Riggs v. San Juan County , 588 F. App'x 764 ( 2014 )

FILED
United States Court of Appeals
Tenth Circuit
October 17, 2014
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
Elisabeth A. Shumaker
TENTH CIRCUIT Clerk of Court
MICHELLE LYMAN; HELEN
VALDEZ; DONNA SINGER; FRED
RIGGS,
Plaintiffs - Appellants,
and
DR. STEVEN MACARTHUR; DR.
NATHANIEL PENN; CANDACE
LAWS; LINDA CACAPARDO; SUE
BURTON; AMY TERLAAK; ALISON
DICKSON; CANDACE HOLIDAY;
NICOLE ROBERTS,
Plaintiffs,
v. No. 14-4003
(D.C. No. 2:00-CV-00584-BSJ)
SAN JUAN COUNTY; SAN JUAN (D. Utah)
HEALTH SERVICES DISTRICT; J.
TYRON LEWIS, Commissioner; BILL
REDD, Commissioner; CRAIG
HALLS; REID M. WOOD; CLEAL
BRADFORD; ROGER ATCITTY;
JOHN LEWIS; JOHN
HOUSEKEEPER; KAREN ADAMS;
PATSY SHUMWAY; DR. JAMES D.
REDD; DR. L. VAL JONES; DR.
MANFRED R. NELSON; RICHARD
BAILEY; MARILEE BAILEY; ORA
LEE BLACK; GARY HOLLADAY;
LORI WALLACE, a/k/a Laurie
Walker; CARLA GRIMSHAW;
GLORIA YANITO; JULIE
BRONSON; LAURIE SCHAFER;
LYN STEVENS, San Juan County
Commissioner; MANUAL MORGAN,
San Juan County Commissioner;
NETTIE PRACK, in his official
capacity only; GLEN IMEL, in his
official capacity only,
Defendants - Appellees.
--------------------------------------------
SUSAN ROSE,
Attorney - Appellant.
ORDER AND JUDGMENT *
Before GORSUCH, MURPHY, and HOLMES, Circuit Judges.
Attorney-Appellant Susan Rose ostensibly challenges the district court’s
denial of injunctive relief on behalf of named Plaintiffs-Appellants Michelle
Lyman, Helen Valdez, Donna Singer, and Fred Riggs. In substance, however, the
instant proceeding is an improper attempt by Ms. Rose to obtain relief in federal
*
Having examined the briefs and appellate record, this panel has
decided unanimously that oral argument would not materially assist the
determination of this appeal. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2); 10th Cir. R. 34.1(G).
The case is therefore ordered submitted without oral argument.
This order and judgment is not binding precedent except under the
doctrines of law of the case, res judicata, and collateral estoppel. It may be cited,
however, for its persuasive value consistent with Federal Rule of Appellate
Procedure 32.1 and Tenth Circuit Rule 32.1.
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court from attorney-discipline proceedings pending against her in Utah. We are
not situated to entertain this appeal and consequently dismiss it on the ground of
abstention under Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37 (1971). 1
I
In 1999, Ms. Rose represented Plaintiffs-Appellants and the above-
captioned Plaintiffs (collectively, “Plaintiffs”) in proceedings in the Navajo
Nation District Court. 2 She later served as counsel in Plaintiffs’ attempt to
enforce the tribal court’s orders by filing suit in the District of Utah—a matter
that was ultimately resolved in Defendants’ favor. See MacArthur v. San Juan
Cnty., 497 F.3d 1057, 1077 (10th Cir. 2007) (affirming the district court’s refusal
to invade the province of the tribal court). Not to be deterred, however, Ms. Rose
has continued to lodge filings pertaining to this matter—purportedly on Plaintiffs’
behalf—for the better part of a decade. She has pursued that course despite
judicial determinations that all dispositive issues in the MacArthur litigation had
been resolved with finality, see MacArthur v. San Juan Cnty., 566 F. Supp. 2d
1239, 1250 (D. Utah 2008) (“The plaintiffs asked, and they received an answer,
albeit one not to their liking. Their question having been answered by the court
1
Ms. Rose has also filed several motions in this court by which she
asks the panel to (1) certify legal questions to the Supreme Court; (2) remand the
case to the district court; and (3) expedite the motion to remand. Because we
have determined that the appeal must be dismissed, we deny her motions as moot.
