Roe v. Johnson County ( 2023 )

Case: 21-10890 Document: 00516599026 Page: 1 Date Filed: 01/05/2023
United States Court of Appeals
for the Fifth Circuit
United States Court of Appeals
Fifth Circuit
No. 21-10890
Summary Calendar FILED
January 5, 2023
Lyle W. Cayce
John Roe, Clerk
Plaintiff—Appellant,
versus
Johnson County; Southwestern Correctional, L.L.C.,
doing business as LaSalle Corrections, L.L.C., doing business as
LaSalle Southwest Corrections; LaSalle Management
Company, L.L.C.; David Blankenship, Johnson County Peace
Officer; Bill Moore; Stu Madison, Assistant Johnson County
Attorney; Jeffrey Acklen, Johnson County Attorney's Investigator;
Eddie Williams; Philip Roden; Robert Matson; Adam
King, Sheriff; Bob Alford, former Johnson County Sheriff, Individually
& Officially; United States of America,
Defendants—Appellees.
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Northern District of Texas
USDC No. 3:18-CV-2497
Before King, Higginson, and Willett, Circuit Judges.
Case: 21-10890 Document: 00516599026 Page: 2 Date Filed: 01/05/2023
No. 21-10890
Per Curiam:*
John Roe brought various constitutional claims, Bivens claims, and
state law claims related to his arrest for allegedly filing a false sexual assault
report. The district court dismissed all but one of Roe’s claims and later
granted Defendants-Appellees’ motion for summary judgment on the
remaining claim. Roe appeals. We affirm.
I.
In November 2015, John Roe was in Immigration and Customs
Enforcement custody in Texas at the Johnson County jail. He alleged that
Defendant-Appellee Roden, a corrections officer, sexually assaulted Roe
with his gun. Defendant-Appellee Blankenship interviewed Roe about his
assault and conducted an investigation. During this investigation,
Blankenship found inconsistencies in Roe’s allegations and identified
concerns about his behavior. Blankenship concluded that probable cause
existed to arrest Roe for making a false report to a peace officer, a
misdemeanor under Texas Penal Code § 37.08. Blankenship arrested Roe
and forwarded the case to the County Attorney’s Office of Johnson County.
In May 2018, Roe was found not guilty after a jury trial.
Proceeding pro se, Roe sued Blankenship, Roden, other prison
officials, state officials, prosecutors, entities operating the Johnson County
jail, and other individuals. He brought claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for
alleged violations of his constitutional rights under the First Amendment,
Fourth Amendment, Fifth Amendment, Sixth Amendment, and Fourteenth
Amendment; he also brought claims pursuant to 42 U.S.C. §§ 1981 and
1985(3) and 28 U.S.C. § 1350, Bivens claims, and state law claims. In
September 2020, the district court granted motions to dismiss filed by
various Defendants-Appellees; the only claim surviving these motions was a
*
This opinion is not designated for publication. See 5th Cir. R. 47.5.
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Fourth Amendment claim against Blankenship related to the alleged seizure
of Roe without probable cause. In August 2021, the district court granted
Blankenship’s motion for summary judgment based on his defense of
qualified immunity. Roe appeals.
II.
Roe challenges the district court’s grant of summary judgment in
favor of Blankenship based on qualified immunity. We review a grant of
summary judgment based on qualified immunity de novo. Carnaby v. City of
Hous., 636 F.3d 183, 187 (5th Cir. 2011). Summary judgment is proper if the
pleadings and discovery on file, together with affidavits, show no genuine
dispute as to any material fact and that the movant is entitled to judgment as
a matter of law. Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322 (1986). We liberally
construe briefs of pro se litigants. Grant v. Cuellar, 59 F.3d 523, 524 (5th Cir.
1995).
To determine whether a defendant is entitled to qualified immunity,
we ask “(1) whether the plaintiff has alleged a violation of a clearly
established constitutional right; and (2) if so, whether the defendant's
conduct was objectively unreasonable in the light of the clearly established
law at the time of the incident.” Domino v. Tex. Dep’t of Crim. Just., 239 F.3d
752, 755 (5th Cir. 2001) (quoting Hare v. City of Corinth, 135 F.3d 320, 325
(5th Cir. 1998) (en banc)). We may “analyze the prongs in either order or
resolve the case on a single prong.” Garcia v. Blevins, 957 F.3d 596, 600 (5th
Cir. 2020).
Roe has the burden of showing that the qualified immunity defense is
unavailable to Blankenship because Blankenship made a good-faith assertion
of that defense. Joseph v. Bartlett, 981 F.3d 319, 329–30 (5th Cir. 2020). Roe
must thus “show that there is a genuine dispute of material fact and that a
jury could return a verdict entitling the plaintiff to relief for a constitutional
3
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injury.” Id. at 330. And “the plaintiff's version of those disputed facts must
also constitute a violation of clearly established law,” meaning that Roe must
“identify a case—usually, a body of relevant case law—in which an officer
acting under similar circumstances . . . was held to have violated the
[Constitution].” Id. (alteration in original) (internal quotations omitted). We
need not accept Roe’s version of the facts as true when they are “blatantly
contradicted by the record, so that no reasonable jury could believe it.” Id. at
325 (quoting Scott v. Harris, 550 U.S. 372, 380 (2007)).
We assume arguendo that Roe successfully alleged violations of clearly
established Fourth Amendment constitutional rights protecting against (1)
an arrest not supported by probable cause and (2) the initiation of criminal
charges without probable cause. Even under this assumption, we hold that
Blankenship can successfully claim that he is entitled to qualified immunity
because Roe fails to identify analogous caselaw that is sufficient to show that
Blankenship violated clearly established law. 1
To meet his burden, Roe must identify a case or statute making
sufficiently clear that every reasonable officer would have understood that
what Blankenship did violated that law. Keller v. Fleming, 952 F.3d 216, 225
(5th Cir. 2020). Specifically, Roe must identify clearly established law
making it sufficiently clear that despite his consideration of Roe’s
inconsistent statements, extrinsic evidence, and witness testimony
suggesting that Roe was not being truthful in his sexual assault claim,
Blankenship did not have probable cause to arrest Roe.
