Gutierrez v. United Foods, Inc. ( 1994 )

  •                                  United States Court of Appeals,
                                               Fifth Circuit.
                                               No. 91-6231.
      Mauricio GUTIERREZ, Francisco Aguirre, Simon Blanco, Teresa Calzada, Domingo Cortez,
    Delfino De La Garza, Co ncepcion Garza, Alfredo Gonzales, Maria Concepcion Guillen, Elena
    Herrera, Eliseo Lerma, Vincente Lopez, Maria Martinez, Pedro Ortiz, Anastacio Ramirez, Carolina
    Salinas, Virginia Aguirre, Paula Chavez, Jose Garcia Sosa, Maria Guadalupe Garza, Candelaria
    Hinojosa, Maria Zapata, and Ofelia Gaona, Plaintiffs-Appellants,
                              UNITED FOODS, INC., Defendant-Appellee.
                                              Jan. 14, 1994.
    Appeal from the United States District Court for the Southern District of Texas.
    Before GARWOOD and DeMOSS, Circuit Judges.*
           GARWOOD, Circuit Judge:
           Plaintiffs-appellants union members sued their former employer, defendant-appellee United
    Foods, Inc., for allegedly breaching the successors and assigns clause of its collective bargaining
    agreement with their union, under which they assert that United Foods was obligated to, but did not,
    require the purchaser of the business from United Foods to assume the labor agreement as a condition
    of the sale. The court below awarded summary judgment to United Foods on the ground that the
    employees lacked standing to bring suit under the Labor-Management Relations Act. We agree with
    that decision and now affirm.
                                      Facts and Proceedings Below
           Plaintiffs in this case are twenty-five Mexican-American laborers who worked for United
    Foods, Inc., a pro cessor of frozen foods, at its Brownsville Refrigerated Services Division in
    Brownsville, Texas (the Brownsville facility). Plaintiffs were represented by Local 408 (previously
    Local 171) of the United Food & Commercial Workers International Union (the Union) and were
    members of a bargaining unit covering all production and maintenance employees, truck drivers,
        Chief Judge Emeritus John R. Brown sat for oral argument in this case, but died before
    issuance of the final decision herein. Accordingly, this decision is rendered by a quorum of the
    panel pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 46(d).
    inspectors, and lead men at the Brownsville facility. United Foods and the Union had negotiated a
    collective bargaining agreement covering the Brownsville facility, which included a successors and
    assigns clause that is the focus of this case:
              "If the Owner or Company hereunder sells, leases or transfers his business or substantially all
              thereof, the successors, lessees or transferees shall be bound fully by the terms of this
              Agreement, and shall be obligated to pay the wages and salaries in effect at the time of the
              sale, lease or transfer, and shall assume all obligations of this Agreement in the place and
              stead of the Owner or Company signatory hereto."1
              On November 26, 1985, United Foods announced its plans to sell the Brownsville facility to
    Refrigeration Engineering Company, the parent corporation of Tex-Mex Cold Storage, Inc. (Tex-
    Mex), and informed all of its Brownsville employees that their employment with United Foods would
    be terminated the following month. Upon learning about United Foods' plans, plaintiffs sought to
    have the Union intervene to protect their rights under the collective bargaining agreement. However,
    the Union took no action to enforce the agreement.
              As promised, the Brownsville facility was transferred to Tex-Mex on December 18, 1985, and
    plaintiffs were discharged from employment. Plaintiffs applied for jobs with Tex-Mex, but were not
    hired. However, Tex-Mex did hire other former United Foods employees who were less senior than
    plaintiffs, in violation of plaintiffs' seniority rights under the collective bargaining agreement.
              Plaintiffs renewed their efforts to involve the Union and requested that it seek arbitration with
    United Foods over the asserted breach of the successors and assigns clause. However, the Union
    again took no action. Therefore, plaintiffs brought suit against United Foods2 under section 301 of
    the Labor-Management Relations Act (LMRA), 29 U.S.C. § 185,3 alleging that, by failing to require
        The collective bargaining agreement, which had been adopted on March 1, 1982, was due to
    expire on March 1, 1986.
        The plaintiffs also filed suit against the Union alleging a breach of the Union's duty of fair
    representation. That suit was subsequently settled. No suit was filed against Tex-Mex, for a
    successor corporation has no obligation to assume a collective bargaining agreement. See NLRB
    v. Burns Int'l Sec. Servs., Inc., 
    406 U.S. 272
    92 S. Ct. 1571
    32 L. Ed. 2d 61
           Section 301(a) of the LMRA provides:
                      "Suits for violation of contracts between an employer and a labor organization
                      representing employees in an industry affecting commerce as defined in this
                      chapter, or between any such labor organizations, may be brought in any district
    Tex-Mex to assume the collective bargaining agreement, United Foods had breached the successors
    and assigns clause.4 United Fo ods moved for summary judgment and the district court in a
    memorandum opinion granted the motion on the basis of the plaintiffs' lack of standing to bring suit