2
Some of the litigants are enrolled members of the Navajo Tribe.
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of appeals, this court remains bound . . . .”), and despite receiving emphatic
advisements to this effect, see Dickson v. San Juan Cnty., 355 F. App’x 243, 249
(10th Cir. 2009) (“[W]e cannot emphasize . . . strongly enough that this matter is
at an end.”).
Ms. Rose’s role in the MacArthur lawsuit drew scrutiny from the Utah State
Bar’s Office of Professional Conduct (“OPC”), which initiated disciplinary
proceedings against her for “engag[ing] in conduct prejudicial to the
administration of justice [under Utah’s rules of professional conduct].” Aplt.
App., Vol. II, at 259A (Disciplinary Compl., filed Dec. 12, 2007). Resisting this
result, and seeking to enjoin the OPC, Ms. Rose filed numerous motions in
federal court in 2011—again claiming to do so on Plaintiffs’ behalf. The district
court disposed of these motions in August 2011, citing her abusive filing habits
and opining that Utah’s courts were entitled to manage attorney discipline
“without preemptive [federal] interference.” Id. at 164A (Order, filed Aug. 15,
2011) [hereinafter, “Motions Order”]. Ms. Rose did not appeal from that ruling.
Since the issuance of the Motions Order, Ms. Rose has filed three
additional federal lawsuits in her bid to halt the pending OPC matter. The first
was dismissed without prejudice, a result she did not challenge. The second was
dismissed “on various grounds, including . . . Younger abstention.” Rose v. Utah
State, No. 2:09-CV-695-TC, 2009 WL 5066687, at *1 (D. Utah Dec. 16, 2009).
Ms. Rose did appeal from that dismissal, and a panel of our court
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“affirm[ed] . . . for the same reasons given by the district court,” including
Younger abstention. Rose v. Utah, 399 F. App’x 430, 436 (10th Cir. 2010).
Although the panel assessed monetary sanctions, it declined to issue “an
injunction preventing Ms. Rose from pursuing . . . litigation related to the Utah
State Bar’s pending disciplinary proceedings.” Id. at 439.
When Ms. Rose filed the third of the above-referenced federal lawsuits
directed at state bar proceedings, all of the judges in the District of Utah recused.
Her case was reassigned to the United States District Court for the District of
New Mexico, which (1) denied Ms. Rose’s motion for preliminary injunctive
relief (citing failure to show a likelihood of success on the merits), and (2)
subsequently dismissed her underlying complaint and imposed attorney’s fees,
costs, and filing restrictions.
Ms. Rose appealed from the order denying injunctive relief and from the
dismissal of her third lawsuit. A panel of this court dismissed her interlocutory
appeal as moot, observing that the District of New Mexico district court had
“recognized that Ms. Rose had previously litigated and lost the Younger issue in
two prior federal lawsuits and therefore was collaterally estopped from litigating
the same issue again in this, her third federal action.” Rose v. Utah State Bar,
444 F. App’x 298, 299 n.1 (10th Cir. 2011). Another panel of this court issued a
ruling in which it (1) affirmed the dismissal of her complaint and the imposition
of sanctions; (2) admonished her for pursuing “the same case on essentially the
5
same grounds”; and (3) noted its recent denial of her “request for a writ of
mandamus seeking [similar] relief.” Rose v. Utah State Bar, 471 F. App’x 818,
822–23 (10th Cir. 2012). Presumably anticipating additional abusive filings, the
latter panel concluded:
Rose’s briefs lack the clarity we expect from an attorney and are
replete with incomprehensible prose, irrelevant arguments, and
mischaracterizations of the record. Accordingly, we warn Rose
that if she persists in relitigating issues in this court that are
related to her state disciplinary proceeding, her filings may be
summarily dismissed, and we may impose sanctions, including
damages and filing restrictions, as necessary and appropriate in
aid of our jurisdiction.
