Titaness Light Shop v. Sunlight Supply, Inc. , 585 F. App'x 390 ( 2014 )

FILED
NOT FOR PUBLICATION OCT 08 2014
MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
TITANESS LIGHT SHOP, LLC, a No. 13-16959
Nevada limited liability company,
D.C. No. 3:12-cv-00620-LRH-
Plaintiff-counter-defendant - VPC
Appellant,
v. MEMORANDUM*
SUNLIGHT SUPPLY, INC., a
Washington corporation; IP HOLDINGS,
LLC, a Washington limited liability
company,
Defendants-counter-claimants -
Appellees.
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the District of Nevada
Larry R. Hicks, District Judge, Presiding
Argued and Submitted September 8, 2014
San Francisco, California
Before: SCHROEDER, OWENS, and FRIEDLAND, Circuit Judges.
*
This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent
except as provided by 9th Cir. R. 36-3.
Since 2008, Sunlight Supply, Inc. and IP Holdings, LLC (collectively,
Sunlight) have used the trademark “Titan Controls” to sell devices that control
indoor gardening equipment. In 2012, Titaness Light Shop (TLS) began marketing
indoor grow lighting systems under the mark “Titaness.” The district court granted
Sunlight’s motion for a preliminary injunction prohibiting TLS from using the
Titaness mark, and TLS appeals. We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1292.
Because the record does not contain sufficient evidence that Sunlight is likely to
suffer irreparable harm absent preliminary relief, we reverse the district court’s
order, vacate the preliminary injunction, and remand.
We review the district court’s decision to grant a preliminary injunction for
abuse of discretion. Herb Reed Enters., LLC v. Florida Entm’t Mgmt., Inc., 736
F.3d 1239, 1247 (9th Cir. 2013). However, we are mindful that a preliminary
injunction is “an extraordinary remedy that may only be awarded upon a clear
showing that the plaintiff is entitled to such relief.” Winter v. Nat. Res. Def.
Council, Inc., 555 U.S. 7, 22 (2008). A party seeking a preliminary injunction
must establish, inter alia, that it is “likely to suffer irreparable harm in the absence
of preliminary relief.” Id. at 20. The mere “possibility of irreparable harm” is
insufficient. Id. at 22.
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To establish a likelihood of irreparable harm, conclusory or speculative
allegations are not enough. Herb Reed, 736 F.3d at 1250; see also Caribbean
Marine Servs. Co. v. Baldridge, 844 F.2d 668, 674 (9th Cir. 1988) (“Speculative
injury does not constitute irreparable injury sufficient to warrant granting a
preliminary injunction.”); Am. Passage Media Corp. v. Cass Commc’ns, Inc., 750
F.2d 1470, 1473 (9th Cir. 1985) (finding irreparable harm not established by
statements that “are conclusory and without sufficient support in facts”). Although
preliminary relief may be ordered to prevent harm to a movant’s reputation and
goodwill, a finding of reputational harm may not be based on “pronouncements
[that] are grounded in platitudes rather than evidence.” Herb Reed, 736 F.3d at
1250.
The allegations of harm in the record are conclusory and speculative.
Sunlight simply asserted to the district court that its goodwill and reputation would
be irreparably harmed because TLS’s Titaness products were being sold by a
website that supposedly catered to marijuana growers, while Sunlight had worked
hard to ensure that its products were not marketed to marijuana growers. The
evidence Sunlight offered in support of this assertion did not establish that Sunlight
had been or was likely to be harmed by TLS’s use of the Titaness mark. It did not
establish that Sunlight’s customers are aware of the website, would associate the
3 13-16959
products on the site with marijuana, or would stop purchasing Sunlight products if
they mistakenly believed that Sunlight was marketing to marijuana growers.1 The
fact that Sunlight’s reputation might be harmed by the marketing of TLS’s
products did not establish that irreparable harm to Sunlight’s reputation is likely.
See Winter, 555 U.S. at 22. Because Sunlight did not produce evidence
establishing a likelihood of irreparable harm, it was not entitled to preliminary
relief. See Herb Reed, 736 F.3d at 1250-51.
We REVERSE the district court’s order granting Sunlight’s motion for a
preliminary injunction, VACATE the preliminary injunction, and REMAND for
further proceedings consistent with this disposition.2
1
In fact, despite Sunlight’s professed concern that its products might be
mistakenly associated with marijuana growers and its contention that the website at
issue “targets growers of illegal substances, including marijuana,” at oral argument
before this court, Sunlight represented that it is actually now selling its Titan
Controls products through this same website.
2
Because we reverse and remand based on Sunlight’s failure to establish a
likelihood of irreparable harm sufficient to support the preliminary injunction, we
need not decide TLS’s argument that Sunlight also failed to establish a likelihood
of success on the merits.
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