United States v. Seekins ( 2022 )

Case: 21-10556 Document: 00516445405 Page: 1 Date Filed: 08/24/2022
United States Court of Appeals
for the Fifth Circuit United States Court of Appeals
Fifth Circuit
FILED
August 24, 2022
No. 21-10556
Lyle W. Cayce
Clerk
United States of America,
Plaintiff—Appellee,
versus
Joshua Seekins,
Defendant—Appellant.
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Northern District of Texas
No. 3:19-CR-563
Before Stewart, Elrod, and Graves, Circuit Judges.
Per Curiam:*
Joshua Seekins was convicted by a jury of being a felon in possession
of ammunition, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 921(g)(1), for possessing two
shotgun shells which he claims he found. He was sentenced to 70 months’
imprisonment after the district court concluded that a flare gun, modified to
accept shotgun shells, counted as a “firearm” for the purposes of U.S.S.G.
*
Pursuant to 5th Circuit Rule 47.5, the court has determined that this
opinion should not be published and is not precedent except under the limited
circumstances set forth in 5th Circuit Rule 47.5.4.
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No. 21-10556
§ 2K2.1(a)(4)(B)(II)(ii)(I). Seekins challenges the sufficiency of the evidence
supporting his conviction, the constitutionality of § 921(g)(1)’s application
to his conduct, and the conclusions underlying the § 2K2.1 firearm
enhancement. We AFFIRM.
I.
We first address Seekins’ arguments that the government failed to
prove each element of his conviction offense and that § 922(g)(1) is
unconstitutional as applied to his conduct in this case. Where, as here, a
defendant preserved a general sufficiency-of-the-evidence challenge by
moving for acquittal under rule 29 at the close of the government’s case-in-
chief and at the close of all of the evidence, we review de novo a denial of a
motion for judgment of acquittal. United States v. Myers, 104 F.3d 76, 78 (5th
Cir. 1997). The jury’s verdict will be affirmed “if a reasonable trier of fact
could conclude from the evidence that the elements of the offense were
established beyond a reasonable doubt.” Id. In assessing evidentiary
sufficiency, we do “not evaluate the weight of the evidence or the credibility
of the witnesses, but view the evidence in the light most favorable to the
verdict, drawing all reasonable inferences to support the verdict.” United
States v. Girod, 646 F.3d 304, 313 (5th Cir. 2011).
To convict under 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1), the government must prove
four elements: (i) Seekins was a felon; (ii) Seekins knew he was a felon;
(iii) Seekins knowingly possessed ammunition; and (iv) the ammunition
traveled in interstate commerce. Rehaif v. United States, 139 S. Ct. 2191, 2195-
96 (2019); United States v. Huntsberry, 956 F.3d 270, 281 (5th Cir. 2020).
Seekins challenges the third and fourth elements.
A.
Seekins first contends that the “district court erred in denying the
defendant’s motions for judgment of acquittal because the government failed
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to prove that [he] knew his bullets were ammunition rather than flare shells.”
The government conceded below that flare shells are not ammunition under
§ 922(g), and thus the jury was instructed that “a safety flare” was not
ammunition. Despite that instruction, the jury concluded that Seekins knew
that he held shotgun shells and not flare cartridges.
The district court did not err in concluding that a jury could
reasonably find that the government proved Seekins’ knowledge. On the one
hand, as Seekins notes, flare shells and shotgun shells are quite similar in
appearance. They are alike in size and color. On the other hand, several
witnesses testified that a shotgun shell is “significantly heavier than a flare
cartridge.” The jury also learned that Seekins had previously possessed
several 12-gauge shotguns, and therefore it could reasonably infer that
Seekins was familiar with shotgun ammunition. Further, Seekins’ arresting
officer described asking Seekins why he had a shotgun shell, and Seekins
simply responded that he had found it and did not express surprise at the
officer’s description of the ammunition. Finally, Seekins had a flare gun that
was visibly modified to accept shotgun shells. Although there is no evidence
that Seekins modified the flare launcher himself, the jury could reasonably
infer that Seekins must have known he held shotgun shells, as modification
would have been unnecessary if he held mere flare cartridges. Viewing the
evidence in the light most favorable to the verdict and drawing all reasonable
inferences to support the verdict, see Girod, 646 F.3d at 313, this was enough
to support the jury’s conclusion that Seekins knew he possessed shotgun
shells and not flare cartridges.
B.
The bulk of Seekins’ argument on appeal addresses the interstate
commerce element, whether in the form of an “as-applied constitutional
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challenge”1 or as a sufficiency-of-the-evidence argument. We address each
argument in turn, though we note that the two arguments are functionally
identical. See, e.g., United States v. Rawls, 85 F.3d 240, 243 (5th Cir. 1996)
(holding, in rejecting an as-applied Commerce Clause challenge to a § 922(g)
conviction, that the “evidence [wa]s sufficient to establish a past connection
between the firearm and interstate commerce” (emphasis added)); United
States v. Crenshaw, 359 F.3d 977, 984 (8th Cir. 2004) (“We first note that the
‘as applied’ constitutional challenge [to a VICAR conviction under the
Commerce Clause] is really not a constitutional objection at all, but is a
challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence supporting the jury verdict.”).