    under section 301.5
            It has long been settled that section 301 permits a union to sue an employer with whom it has
    negotiated a collective bargaining agreement for violations of that agreement. See Textile Workers
    Union v. Lincoln Mills, 
    353 U.S. 448
    77 S. Ct. 912
    1 L. Ed. 2d 972
     (1957). In Smith v. Evening
    News Ass'n, 
    371 U.S. 195
    83 S. Ct. 267
    9 L. Ed. 2d 246
     (1962), the Supreme Court held that section
    301 also encompasses suits brought by union members seeking "t o vindicate individual employee
                   court of the United States having jurisdiction of the parties, without respect to the
                   amount in controversy or without regard to the citizenship of the parties." 29
                   U.S.C. § 185(a).
         We express no opinion as to whether this clause in fact created any obligation on the part of
    United Foods. In Central States, Southeast & Southwest Areas Pension Fund v. PYA/Monarch of
    Texas, Inc., 
    851 F.2d 780
     (5th Cir.1988), this Court was faced with a successorship clause similar
    to the one in this case. The clause at issue in Central States provided:
                   "This agreement shall be binding upon the parties hereto, their successors,
                   administrators, executors and assigns. In the event of a sale of the operation or
                   any part thereof is sold, leased, transferred or taken over by sale, transfer, lease,
                   assignment or bankruptcy proceedings, such operation shall continue to be subject
                   to the terms and conditions of the agreement for the life thereof...." Id. at 781-82.
           Acknowledging that the clause contained "general successorship language," this Court
           nonetheless held that it did not require the employer to compel assumption of the
           collective bargaining agreement by the purchaser. Id. at 782. Lacking more "explicit" or
           "specific" language, the Court deemed the successorship clause to be "toothless." Id. at
           782, 783. But see Glass, Molders, Pottery, Plastics & Allied Workers Int'l Union v.
           Owens-Illinois, Inc., 
    758 F. Supp. 962
    , 971 (D.N.J.), aff'd without op., 
    941 F.2d 1201
           Cir.1991), cert. denied, --- U.S. ----, 
    112 S. Ct. 877
    116 L. Ed. 2d 781
     (1992) (upholding
           an arbitrator's decision that a successorship clause obligated an employer to require a
           purchaser to assume a labor agreement and noting the tension between this conclusion and
           Central States ).
        United Foods also argued before the district court that the plaintiffs had failed to exhaust the
    collective bargaining agreement's grievance procedures or the Union's internal remedies. Granting
    summary judgment on the standing issue, the district court did not reach these arguments. Nor do
    rights arising from a collective bargaining contract." Id. at 200, 83 S.Ct. at 270.6 Yet Smith is
    properly read as establishing the jurisdiction of federal courts over such suits. Smith did not address
    the separate question of the scope of employee standing to sue, as the majority acknowledged, see
    id. at 201 n. 9, 83 S.Ct. at 270 n. 9, and a dissent emphasized: "[T]he Court studiously refrain[ed]
    from saying when, for what kinds of breach, or under what circumstances an individual employee can
    bring a § 301 action and when he must step aside for the union to prosecute his claim." Id. at 204,
    83 S.Ct. at 272 (opinion of Black, J.).7
            The Supreme Court's sole attempt to articulate the standing requirements for suits brought
    by individuals under section 301 occurred in Hines v. Anchor Motor Freight, Inc., 
    424 U.S. 554
    96 S. Ct. 1048
    47 L. Ed. 2d 231
     (1976). In Hines, the Court sustained an employee's right to sue his
    employer for wrongful discharge in violation of a collective bargaining agreement. Individual workers
    have standing under section 301, the Hines Court said, when they assert " "uniquely personal' rights
    of employees such as wages, hours, overtime pay, and wrongful discharge." Id. at 5, 96 S.Ct. at 1055
    (citing Smith ).8 Since Hines, however, the Supreme Court has provided no additional guidance as
    to the scope of the personal rights which give rise to standing under section 301. Judicial
    development of the Hines doctrine in the Courts of Appeals has been similarly scanty and in this
    Circuit non-existent.9
        Accord DelCostello v. Int'l Bhd. of Teamsters, 
    462 U.S. 151
    , 163, 
    103 S. Ct. 2281
    , 2290, 
    76 L. Ed. 2d 476
     (1983) ("It has long been established that an individual employee may bring suit
    against his employer for breach of a collective bargaining agreement.") (citing Smith ).
        That section 301 imposes analytically distinct jurisdictional and standing requirements was
    reaffirmed recently in Wooddell v. Int'l Bhd. of Elec. Workers, --- U.S. ----, ---- & n. 4, 
    112 S. Ct. 494
    , 498 & n. 4, 
    116 L. Ed. 2d 419
        Before bringing such a suit against his employer, however, an employee must exhaust any
    grievance or arbitration procedures contained in the collective bargaining agreement, see Republic
    Steel Corp. v. Maddox, 
    379 U.S. 650
    85 S. Ct. 614
    13 L. Ed. 2d 580
     (1965), unless the union has
    breached its duty of fair representation, see Vaca v. Sipes, 
    386 U.S. 171
    87 S. Ct. 903
    17 L. Ed. 2d 842
     (1967). Nevertheless, to sue his employer, an employee must still prove that the
