Lopez v. Ramirez ( 2022 )

Case: 21-40235 Document: 00516427859 Page: 1 Date Filed: 08/10/2022
United States Court of Appeals
for the Fifth Circuit
United States Court of Appeals
Fifth Circuit
FILED
August 10, 2022
No. 21-40235 Lyle W. Cayce
Clerk
Marin Lopez; Pedro Bermea; Trinidad Lopez; Arturo
Menchaca; Eladio Bermudez; Javier Garcia; Robert
Guerra; Luis Carlos Gonzalez; Epigmenio “TJ”
Gonzalez; Juan Garcia, Jr.; Julio Eguia; Aaron Garcia,
Plaintiffs—Appellees,
versus
Eduardo Ramirez; Noe Castillo; Basilio D. Villareal,
Jr.; Roel Gonzalez,
Defendants—Appellants.
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Southern District of Texas
USDC No. 7:20-CV-33
Before Richman, Chief Judge, and Higginbotham and Elrod,
Circuit Judges.
Per Curiam:*
*
Pursuant to 5th Circuit Rule 47.5, the court has determined that this
opinion should not be published and is not precedent except under the limited
circumstances set forth in 5th Circuit Rule 47.5.4.
Case: 21-40235 Document: 00516427859 Page: 2 Date Filed: 08/10/2022
No. 21-40235
This is an interlocutory appeal from a district court order that
summarily denied defendants–appellants’ motion to dismiss. We VACATE
that order and REMAND for further proceedings consistent with this
opinion.
Twelve employees of Rio Grande City Consolidated Independent
School District sued the school district and four members of the school board
under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, alleging First Amendment retaliation. The Board
Members moved to dismiss for failure to state a claim under Rule 12(b)(6)
and asserting legislative and qualified immunity. In a minute-entry order
without any reasons given, the district court summarily denied the
defendants’ motion without prejudice to refile as a motion for summary
judgment. The individual board-member defendants filed this interlocutory
appeal. 1
When multiple plaintiffs each lodge claims against multiple
defendants, the complaint must allege sufficient facts to state plausible claims
to relief as to each plaintiff’s claim against each defendant. See Lynch v.
Cannatella, 810 F.2d 1363, 1377 (5th Cir. 1987) (holding that “individual
[defendants] are entitled to specific recitals of the wrong each is alleged to
have perpetrated on each plaintiff” (emphases added)). And “to overcome
[an] immunity [defense],” a plaintiff “must plead specific facts that both
allow the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable
for the harm he has alleged and that defeat [the] immunity defense with equal
specificity. See Backe v. LeBlanc, 691 F.3d 645, 648 (5th Cir. 2012) (emphasis
added).
1
We have jurisdiction over this interlocutory appeal under the collateral order
doctrine. See Carroll v. Ellington, 800 F.3d 154, 167–68 (5th Cir. 2015); Keko v. Hingle, 318
F.3d 639, 642 n.3 (5th Cir. 2003) (“The denial of an immunity defense may be subject to
interlocutory appeal.”).
2
Case: 21-40235 Document: 00516427859 Page: 3 Date Filed: 08/10/2022
No. 21-40235
In this appeal, not only do we not have the benefit of granular plaintiff-
by-plaintiff and defendant-by-defendant analysis from the district court; we
have no analysis or reasons given at all. When a district court’s order or
opinion is not sufficiently reasoned for this court to review on appeal, we may
vacate and remand for the district court to reassess the issue and offer reasons
for its conclusion. 2 We do so here.
In returning this case, we note that among the chief benefits of an
immunity defense is “protection from pretrial discovery, which is costly,
time-consuming, and intrusive.” Backe, 691 F.3d at 648. For this reason, “a
defendant’s entitlement to . . . immunity should be determined at the earliest
possible stage of the litigation.” Ramirez v. Guadarrama, 3 F.4th 129, 133
(5th Cir. 2021) (ellipses added)).
Because we cannot ascertain the grounds for the district court’s
decision to allow discovery to proceed notwithstanding defendant–appellant
Board Members’ immunity defenses, we VACATE and REMAND to
allow the district court to reassess Board Members’ motion on a plaintiff-by-
plaintiff, defendant-by-defendant basis and assign reasons for its subsequent
decision.
2
See, e.g., Liberty Mut. Ins. Co. v. Brown, 86 F. App’x 718, 719 (5th Cir. 2004)
(remanding to the district court “for the limited purpose of permitting that court to state
the reasons for its decision,” and noting that “[w]hen we have no notion of the basis for a
district court’s decision because its reasoning is vague or simply left unsaid, there is little
opportunity for effective review”); Thule Drilling ASA v. Schimberg, 290 F. App’x 745, 747
(5th Cir. 2008) (“Because we are uncertain about the rationale for the district court’s
decision, we VACATE and REMAND for entry of reasons in support of the granting of
summary judgment . . . .”); Westwego Citizens for Better Gov’t v. City of Westwego, 872 F.2d
1201, 1213 (5th Cir. 1989) (similar); cf. Cutter v. Wilkinson, 544 U.S. 709, 718 n.7 (2005)
(“[W]e are a court of review, not of first view.”).
3