William Garrett v. Andres Ruiz , 585 F. App'x 348 ( 2014 )


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  •                                                                            FILED
    NOT FOR PUBLICATION                             OCT 7 2014
    MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
    UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS                      U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
    FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
    WILLIAM ALLEN GARRETT,                           No. 13-55635
    Plaintiff - Appellant,            D.C. No. 3:11-cv-02540-IEG-
    WVG
    v.
    ANDRES RUIZ; et al.,                             MEMORANDUM*
    Defendants - Appellees.
    Appeal from the United States District Court
    for the Southern District of California
    Irma E. Gonzalez, District Judge, Presiding
    Submitted September 23, 2014**
    Before:        W. FLETCHER, RAWLINSON, and CHRISTEN, Circuit Judges.
    William Allen Garrett appeals pro se from the district court’s summary
    judgment in his 
    42 U.S.C. § 1983
     action alleging that defendants violated his
    constitutional rights. We have jurisdiction under 
    28 U.S.C. § 1291
    . We review de
    novo, Billington v. Smith, 
    292 F.3d 1177
    , 1183 (9th Cir. 2002), and we affirm.
    *
    This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent
    except as provided by 9th Cir. R. 36-3.
    **
    The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision
    without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).
    The district court properly granted summary judgment on Garrett’s
    excessive force claim because Garrett failed to raise a genuine dispute of material
    fact as to whether defendants’ actions were objectively unreasonable under the
    circumstances, including the undisputed facts that Garrett was apprehended during
    the course of a night-time burglary, Garrett admitted he was armed with a knife
    and was attempting to evade arrest by flight, and the events happened very quickly.
    See Graham v. Connor, 
    490 U.S. 386
    , 396-97 (1989) (determining the
    reasonableness of a particular application of force requires “careful attention to the
    facts and circumstances of each particular case,” taking into account the
    “split-second judgments” in circumstances that are “tense, uncertain, and rapidly
    evolving”).
    The district court properly granted summary judgment on Garrett’s claim
    that defendants violated his privilege against self-incrimination because Garrett
    seeks to re-litigate issues previously decided during his state criminal proceeding.
    See Ayers v. City of Richmond, 
    895 F.2d 1267
    , 1270-72 (9th Cir. 1990) (applying
    California issue preclusion law to prevent plaintiff’s re-litigation of a suppression
    determination in a subsequent § 1983 action).
    The district court did not abuse its discretion by denying Garrett’s discovery
    motions because Garrett failed to demonstrate that he suffered any prejudice. See
    2                                    13-55635
    Hallett v. Morgan, 
    296 F.3d 732
    , 751 (9th Cir. 2002) (providing standard of review
    and noting the trial court’s broad discretion in discovery matters).
    We reject Garrett’s contentions concerning alleged due process violations
    and the district court’s alleged bias and incorrect application of the summary
    judgment standard because they are unsupported by the record.
    Defendants’ motion to transmit evidence, filed on September 16, 2013, is
    denied.
    Garrett’s pending requests, filed on May 14, 2014, June 30, 2014, and
    September 12, 2014, are denied.
    AFFIRMED.
    3                                     13-55635