Id. at 823 (internal quotation marks omitted).
As noted supra, despite repeated warnings, Ms. Rose has continued seeking
redress in federal court. She filed two motions in December 2013—in the
original federal MacArthur lawsuit, again purportedly on Plaintiffs’ behalf—with
an eye toward enjoining her disciplinary matter. The District of Utah district
court denied both motions on January 8, 2014. In so doing, the court noted that it
was denying relief for the same reasons stated in the Motions Order and quoted
from that order as follows:
To date, as Ms. Rose acknowledges, the State court has imposed
no sanction or disciplinary punishment upon her based upon her
handling of this case. Counsel for the Bar assures this court that
the State court has not yet held an evidentiary hearing on the
merits of the Bar’s complaint against Ms. Rose on any of the
grounds alleged; that it is clearly an ongoing State judicial
proceeding; and that Ms. Rose will be afforded a full opportunity
to present her defense on those merits before sanction or
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discipline, if any, is imposed by the State court. It also appears
that the State court remains structurally capable of
resolving—either at the district level or on appeal—the
constitutional, legal and jurisdictional questions that Ms. Rose
persists in raising in both her State and federal proceedings. That
being so, the State court should be afforded the opportunity to do
so without preemptive interference by this court.
Aplt. App., Vol. II, at 158A (footnotes omitted) (citation omitted) (quoting
Motions Order). Ms. Rose styled the instant appeal as a challenge to the January
2014 order.
The events set forth herein prompted our clerk’s office to consider the
matter for summary disposition and to order Ms. Rose to “file a written
response . . . addressing whether the issues raised by this appeal are related to her
state disciplinary proceedings.” Order, No. 14-4003, at 2 (10th Cir., filed Jan. 28,
2014). Defendants responded as well, requesting that this court consider
assessing monetary sanctions and Tenth Circuit filing restrictions against Ms.
Rose. In light of the responses submitted—most saliently, Ms. Rose’s 152-page
filing, which did not dispute that this appeal concerns the OPC matter—we
ordered Ms. Rose to address sanctions and filing restrictions in her opening brief.
She has failed to advance any meaningful argument in that regard or to
demonstrate that her state bar matter has been resolved.
II
In light of this procedural history, we reach two critical conclusions
regarding the case’s disposition. First, we harbor no doubt that Ms. Rose’s appeal
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is not a substantive challenge to the denial of injunctive relief. We therefore do
not engage in the traditional analysis for appeals that in fact dispute a district
court’s denial of a preliminary injunction. See Republican Party of N.M. v. King,
741 F.3d 1089, 1092 (10th Cir. 2013) (assaying for an abuse of discretion and
describing the usual four-prong test for such challenges). Second, we are
satisfied that summary dismissal of Ms. Rose’s appeal is justified. See 10th Cir.
R. 27.2(B) (permitting summary dismissal “[a]fter giving notice to the parties”);
United States v. Rubio-Ayala, 435 F. App’x 755, 758 (10th Cir. 2011) (“[W]e
have examined the relevant parts of the record, and we summarily dispose of this
appeal [under Rule 27.2(B)].”); see also 10th Cir. R. 27.2(A) (authorizing
summary dismissal “for any other reason a dismissal is permitted”). Ms. Rose has
received the requisite notice and opportunity to respond as regards summary
dismissal—and, in her response, has demonstrated that this appeal undeniably
relates to the state court action initiated by the OPC. Summary dismissal on
grounds of Younger abstention is therefore appropriate.