    union breached its duty of fair representation. A union breaches its duty of fair representation by
    acting in a "discriminatory, dishonest, arbitrary, or perfunctory manner." DelCostello, 462 U.S. at
    164, 103 S.Ct. at 2290.
       The Hines decision had been anticipated by this Court's decision in Woodward Iron Co. v.
    261 F.2d 138
     (5th Cir.1958), in which Judge Wisdom held that two employees "have
              Thus, to evaluate the standing of plaintiffs in this case, we must decide whether United Foods'
    alleged breach of the successors and assigns clause violated a uniquely personal right of the plaintiffs.
    Initially, we consider plaintiffs' suggestion that we should "characterize as personal any right
    conferred by the collective bargaining agreement that is not reserved exclusively to the union as a
    matter of law." We decline this invitation. Plaintiffs present no authority on behalf of their novel
    theory and instead defend it on the ground that it strikes an appropriate balance between the
    competing labor law interests in, on the one hand, having unions act as the exclusive representatives
    of employee interests and, on the other hand, allowing workers to vindicate their individual rights.
    Although we might agree that these are the relevant concerns,10 plaintiffs' theory does not strike a
    proper balance. The standing of individual employees to bring suit under section 301 is an exception
    to the general rule that only unions can litigate violations of labor agreements. Plaintiffs, however,
    have identified only two rights which, under their theory, would be reserved exclusively to unions:
    the right to bargain collectively with the employer, see May Dep't Stores Co. v. NLRB, 
    326 U.S. 376
    66 S. Ct. 203
    90 L. Ed. 145
     (1945), and the right to picket an employer's premises, see Emporium
    Capwell Co. v. Western Addition Community Org., 
    420 U.S. 50
    95 S. Ct. 977
    43 L. Ed. 2d 12
    Thus, under plaint iffs' theory, the exception would all but swallow the rule. This outcome would
    contradict the Supreme Court's instruction that individual standing be limited to uniquely personal
    standing in court to sue their employer for damages for unlawful discharge. This right is personal
    to them and exists irrespective of the union's suable status and interest in prosecuting employee
    claims under collective agreements." Id. at 141.
         As this Court said in Harris v. Chemical Leaman Tank Lines, Inc., 
    437 F.2d 167
    Cir.1971) (per curiam):
                     "While [Smith ] established that jurisdiction exists in this Court to entertain a suit
                     by an individual employee regarding personal rights under Section 301(a),
                     clarification of standing requirements was left to subsequent cases. The problem is
                     that of "striking a meaningful balance, consistent with existing labor policy,
                     between individual rights and the continued effectiveness of the collective
                     bargaining process.' " Id. at 170 (quoting Local Union No. 12 v. NLRB, 
    368 F.2d 12
    , 18 (5th Cir.1966)).
            Setting aside plaintiffs' overbroad theory, we have no trouble concluding that plaintiffs lack
    standing in this case. As we conceive of it, our task is to determine whether the right being asserted
    by plaintiffs is a uniquely personal right, and therefore amenable to individual enforcement, or a
    collective right of all union members, and therefore reserved to the union to enforce. This line
    between personal and collective rights is not entirely pellucid. Fortunately, we need not today draw
    that line with precision for this is not a marginal case.
            The "right" which United Foods allegedly violated is that of failing to obtain an agreement by
    Tex-Mex to assume the collective bargaining agreement and to be bound by its terms.11 This cannot
    be fairly described as a personal right, much less a uniquely personal one. The successors and assigns
    clause was a promise made by United Foods to ensure the perpetuation of the collective bargaining
    agreement should United Foods sell its operation. As such, it represented an obligation from United
    Foods to the Union as a collectivity. To be sure, assumption of the collective bargaining agreement
    by Tex-Mex would have benefited individual workers to varying degrees. However, the right at
    issue—United Foods' duty to honor the successors and assigns clause—is one that ran to all United
    Foods employees in equal measure.
            The collective nature of the right is also evident in the following respect. Successful assertion
    of the successors and assigns clause would mean that United Foods was obligated to get Tex-Mex
    to honor not just plaintiffs' seniority rights but the whole package of benefits and privileges contained
    in the collective bargaining agreement. Chief among these is the recognition of the Union as the
    workers' representative. Article I, section one of the Agreement stated that "[t]he Company
    recognizes the Union as the certified collective bargaining agent for all production and maintenance
    employees, t ruck drivers, inspectors and leadmen employed by the Company in Cameron County,
    Texas...." Therefore, by saying that United Foods was obligated to require Tex-Mex to assume the
    collective bargaining agreement, plaintiffs necessarily are saying that United Foods was obligated to
         At oral argument, plaintiffs' counsel mischaracterized the right at issue by arguing that
    plaintiffs are merely asserting their seniority rights under the collective bargaining agreement. The
