State of Minnesota v. Hugh Alexander Larson ( 2014 )

This opinion will be unpublished and
may not be cited except as provided by
Minn. Stat. § 480A.08, subd. 3 (2012).
STATE OF MINNESOTA
IN COURT OF APPEALS
A13-2090
State of Minnesota,
Respondent,
vs.
Hugh Alexander Larson,
Appellant.
Filed November 3, 2014
Affirmed as modified
Schellhas, Judge
Stearns County District Court
File No. 73-CR-12-4554
Lori Swanson, Attorney General, Karen B. Andrews, Assistant Attorney General, St.
Paul, Minnesota; and
Janelle P. Kendall, Stearns County Attorney, St. Cloud, Minnesota (for respondent)
Cathryn Middlebrook, Chief Appellate Public Defender, Anders J. Erickson, Assistant
Public Defender, St. Paul, Minnesota (for appellant)
Considered and decided by Rodenberg, Presiding Judge; Worke, Judge; and
Schellhas, Judge.
UNPUBLISHED OPINION
SCHELLHAS, Judge
Appellant challenges his convictions of second-degree criminal sexual conduct
and false imprisonment and his sentences, arguing that: (1) the evidence is insufficient to
support his convictions; (2) the district court committed reversible error in admitting the
victim’s out-of-court statements to a medical professional; and (3) the court erred by
sentencing appellant for false imprisonment. We affirm as modified.
FACTS
In November 2011, 35-month-old C.W. became separated from his stepfather,
who was supervising him and several other young children at church. About eight to ten
minutes after C.W.’s stepfather realized that C.W.’s whereabouts were unknown, C.W.
emerged from a men’s bathroom with appellant Hugh Alexander Larson. C.W.’s
stepfather yelled at Larson, and C.W.’s mother called police. Larson told the church
pastor and a police officer that he had helped C.W. use the toilet and denied touching
C.W. in an inappropriate manner. That evening, C.W. told his mother that Larson had
touched C.W.’s penis, that C.W. had touched Larson’s penis, and that C.W.’s penis hurt
and “was dirty.” C.W.’s mother reported this information to police.
Larson gave a recorded statement to police in November 2011 in which he again
claimed to have helped C.W. use the toilet and denied touching C.W. inappropriately. In
December, Larson indicated in another statement that he had touched C.W.’s penis
briefly while he was helping him with his clothes but denied that the touching was
sexually motivated. Larson later told two fellow inmates at the Stearns County Jail that
he had held down C.W.’s penis to direct his urine into the toilet, and he told one inmate
that “[t]his was the first time he’s ever gotten caught.”
Following the November 2011 incident, C.W. began to have potty-training
accidents and bedtime problems, including nightmares and fear of the dark. C.W. also
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began to make masturbation motions and began to hit his penis. In December 2011, C.W.
again told his mother that the “big man” had touched his penis. C.W.’s mother asked him
whether the man had hurt him, and C.W. responded affirmatively and pointed to his
buttocks. C.W.’s mother also reported this information to police and took C.W. to a
hospital, where a physician assistant examined him. C.W. told the physician assistant that
“the big guy had hurt him” and had “touched his pee-pee and his butt” and that his “pee-
pee and butt hurt.” The physician assistant’s examination of C.W. did not reveal any
physical injuries. C.W. later saw a clinical therapist, who concluded that C.W. met the
criteria for posttraumatic stress disorder (PTSD).
By an amended complaint filed in December 2012, respondent State of Minnesota
charged Larson with second-degree criminal sexual conduct under Minn. Stat. § 609.343,
subd. 1(a) (2010); kidnapping under Minn. Stat. § 609.25, subd. 1(2) (2010); and false
imprisonment under Minn. Stat. § 609.255, subd. 2 (2010). The district court determined
that C.W. lacked capacity to testify at trial and denied Larson’s motion to suppress
C.W.’s out-of-court statements to his mother and the physician assistant.
