Frederick Felt v. MEI Technologies, Inc. , 584 F. App'x 139 ( 2014 )

UNPUBLISHED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
No. 14-1079
FREDERICK FELT,
Plaintiff - Appellant,
v.
MEI TECHNOLOGIES, INC.; DELL SERVICES FEDERAL GOVERNMENT,
INC.,
Defendants - Appellees.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the District of
Maryland, at Greenbelt. J. Frederick Motz, Senior District
Judge. (8:12-cv-02873-JFM)
Submitted: September 29, 2014 Decided: October 7, 2014
Before GREGORY and DIAZ, Circuit Judges, and DAVIS, Senior
Circuit Judge.
Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.
Mitchell I. Batt, SULLIVAN TALBOTT & BATT, Rockville, Maryland,
for Appellant. Joanna Lee Faust, Timothy Joseph McEvoy, CAMERON
MCEVOY, PLLC, Fairfax, Virginia; Joel Jacob Borovsky, Teresa
Burke Wright, JACKSON LEWIS, LLP, Reston, Virginia, for
Appellees.
Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
PER CURIAM:
Frederick Felt appeals the district court’s order
granting summary judgment in favor of MEI Technologies, Inc.,
(“MEI”) and Dell Services Federal Government, Inc., on his
claims of retaliation under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of
1964, as amended (“Title VII”), 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e to 2000e-17
(2012), the Maryland Human Relations Act, and the Prince
George’s County Code. We affirm.
We review de novo a district court’s order granting
summary judgment. D.L. ex rel. K.L. v. Balt. Bd. of Sch.
Comm’rs, 706 F.3d 256, 258 (4th Cir. 2013). Summary judgment is
appropriate where “there is no genuine dispute as to any
material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter
of law.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a); see Anderson v. Liberty Lobby,
Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986). In determining whether a
genuine issue of material fact exists, we view the facts, and
draw all reasonable inferences therefrom, in the light most
favorable to the nonmoving party. Bonds v. Leavitt, 629 F.3d
369, 380 (4th Cir. 2011).
The relevant inquiry on summary judgment is “whether
the evidence presents a sufficient disagreement to require
submission to a jury or whether it is so one-sided that one
party must prevail as a matter of law.” Anderson, 477 U.S. at
251-52. An otherwise properly supported summary judgment motion
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will not be defeated by the existence of some factual dispute,
however; only disputes over facts that might affect the outcome
of the suit under the governing law will properly preclude the
entry of summary judgment. Id. at 248.
Felt first argues that there is sufficient evidence to
establish that he was terminated in retaliation for protected
activity. Because Felt presented no direct evidence of
retaliation, his Title VII claims are analyzed under the
familiar burden-shifting framework established in McDonnell
Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792 (1973). Price v. Thompson,
380 F.3d 209, 212 (4th Cir. 2004). A plaintiff can establish a
prima facie case of retaliation by demonstrating that: (1) he
engaged in a protected activity; (2) the defendant took an
adverse action against him; and (3) there was a causal
connection between the first two elements. Id. at 212. If a
prima facie case is established, the burden of production shifts
to the defendant to articulate a legitimate, nonretaliatory
basis for the action. Id. Once this burden is met, the
plaintiff must show that the proffered reasons are pretextual.
Id. Throughout this process, the plaintiff bears the ultimate
burden of “establish[ing] that . . . h[is] protected activity
was a but-for cause of the alleged adverse action by the
employer.” Univ. Tex. Sw. Med. Ctr. v. Nassar, 133 S. Ct. 2517,
2534 (2013).
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We conclude that Felt failed to establish a prima
facie case of retaliation under Title VII, as he did not
demonstrate a causal connection between his discharge and his
protected activity. The record reflects that the two MEI
personnel identified by Felt as retaliating against him did not
have a significant influence on the termination decision.
Moreover, Felt failed to demonstrate that the legitimate,
nonretaliatory reasons for terminating his employment were
pretext for retaliation. To the contrary, there is sufficient
evidence that Felt’s termination was caused by his failure to
meet the expectations of his employment.
We likewise reject Felt’s retaliation claims brought
pursuant to Maryland state law, as he has not established that
his engagement in protected activity caused or was a motivating
factor in his termination. Accordingly, we affirm the judgment
of the district court.
We dispense with oral argument because the facts and
legal contentions are adequately presented in the materials
before this court and argument would not aid the decisional
process.
AFFIRMED
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