    legal right which United Foods allegedly breached is that of failing to enforce the successors and
    assigns clause. That United Foods' inaction caused plaintiffs to be passed over in favor of less
    senior workers is a consequence of the right violation, but not the right violation itself.
    require Tex-Mex to recognize the Union. Individual union members, however, have no authority to
    assert a union's right to recognition. A union must do that for itself.
            Our conclusion today is supported by Brown v. Sterling Aluminum Products Corp., 
    365 F.2d 651
     (8th Cir.1966), cert. denied, 
    386 U.S. 957
    87 S. Ct. 1023
    18 L. Ed. 2d 105
     (1967), in which
    individual employees sued their employer for refusing to bargain over the company's plan to shut
    down its plant and relocate it after the collective bargaining agreement had expired. The Eighth
    Circuit, however, held that the employees lacked standing because the company's "failure to discuss
    these matters according to the contract is a violation of the collective rights of the entire unit and not
    of the personal rights of the individual members." Id. at 657. We agree with the principle articulated
    by the Brown Court:
            "[W]henever the right sought to be enforced is not uniquely personal to the individual but is
            a right possessed by the bargaining unit as a whole, only the Union as the sole representative
            of that unit would normally have the standing to enforce the right. Thus the individual would
            have no standing to compel discussion of broad collective bargaining principles such as the
            re-negotiation of a new contract or the relocation of a plant, even if such discussion were
            required by the existing collective bargaining agreement." Id.12
    It is plain that the successors and assigns clause was, in the words of the Brown court, a "collective
    right[ ] of the entire unit" or a right "possessed by the bargaining unit as a whole."
            Plaintiffs attempt to evade the impact of Brown by pointing to that court's broad statement
    that individuals can "enforce any contractual rights acquired under the agreem ent and sue for any
    breach by the Company that occurred during the term of the agreement." Id. Plaintiffs conveniently
    omit, however, the important qualifying language contained in the next sentence: "We believe,
    however, that for an individual to bring an action under § 301 he must be seeking to enforce a right
    that is personal to him and vested at the time of the suit." Id. (emphasis added) (citation omitted).
    Brown simply cannot be read to sanction an employee's standing to sue to enforce a company's
         This same principle was applied in Jensen v. Farrell Lines, Inc., 
    658 F.2d 27
     (2d Cir.1981)
    (per curiam), in which employees brought suit to enforce a provision of a purchasing agreement
    which obligated their new employer to recognize the union which had represented them
    previously. Citing Brown, the Second Circuit denied the employees standing on the ground that
    "only [the union] could litigate over the existence of the bargaining relationship." Id. at 29.
    alleged breach of a successors and assigns clause.
              Also buttressing our decision is Anderson v. Ideal Basic Industries, 
    120 L.R.R.M. (BNA) 2039
    1985 WL 56750
     (E.D.Tenn.1985), aff'd, 
    804 F.2d 950
     (6th Cir.1986), a factually analogous case. As here,
    in Anderson individual union members brought suit under section 301 to enforce a successorship
    clause after their employer had sold its operations to another firm and failed to require the purchaser
    to accede to the terms of a collective bargaining agreement. One issue in Anderson was whether the
    employees had the requisite standing to enforce the successorship clause. It was held that they did
              "The Court further is of the opinion that any obligations created by the successorship clause
              are obligations to the bargaining unit as a whole and are not obligations to the individual
              members.... Individual union members have no authority to bargain with the Company over
              the terms of the Agreement. Rather, the Union has the power and responsibility to enforce
              the successorship clause in bargaining with the Company." Id. at 2044 (citations omitted).
              Plaintiffs attempt to distinguish Anderson on the ground that the successorship clause in that
    case obligated the company to bargain with the union, which plaintiffs concede is a collective right.
    This is a mistaken reading of Anderson. The successorship clause in Anderson did not impose a duty
    to bargain; it was, in fact, quite similar to the clause at issue in this case.13 To be sure, Anderson did
    hold that the employees lacked standing to sue their employer for failing to bargain with the union.
    However, the duty to bargain had nothing to do with the successorship clause. As the Anderson
    court recognized, employers have a dut y to bargain with a union over the effects of a plant shut
    down. See First Nat'l Maintenance Corp. v. NLRB, 
    452 U.S. 666
    , 677 n. 15, 
    101 S. Ct. 2573
    , 2580
    n. 15, 
    69 L. Ed. 2d 318
     (1981) (cited in Anderson, 120 L.R.R.M. at 2043). This duty is derived not
    from any collective bargaining agreement, however, but from §§ 8(d) and 8(a)(5) of the National
            The successorship clause in Anderson provided:
                     "This Agreement shall be binding upon the parties hereto, their successors,
