Eric Dudley v. JP Morgan Chase Bank, N.A. , 581 F. App'x 834 ( 2014 )

Case: 14-12535 Date Filed: 10/31/2014 Page: 1 of 3
[DO NOT PUBLISH]
IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT
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No. 14-12535
Non-Argument Calendar
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D.C. Docket No. 8:14-cv-01030-VMC-TGW
ERIC DUDLEY,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
versus
JP MORGAN CHASE BANK, N.A.,
Defendant-Appellee.
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Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Middle District of Florida
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(October 31, 2014)
Before TJOFLAT, MARTIN, and JORDAN, Circuit Judges.
PER CURIAM:
Eric Dudley, proceeding pro se, appeals the district court’s sua sponte
dismissal of his complaint for lack of jurisdiction and denial of his motion for
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reconsideration. Because the district court correctly determined that it lacks
jurisdiction over Dudley’s action, we affirm.
The district court dismissed Dudley’s federal case because he sought federal
court review of a state court’s decision against him in a state foreclosure action.
On appeal, Dudley does not dispute that “the purpose of this [action] is to request
the Supreme Court of Florida to correct the error of the lower courts,” that is, the
Florida state courts which exercised jurisdiction over his foreclosure.
However, as the district court’s order correctly concludes, “federal district
courts have no authority to review final judgments of a state court.” Lozman v.
City of Riviera Beach, Fla., 713 F.3d 1066, 1072 (11th Cir. 2013) (quotation mark
omitted); see also Casale v. Tillman, 558 F.3d 1258, 1260 (11th Cir. 2009) (per
curiam) (“The Rooker-Feldman doctrine makes clear that federal district courts
cannot review state court final judgments because that task is reserved for state
appellate courts or, as a last resort, the United States Supreme Court.”). Dudley’s
action in the federal district court falls squarely within the narrow scope of cases
which cannot be entertained in federal district courts under the Rooker-Feldman
doctrine. 1 His case is one “brought by [a] state-court loser[] complaining of
injuries caused by state-court judgments rendered before the district court
1
The Rooker-Feldman doctrine stems from the United States Supreme Court’s decisions
in Rooker v. Fidelity Trust Co., 263 U.S. 413, 44 S. Ct. 149 (1923), and District of Columbia
Court of Appeals v. Feldman, 460 U.S. 462, 103 S. Ct. 1303 (1983).
2
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proceedings commenced and inviting district court review and rejection of those
judgments.” Exxon Mobil Corp. v. Saudi Basic Indus. Corp., 544 U.S. 280, 284,
125 S. Ct. 1517, 1521–22 (2005). The district court therefore correctly concluded
that it cannot exercise jurisdiction over Dudley’s action. As a result, we find no
error in the district court’s sua sponte dismissal of Dudley’s complaint or its denial
of his motion for reconsideration.
AFFIRMED.
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