotic episode at the time of the robbery.         Moreover, there was no
    explanation as to how Jenkins’s illnesses may have prevented him from
    appreciating the wrongfulness of his crime.       See 
    id. at 407
    .    Rather, the
    undisputed evidence showed that Jenkins was able to appreciate the
    wrongfulness of his actions. See United States v. Barton, 
    992 F.2d 66
    , 69 (5th
    Cir. 1993).
    Jenkins failed to “provide sufficient evidence so that a rational jury could
    conclude, by clear and convincing evidence, that he was unable to appreciate
    his wrongdoing as a result of a severe mental illness.” See Dixon, 
    185 F.3d at 406
    . Accordingly, the district court did not err in refusing to instruct the jury
    on the insanity defense. See 
    id.
    AFFIRMED.
    

Document Info

Docket Number: 14-10091

Citation Numbers: 592 F. App'x 311

Filed Date: 2/3/2015

Precedential Status: Non-Precedential

Modified Date: 1/13/2023