                     administrators, executors and assigns. In the event of the sale or lease by the
                     Company of any plant or terminal covered by this Agreement, or in the event the
                     Company is taken over by sale, lessee assignments, receivership or bankruptcy
                     proceedings, such operation shall continue to be subject to the terms and
                     conditions of this Agreement for the life thereof. The Company shall give notice
                     of the existence of this Agreement to any purchaser, lessee, assignee, etc., of this
                     Agreement. Such notice shall be in writing with a copy to the Union not later than
                     the effective date of sale." 120 L.R.R.M. at 2042 n. 2.
    Labor Relations Act, 29 U.S.C. §§ 158(d) and 158(a)(5). Thus, Anderson 's holding pertaining to
    standing to enforce the successorship clause was entirely distinct from its holding pertaining to
    standing to require bargaining.
           Plaintiffs direct our attention to several circuit court cases which uphold the standing of
    individual employees to sue under section 301. None of these cases, however, articulates a principle
    which would support the conclusion that plaintiffs have standing in this case.
            In Schultz v. Owens-Illinois, Inc., 
    560 F.2d 849
     (7th Cir.1977), cert. denied, 
    434 U.S. 1011
    98 S. Ct. 723
    54 L. Ed. 2d 754
     (1978), the Sevent h Circuit held that machine manufacturing shop
    employees had standing to sue their employer for failure to institute an apprenticeship program. In
    so doing, the Schultz court purported to apply a two-part "test" for determining whether an asserted
    right is uniquely personal. According to the Schultz court, a right is uniquely personal if, first, the
    "employment benefit is mandatory under the collective bargaining agreement," id. at 854, and second,
    if there is a "factual predicate which is unique and personal to a particular employee." Id. In our
    opinion, this "test" does nothing to further or clarify the analysis of the issue before us. The first
    prong merely asks whether the employee was entitled to some benefit under a collective bargaining
    agreement. But this does not tell us whether the entitlement is personal or collective. The second
    prong asks whether that right or interest is unique and personal. That, however, merely restates the
    question which we are called upon to decide. Thus, from the Schultz "test" we can derive no
    principle which would support standing for plaintiffs. On the other hand, Schultz does endorse the
    principle upon which we base our decision today. Namely, that a uniquely personal right is not "a
    right possessed by the bargaining unit as a whole." Id. at 855; see also id. at 854 ("These plaintiffs
    are not seeking to represent the entire work force of 366 employees.").
           In Lerwill v. Inflight Motion Pictures, Inc., 
    582 F.2d 507
    , 511 (9th Cir.1978), the Ninth
    Circuit held that two technicians had standing to sue to recover overtime pay as provided under a
    collective bargaining agreement. The Lerwill Court, however, articulated no theory of what rights
    are "uniquely personal" and merely took its cue from dicta in Hines that among such rights are
    agreements relating to "wages, hours, overtime pay, and wrongful discharge." Hines, 424 U.S. at
    562, 96 S.Ct. at 1055 (emphasis added) (quoted in Lerwill with identical emphasis, 582 F.2d at 511).
            Similarly, in Diaz v. Schwerman Trucking Co., 
    709 F.2d 1371
     (11th Cir.1983) (per curiam),
    the Eleventh Circuit held that employees could sue to recover the back pay to which they were
    entitled under a collective bargaining agreement. As in Lerwill, Diaz reasoned that the case "involves
    wages, a matter Hines and Smith expressly held to be a proper subject of an employee's section 301
    suit." 709 F.2d at 1374.14
            Finally, plaintiffs cite Santos v. Dist. Council of New York City and Vicinity of United Bhd.
    of Carpenters & Joiners, 
    547 F.2d 197
    , 199-200 (2d Cir.1977), in which the Second Circuit held that
    union members had standing to seek enforcement of an umpire's resolution of an interunion dispute.
    Whatever analogical significance this holding may have, we believe that the Santos court confused
    standing under Article III with standing under section 301. Santos quoted from Warth v. Seldin, 
    422 U.S. 490
    95 S. Ct. 2197
    45 L. Ed. 2d 343
     (1975), an Article III standing case concerning a
    constitutional challenge to a zoning ordinance. In any event, a more recent decision by the Second
    Circuit cited with approval Brown v. Sterling Aluminum Products Corp., a case which squarely
    supports our holding. See Jensen v. Farrell Lines, Inc., 
    658 F.2d 27
    , 29 (2d Cir.1981) (discussed
    supra in note 12).
            For the reasons stated, we conclude that plaintiffs lack standing to bring suit under section
    301 because United Foods' alleged breach of the successors and assigns clause did not violate a
    uniquely personal right of the plaintiffs. The judgment of the district court is accordingly
         Diaz characterized this as an issue of subject matter jurisdiction rather than personal
    standing. This confusion is understandable since, as noted above, the Supreme Court's Smith
    opinion was cast in jurisdictional terms and only later did Hines address standing under section
    301. Standing was also involved in Diaz, but the issue was standing under Article III rather than
    standing under section 301.