Larson waived his right to a jury trial, and the district court conducted a bench
trial. Larson did not testify or call any witnesses. The district court found Larson guilty of
second-degree criminal sexual conduct and false imprisonment and not guilty of
kidnapping. The court imposed a stayed 36-month prison sentence for Larson’s
conviction of criminal sexual conduct and a stayed 13-month prison sentence for his
conviction of false imprisonment.
This appeal follows.
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DECISION
Sufficiency of the evidence
Larson argues that the evidence is insufficient to support his convictions. “When
reviewing a claim of insufficient evidence, our inquiry is limited to whether the fact-
finder could have reasonably concluded that the defendant was guilty beyond a
reasonable doubt.” Gulbertson v. State, 843 N.W.2d 240, 244–45 (Minn. 2014). In
conducting that inquiry, “[w]e view the evidence in the light most favorable to the verdict
and assume that the fact finder believed the state’s witnesses and disbelieved any
contrary evidence.” Id. at 245 (quotation omitted).
Larson argues that the evidence is insufficient to support his conviction of second-
degree criminal sexual conduct because the state failed to prove that he acted with sexual
or aggressive intent when he touched C.W.’s penis. “A person who engages in sexual
contact with another person is guilty of criminal sexual conduct in the second degree
if . . . the complainant is under 13 years of age and the actor is more than 36 months older
than the complainant.” Minn. Stat. § 609.343, subd. 1(a). Sexual contact includes “the
intentional touching by the actor of the complainant’s intimate parts,” where such
touching is “committed with sexual or aggressive intent.” Minn. Stat. § 609.341, subd.
11(a)(i) (2010).
“[B]ecause intent is a state of mind, it is generally proved by inferences drawn
from a person’s words or actions in light of all the surrounding circumstances.” State v.
Thompson, 544 N.W.2d 8, 11 (Minn. 1996); see also State v. Austin, 788 N.W.2d 788,
792 (Minn. App. 2010) (“[A] showing of sexual intent does not require direct evidence of
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the defendant’s desires or gratification because a subjective sexual intent typically must
be inferred from the nature of the conduct itself.”), review denied (Minn. Dec. 14, 2010).
We apply a two-step analysis in determining whether
circumstantial evidence is sufficient to support a guilty
verdict. The first step is to identify the circumstances proved.
The second step is to determine whether the circumstances
proved are consistent with guilt and inconsistent with any
rational hypothesis except that of guilt.
State v. Moore, 846 N.W.2d 83, 88 (Minn. 2014) (quotations and citations omitted). “A
[fact-finder] is in the best position to evaluate circumstantial evidence, and its verdict is
entitled to due deference.” State v. Fairbanks, 842 N.W.2d 297, 307 (Minn. 2014).
Here, the record supports, and Larson concedes in his brief, that the circumstances
proved include the following:
 [Larson] and C.W. . . . were alone in a men’s bathroom . . .
for at least five minutes.
 [Larson] was not authorized, and did not have C.W.’s
parents’ permission, to bring C.W. into the bathroom.
 [Larson] shut and locked the bathroom door.
 [Larson] touched C.W.’s penis while inside the bathroom.
 C.W. appeared frightened as he exited the bathroom . . . .
 C.W. complained to his mother and a physician assistant that
his penis hurt and that the “big man” touched his penis. Also,
C.W. exhibited symptoms associated with being sexually
assaulted. C.W. was diagnosed with post-traumatic stress
disorder. . . .
 [Larson] . . . admitted he touched C.W.’s penis while helping
C.W. pull his pants to his waist after using the bathroom.
 [Larson] stated to an inmate at the Steams County Jail that
this was the first time he was “caught.” [Larson] also
admitted to inmates that he held C.W.’s penis down while
C.W. went to the bathroom.