Based on Congress’s “desire to permit state courts to try state cases free
from interference by federal courts,” Younger, 401 U.S. at 43, Younger abstention
is warranted when (1) there are “ongoing state criminal, civil, or administrative
proceedings”; (2) the state court “offer[s] an adequate forum to hear the federal
plaintiff’s claims from the federal lawsuit”; and (3) the state proceeding concerns
“important state interests, matters which traditionally look to state law for their
8
resolution or implicate separately articulated state policies,” Taylor v. Jaquez, 126
F.3d 1294, 1297 (10th Cir. 1997); accord Chapman v. Oklahoma, 472 F.3d 747,
749 (10th Cir. 2006). Abstention under Younger is mandatory once these
requirements have been met. See Amanatullah v. Colo. Bd. of Med. Exam’rs, 187
F.3d 1160, 1163 (10th Cir. 1999) (“Younger abstention dictates that federal courts
not interfere.” (emphasis added) (quoting Rienhardt v. Kelly, 164 F.3d 1296, 1302
(10th Cir. 1999)) (internal quotation marks omitted)); accord Walck v.
Edmondson, 472 F.3d 1227, 1233 (10th Cir. 2007).
The Supreme Court has expressly held that “[c]ircumstances fitting within
the Younger doctrine . . . include . . . ‘civil proceedings involving certain orders
that are uniquely in furtherance of the state courts’ ability to perform their
judicial functions.’” Sprint Commc’ns, Inc. v. Jacobs, --- U.S. ----, 134 S. Ct.
584, 588 (2013) (quoting New Orleans Pub. Serv., Inc. v. Council of City of New
Orleans, 491 U.S. 350, 367–68 (1989)). The Court has likewise made clear that
state attorney-discipline proceedings are within Younger’s scope. See Middlesex
Cnty. Ethics Comm. v. Garden State Bar Ass’n, 457 U.S. 423, 433–34 (1982)
(finding it “clear beyond doubt” that a state supreme court’s attorney-discipline
processes and procedures are “judicial in nature” (internal quotation marks
omitted)). We have heeded this instruction. See, e.g., Razatos v. Colo. Supreme
Court, 746 F.2d 1429, 1435 (10th Cir. 1984) (“[T]he challenged [attorney]
disciplinary proceedings are definitely judicial . . . .”); see also Vakas v.
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Rodriquez, 728 F.2d 1293, 1297 (10th Cir. 1984) (“The principles of comity and
federalism dictate that federal courts abstain from premature entry into state
judicial construction of . . . disciplinary procedures.”).
With these principles in mind, we find it pellucid that there is no legally
cognizable basis for undertaking a merits analysis of Ms. Rose’s frivolous appeal.
It is well-settled in this circuit that “[a]n appeal is frivolous when the result is
obvious, or the appellant’s arguments of error are wholly without merit.” Braley
v. Campbell, 832 F.2d 1504, 1510 (10th Cir. 1987) (en banc) (internal quotation
marks omitted). Under Younger, the result could hardly be more obvious: we
must dismiss the appeal, and Ms. Rose must see her state court matter through to
completion. There is no dispute that (1) Ms. Rose’s OPC matter is one of the
“ongoing” state proceedings contemplated by Younger and Middlesex; (2) she
could raise in state court the same claims brought here (i.e., her basic
disagreement with the propriety of the OPC charges), see, e.g., Dist. Ct. Doc.
1134, at 2 (Mot., filed Dec. 30, 2013) (“The simplest issue is that the Plaintiffs[’]
lawyer is being prosecuted . . . in state court.”); or (3) the issue of her
professional competence is an important matter of Utah law. Additionally, to the
extent her appeal could be construed as anything other than an attack on ongoing
state proceedings, it is nonetheless frivolous for lack of any cogent legal
argument. “Courts are in no way obligated to tolerate arguments that thoroughly
defy common sense,” Charczuk v. Comm’r of Internal Revenue, 771 F.2d 471,
10
475 (10th Cir. 1985), and we are confident that this statement aptly describes Ms.
Rose’s filings.
Ultimately, it is clear that all three Younger requirements are present in Ms.
