United States v. Thomas Legall , 585 F. App'x 4 ( 2014 )


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  •                             UNPUBLISHED
    UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
    FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
    No. 14-4263
    UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
    Plaintiff - Appellee,
    v.
    THOMAS LAMONT LEGALL, a/k/a Clarence Shamel Rahmeik Gatling,
    Defendant - Appellant.
    Appeal from the United States District Court for the Eastern
    District of Virginia, at Newport News. Robert G. Doumar, Senior
    District Judge. (4:12-cr-00106-RGD-LRL-1)
    Submitted:   September 23, 2014           Decided:   October 20, 2014
    Before NIEMEYER, KING, and DUNCAN, Circuit Judges.
    Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.
    Crystina M. O’Brien, THE O’BRIEN LAW FIRM, PLC, Hampton,
    Virginia, for Appellant.       Dana J. Boente, United States
    Attorney, Richard D. Cooke, Assistant United States Attorney,
    Richmond, Virginia, for Appellee.
    Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
    PER CURIAM:
    Thomas Lamont Legall pleaded guilty to one count of
    conspiracy to distribute and possess with intent to distribute
    five kilograms or more of cocaine, in violation of 21 U.S.C.
    §§ 841(a)(1), (b)(1)(A), and 846 (2012), but reserved his right
    to appeal the district court’s denial of his motion to suppress
    the evidence seized from his hotel room.                         On appeal, Legall
    argues     that    the    use     of   a   drug-detecting       dog   constituted     an
    illegal warrantless search.                Finding no error, we affirm.
    This        court     reviews        a   district        court’s    legal
    conclusions on a motion to suppress de novo.                      United States v.
    Guijon-Ortiz, 
    660 F.3d 757
    , 762 (4th Cir. 2011).                         Because the
    district court denied the motion, we construe the evidence in
    the light most favorable to the Government, the party prevailing
    below.      United States v. Black, 
    707 F.3d 531
    , 534 (4th Cir.
    2013).
    Legall first argues, relying on Florida v. Jardines,
    
    133 S. Ct. 1409
    (2013), that police entered the curtilage of his
    hotel room when they approached the threshold and deployed a
    drug-detecting dog to conduct a sniff of his hotel room door.
    In    Jardines,      the     Supreme        Court     applied     the   “traditional
    property-based understanding of the Fourth Amendment,” 133 S.
    Ct.   at   1417,    to     hold    that     “using    a   drug-sniffing    dog   on    a
    homeowner’s porch to investigate the contents of the home is a
    2
    ‘search’ within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment.”                             
    Id. at 1413,
    1418.      Because “the officers’ investigation took place in
    a    constitutionally         protected     area,”    
    id. at 1415,
        and    the
    officers exceeded the scope of the implicit license permitting
    them     to     approach        the    front       door,         the     search         was
    unconstitutional.        
    Id. at 1416.
    We conclude that, here, the officer did not enter the
    curtilage of the hotel room when conducting the search.                                  In
    determining whether an area is curtilage to the home, this court
    considers      “‘[1]    the     proximity     of     the    area       claimed     to    be
    curtilage to the home, [2] whether the area is included within
    an enclosure surrounding the home, [3] the nature of the uses to
    which the area is put, and [4] the steps taken by the resident
    to protect the area from observation by people passing by.’”
    United States v. Jackson, 
    728 F.3d 367
    , 373 (4th Cir. 2013)
    (quoting      United    States    v.   Dunn,    
    480 U.S. 294
    ,     301     (1987))
    (alterations in Jackson), cert. denied, 
    134 S. Ct. 1347
    (2014).
    The “centrally relevant consideration” is “whether the area in
    question is so intimately tied to the home itself that it should
    be   placed     under    the     home’s   ‘umbrella’        of     Fourth      Amendment
    protection.”       
    Id. at 374
    (internal quotation marks omitted).
    Applying these factors, we find that the common hallway of the
    hotel was not within any curtilage of the hotel room.
    3
    Legall further argues that the dog sniff infringed on
    his legitimate expectation of privacy.                           He asserts that police
    violated his right to privacy when they used a trained drug-
    detecting dog to ascertain the contents of his room.                              See Kyllo
    v. United States, 
    533 U.S. 27
    , 40 (2001) (holding that use of a
    device not in general-public use, such as thermal imaging, by
    the    Government     to     explore    aspects             of    home    not    previously
    knowable without physical entry surveillance is a search).
    We conclude that the officer here did not infringe
    upon a reasonable expectation of privacy.                           “The use of a well-
    trained   narcotics-detection          dog       —    one        that   ‘does    not    expose
    noncontraband     items      that    otherwise         would        remain      hidden    from
    public view — during a lawful traffic stop, generally does not
    implicate legitimate privacy interests.”                          Illinois v. Caballes,
    
    543 U.S. 405
    , 409 (2005) (internal quotation marks and citation
    omitted).        Moreover,          “[t]he       legitimate             expectation       that
    information about perfectly lawful activity will remain private
    is    categorically     distinguishable              from    [a     person’s]      hopes    or
    expectations concerning the nondetection of contraband.”                                
    Id. at 410.
       Because the drug-detecting dog disclosed only the presence
    of illegal narcotics, we find that the dog-sniff did not violate
    Legall’s legitimate expectation of privacy.
    Accordingly, we affirm the district court’s judgment.
    We    dispense   with      oral   argument       because          the    facts    and    legal
    4
    contentions are adequately presented in the material before this
    court and argument will not aid the decisional process.
    AFFIRMED
    5
    

Document Info

Docket Number: 14-4263

Citation Numbers: 585 F. App'x 4

Filed Date: 10/20/2014

Precedential Status: Non-Precedential

Modified Date: 1/13/2023