Document Info

DocketNumber: 91-06231

Filed Date: 1/14/1994

Precedential Status: Precedential

Modified Date: 12/21/2014

Authorities (22)

May Stores Co. v. Labor Board , 326 U.S. 376 ( 1945 )

Textile Workers v. Lincoln Mills of Ala. , 353 U.S. 448 ( 1957 )

Smith v. Evening News Assn. , 371 U.S. 195 ( 1962 )

Republic Steel Corp. v. Maddox , 379 U.S. 650 ( 1965 )

Vaca v. Sipes , 386 U.S. 171 ( 1967 )

NLRB v. Burns Int'l Security Services, Inc. , 406 U.S. 272 ( 1972 )

Emporium Capwell Co. v. Western Addition Community ... , 420 U.S. 50 ( 1975 )

Warth v. Seldin , 422 U.S. 490 ( 1975 )

Hines v. Anchor Motor Freight, Inc. , 424 U.S. 554 ( 1976 )

First Nat. Maintenance Corp. v. NLRB , 452 U.S. 666 ( 1981 )

DelCostello v. Teamsters , 462 U.S. 151 ( 1983 )

Wooddell v. Electrical Workers , 502 U.S. 93 ( 1991 )

Woodward Iron Compant v. Anderson L. Ware and Lawrence ... , 261 F.2d 138 ( 1958 )

Holden Brown, George House and George Wolff v. Sterling ... , 365 F.2d 651 ( 1966 )

Local Union No. 12, United Rubber, Cork, Linoleum & Plastic ... , 368 F.2d 12 ( 1966 )

Frank Santos v. District Council of New York City and ... , 547 F.2d 197 ( 1977 )

John Schultz v. Owens-Illinois, Inc., and District No. 9, ... , 560 F.2d 849 ( 1977 )

L. Mets Lerwill, Charles M. Perry, for Themselves and on ... , 582 F.2d 507 ( 1978 )

william-jensen-edwin-kremer-john-gardella-william-kuyl-dominick , 658 F.2d 27 ( 1981 )

Bienvenido Diaz v. Schwerman Trucking Company , 709 F.2d 1371 ( 1983 )

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