Rose’s case and that Ms. Rose has not met her “heavy burden to overcome the bar
of Younger abstention.” Phelps v. Hamilton, 122 F.3d 885, 889 (10th Cir. 1997)
(internal quotation marks omitted). These considerations lead ineluctably to the
conclusion that we are not situated to resolve the matter. We therefore dismiss
Ms. Rose’s appeal.
III
Ms. Rose has ignored numerous warnings that further frivolous filings
might subject her to filing restrictions. She has “no constitutional right of access
to the courts to prosecute an action that is frivolous or malicious.” Landrith v.
Schmidt, 732 F.3d 1171, 1174 (10th Cir. 2013) (per curiam) (quoting Tripati v.
Beaman, 878 F.2d 351, 353 (10th Cir. 1989) (per curiam)) (internal quotation
marks omitted). Our precedent establishes that we may invoke our “inherent
power” to impose “carefully tailored restrictions,” id. (quoting Cotner v. Hopkins,
795 F.2d 900, 902 (10th Cir. 1986)) (internal quotation marks omitted), so long as
“[her] abusive and lengthy history is properly set forth”—as we have done in Part
II, supra—and she is allowed to oppose the restrictions before they take effect,
Tripati, 878 F.2d at 353–54.
Subject to Ms. Rose’s opportunity to file written objections that we outline
11
below, we propose to enjoin her from petitioning the Tenth Circuit Court of
Appeals for relief, either by appeal or through an original proceeding, unless she
complies with the following restrictions:
First, Ms. Rose may not file any documents in this court unless she is
represented by a licensed attorney—other than herself—who is admitted to
practice in this court. Her attorney must certify that, based on his or her review
of the proposed filing, Ms. Rose has stated a legally cognizable cause of action
that comports with all applicable federal and circuit rules of procedure.
Alternatively, if Ms. Rose seeks to proceed pro se, she must:
1. Submit a petition to the clerk of this court seeking leave to
file a pro se action and setting forth: (a) a list of all pro se
lawsuits currently pending or filed previously with this
court, including the name, number, and citation (if
applicable) of each case, and the current status or
disposition of the case; and (b) a list of all outstanding
injunctions or orders limiting Ms. Rose’s access to federal
court, including orders and injunctions requiring her either
to seek leave to file matters pro se or be represented by
counsel, with each matter identified by name, number, and
citation (if applicable), of all such orders or injunctions;
and
2. File with the clerk of this court a notarized affidavit
reciting the issues she seeks to present, including a short
discussion of the legal basis asserted in support and, if
appropriate, describing with particularity the order being
challenged. The affidavit must certify to the best of Ms.
Rose’s knowledge that the legal arguments being raised
are not frivolous or made in bad faith; that they are
warranted by existing law or a good-faith argument for the
extension, modification, or reversal of existing law; that
her petition or appeal is not being filed for any improper
12
purpose; and that she will comply with all appellate and
local rules of this court.
Once filed, these documents shall be submitted to the chief judge of this
court or her designee for review. Without the approval of the chief judge or her
designee, the matter will be dismissed. If Ms. Rose’s submission is approved, an
order will be entered indicating that the matter shall proceed in accordance with
the Federal Rules of Appellate Procedure and Tenth Circuit Rules.
Within twenty-one days of the date of this order and judgment, Ms. Rose is
ordered to show cause why these filing restrictions should not issue. Her
response shall be in writing and shall be limited to fifteen pages, following the
font and type limitations set forth in Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure 32(a).
Failure to respond shall result in the proposed injunction taking effect twenty-
eight days from the date of this order and judgment and applying to any matter
filed after that date. If Ms. Rose does file a timely, compliant response, the
proposed injunction will not enter unless this court so orders, after fairly
considering the response and ruling on Ms. Rose’s objections.
IV
We DISMISS Ms. Rose’s appeal on grounds of Younger abstention.
Consistent with our proposal in Part III, supra, we also order Ms. Rose to file a
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response within twenty-one days of this order and judgment.
Entered for the Court
JEROME A. HOLMES
Circuit Judge
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