1
Roe does not meet the “sky high” burden to show that analogous case law is not
necessary because this case presents the extreme circumstance of an obvious constitutional
violation. Joseph, 981 F.3d at 338.
4
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Roe does not identify that Blankenship violated clearly established law
with these actions. Although he correctly notes that he does not need to
identify relevant caselaw that is directly on point, the cases he cites only
announce general propositions about, e.g., the Fourth Amendment’s
protections against searches without probable cause. This is insufficient to
meet the required burden. Joseph, 981 F.3d at 329. 2
III.
Roe also argues that the district court erroneously dismissed his
official capacity claims against Blankenship. Roe argues that Blankenship was
responsible for overseeing the day-to-day operation of the Johnson County
jail, which gave him final policymaking authority as to the jail. Roe thus
attempts to establish county liability based on an alleged unconstitutional
action taken by Blankenship alone, as the final policymaker.
We review a dismissal for failure to state a claim under Rule 12(b)(6)
de novo. Whitaker v. Collier, 862 F.3d 490, 496–97 (5th Cir. 2017). We accept
all well-pleaded facts as true and must view those facts in a light most
favorable to the plaintiff. Campbell v. City of San Antonio, 43 F.3d 973, 975
(5th Cir. 1995). However, only facts set forth in the pleadings are considered;
unsupported conclusions and conclusory allegations are not considered in
this assessment. Id.“Under Texas law, sheriffs are ‘final policymakers’ in the area of law
enforcement for the purposes of holding a county liable under § 1983.” James
v. Harris Cnty., 577 F.3d 612, 617 (5th Cir. 2009) (quoting Williams v.
2
Roe raises other arguments outlining various factual disputes concerning the
summary judgment evidence. None of these disputes affect the reasonableness of
Blankenship’s decision after evaluating the totality of the evidence in identifying probable
cause, and Roe’s conclusory arguments do not rectify his failure to identify that
Blankenship’s actions were a violation of clearly established law.
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Kaufman Cnty., 352 F.3d 994, 1013 (5th Cir. 2003)). And the Texas Local
Government Code allows the county sheriff to appoint a jailer to “operate
the jail and meet the needs of the prisoners, but the sheriff shall continue to
exercise supervision and control over the jail.” Tex. Loc. Gov’t Code
Ann. § 351.041.
Roe misunderstands the point that “[t]here is a fundamental
difference between decision makers and policymakers,” such that
“[d]iscretion to exercise a particular function does not necessarily entail final
policymaking authority over that function.” Martinez v. City of N. Richland
Hills, 846 F. App’x 238, 246 (5th Cir. 2021) (per curiam) (quoting Bolton v.
City of Dallas, 541 F.3d 545, 548–49 (5th Cir. 2008) (per curiam)). None of
his citations to the record nor his arguments on appeal point to the contrary
conclusion that Blankenship could be considered a final policymaker based
only on his ability to make decisions. 3 As such, the district court correctly
dismissed Roe’s official capacity claims.
Finally, we briefly address other arguments made by Roe in briefing.
Roe’s civil conspiracy allegations are unsupported by the record and were
thus correctly dismissed on summary judgment. See Montgomery v. Walton,
759 F. App’x 312, 314 (5th Cir. 2019) (per curiam) (“Conclusory allegations
that do not reference specific factual allegations tending to show an
agreement do not suffice to state a civil rights conspiracy claim under
§ 1983.”). Roe’s fabrication of evidence claim fails because he offers no
3
Roe analogizes his case to Paz v. Weir, 137 F. Supp. 2d 782 (S.D. Tex. 2001).
There, the court found that there was a jail “custom” of allowing misconduct and denied
summary judgment because of factual issues as to whether the county and the jail
administrator displayed deliberate indifference to reports of misconduct and as to whether
said alleged indifference was the “moving force” behind misconduct related to the
plaintiff. Id. at 815–16. Roe does not adequately argue that such a custom or deliberate
indifference is present here, and Paz is thus inapposite.
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material facts showing that any pretrial deprivations of his liberty were
caused by Blankenship’s alleged malfeasance in fabricating evidence. See
McDonough v. Smith, 139 S. Ct. 2149, 2156 (2019) (requiring plaintiff to show
that the deprivations of his liberty were caused by defendant’s malfeasance
in fabricating evidence). Roe’s collateral estoppel claim fails because his
argument that the district court found no probable cause mischaracterizes the
district court’s ruling that an affidavit did not establish probable cause.
Finally, Roe’s argument that the district court should have retained
jurisdiction over the remaining state law claims fails because he does not
show why the district court should have deviated from the general rule of
declining to exercise jurisdiction over remaining state-law claims 4 when all
federal-law claims are eliminated before trial. Brookshire Bros. Holding, Inc. v.
Dayco Prods., Inc., 554 F.3d 595, 602 (5th Cir. 2009). 5
IV.
For the foregoing reasons, we AFFIRM.
4
For clarity, this includes the indemnity claim against Defendants-Appellees
Southwestern Correctional, L.L.C. and LaSalle Management Company, L.L.C.
5
Roe’s remaining arguments are inadequately briefed and thus abandoned. See
Cinel v. Connick, 15 F.3d 1338, 1345 (5th Cir. 1994) (“A party who inadequately briefs an
issue is considered to have abandoned the claim.”).
7