First, the government introduced enough evidence that Seekins’
shotgun shells traveled in interstate commerce, and that is all our caselaw
requires to satisfy the interstate commerce element. That element is satisfied
where the government demonstrates that the ammunition was manufactured
out of state. See United States v. Guidry, 406 F.3d 314, 318 (5th Cir. 2005).
The district court therefore correctly instructed the jury that it had to be
convinced beyond a reasonable doubt that “the ammunition possessed
traveled in interstate or foreign commerce; that is, before the defendant
possessed the ammunition, it had traveled at some time from one state to
another or between any part of the United States.” See Fifth Circuit
Pattern Jury Instructions (Criminal) § 2.43D. With ample
testimony that Seekins’ shotgun shells were manufactured in Illinois, the
evidence was sufficient to show that they had traveled in interstate
commerce. Though Seekins points to contrary but speculative testimony, the
1
Seekins also mounts a brief facial challenge to § 922(g)’s constitutionality. But
Seekins concedes that this argument is foreclosed under our precedent. E.g., United States
v. Willingham, 310 F.3d 367, 373 (5th Cir. 2002).
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jury was entitled to choose among any reasonable construction of the
evidence, see United States v. Mitchell, 484 F.3d 762, 768 (5th Cir. 2007), and
the resolution of conflicts in the evidence was solely within the jury’s domain,
see United States v. Sanchez, 961 F.2d 1169, 1173 (5th Cir. 1992). The district
court therefore did not err in denying Seekins’ motion for judgment of
acquittal.
Seekins’ second argument—that § 922(g)(1) cannot constitutionally
be applied to found ammunition—fails under our caselaw. We have long held
that § 922(g) can be constitutionally applied where the “in or affecting
commerce” element is proved by showing the firearm had previously
traveled across state lines without regard to the defendant’s conduct. E.g.,
United States v. Kuban, 94 F.3d 971, 973 (5th Cir. 1996); Rawls, 85 F.3d
at 242; United States v. Pierson, 139 F.3d 501, 503 (5th Cir. 1998); United
States v. De Leon, 170 F.3d 494, 499 (5th Cir. 1999). “There is no additional
requirement that, to apply the law constitutionally, the Government must
prove some economic activity beyond the interstate movement of the
weapon.” United States v. Collins, 573 F. App’x 374, 375 (5th Cir. 2014)
(citing United States v. Meza, 701 F.3d 411, 418 (5th Cir. 2012)). That Seekins
purportedly found the shotgun shells is thus of no moment. We therefore
affirm the district court’s denial of Seekins’ motions to dismiss and for
acquittal.
II.
Seekins next argues that the district court “miscalculated” the
guidelines imprisonment range for his offense. He challenges the district
court’s conclusion that Seekins’ modified flare gun constitutes a “firearm”
under 26 U.S.C. § 5845(a). See U.S.S.G. § 2K2.1(a)(4)(B)(i)(II). We need
not resolve this novel question of whether a modified flare gun amounts to a
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No. 21-10556
firearm under § 5845(a), because any error in the district court’s conclusion
is harmless.
As relevant here, harmlessness can be shown if the district court
considers both the incorrect and correct ranges and explains that it would
have given the same sentence in either case. United States v. Guzman-Rendon,
864 F.3d 409, 411 (5th Cir. 2017). The district court expressly stated that it
would impose the same sentence even without the enhancement, opining
that a 70-month sentence “is an appropriate, fair and reasonable sentence,
taking into account all the factors under 18 [U.S.C. §] 3553(a).” Seekins
argues that the district court should have expressly stated its consideration
of the lower guidelines range, but we do not “demand ‘magic words’ or
‘robotic incantations’ from district judges.” United States v. Vega-Garcia,
893 F.3d 326, 328 (5th Cir. 2018). Instead, “when a district court entertains
arguments as to the proper guidelines range and explicitly states that it would
have given the same sentence it did regardless, any error in the range
calculation is harmless.” United States v. Nanda, 867 F.3d 522, 531 (5th Cir.
2017) (citations omitted); see United States v. Medel-Guadalupe, 987 F.3d 424,
429 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 141 S. Ct. 2545 (2021) (“[T]he district court was
aware of the guidelines range absent the enhancements because Medel-
Guadalupe advised the court of this range in his written PSR objections.”).
Here, Seekins twice requested the alternative guidelines range of 37-46
months. Nonetheless, the district court determined that a 70-month sentence
was fair and reasonable even absent the § 2K2.1(a)(4)(B)(II)(ii)(I)
enhancement. The district court’s statements at sentencing, taken in their
totality, are sufficient to support application of the harmless error doctrine.
Vega-Garcia, 893 F.3d at 327-28.
In summary, we AFFIRM the district court’s judgment and
sentence.
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