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The record reveals that Larson related several inconsistent versions of the incident
to police and inmates. He alternately denied that he had touched C.W.’s penis,
acknowledged that he might have “grazed” or “brushed” C.W.’s penis while re-dressing
him, stated that he had “readjust[ed]” C.W.’s penis while pulling up his underwear, and
explained that he had held down C.W.’s penis to direct his urine into the toilet. Larson
also repeatedly told police and inmates that the bathroom door had locked automatically
after he and C.W. entered the bathroom. One of Larson’s co-inmates testified about his
familiarity with the church bathroom, noting that the door did not automatically lock. As
above noted, Larson concedes that he shut and locked the bathroom door.
We conclude that the district court had “substantial grounds to doubt the veracity”
of Larson’s assertion that, while he touched C.W.’s penis, he did so without sexual or
aggressive intent. See State v. Race, 383 N.W.2d 656, 662 (Minn. 1986) (quotation
omitted) (“Significant inconsistencies in [defendant]’s statements to authorities
substantially diminished the credibility of his [exculpatory] assertion . . . .”). We also
conclude that the circumstances proved are inconsistent with any rational hypothesis
except that Larson touched C.W.’s penis with sexual or aggressive intent. Accordingly,
we conclude that Larson fails to show that his conviction for second-degree criminal
sexual conduct is not supported by sufficient evidence.
Larson also argues that the evidence is insufficient to support his conviction of
false imprisonment because his confinement and restraint of C.W. was incidental to his
sexual touching of C.W. While Larson concedes that he confined and restrained C.W. in
the bathroom by shutting and locking the door, he claims that such confinement and
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restraint is not “criminally significant in the sense of being more than merely incidental to
the underlying crime” of second-degree criminal sexual conduct. See State v. Smith, 669
N.W.2d 19, 32 (Minn. 2003), overruled on other grounds by State v. Leake, 699 N.W.2d
312, 323 (Minn. 2005). A person commits the offense of false imprisonment when he
“knowingly lacking lawful authority to do so, intentionally confines or restrains someone
else’s child under the age of 18 years without consent of the child’s parent or legal
custodian.” Minn. Stat. § 609.255, subd. 2 (emphasis added).
In the context of kidnapping, the supreme court has stated that “confinement or
removal must be criminally significant in the sense of being more than merely incidental
to the underlying crime.”1 Smith, 669 N.W.2d at 32. The supreme court concluded that
“where the confinement or removal of the victim is completely incidental to the
perpetration of a separate felony, it does not constitute kidnapping.” Id. (emphasis
added); see also State v. Welch, 675 N.W.2d 615, 620 (Minn. 2004) (concluding, when
“[n]o removal—let alone nonincidental removal—[wa]s even alleged,” that “facts clearly
d[id] not support a conviction for kidnapping”).
In this case, Larson was not convicted of kidnapping—he was convicted of false
imprisonment. We have found no reported case addressing the applicability of Smith and
Welch in the context of false imprisonment. Even assuming the applicability of Smith and
Welch, we are persuaded that Larson’s confinement and restraint of C.W. was not
1
See Minn. Stat. § 609.25, subd. 1 (2010) (providing that a person commits the offense
of kidnapping when he “confines or removes from one place to another . . . [a] person . . .
under the age of 16 years, without the consent of the person’s parents or other legal
custodian,” for any enumerated purpose (emphasis added)).
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completely incidental to his commission of second-degree criminal sexual conduct. We
conclude that Larson’s taking C.W. into the bathroom and locking the door constituted
confinement and restraint of C.W. that was “criminally significant in the sense of being
more than merely incidental to the underlying crime [of second-degree criminal sexual
conduct].” See Smith, 669 N.W.2d at 32. Compare State v. Juarez, 837 N.W.2d 473, 484–
85 (Minn. 2013) (concluding that removal of victim from outside of bar to nearby narrow
alley was not “completely incidental” to criminal sexual conduct, although “removal was
committed at approximately the same time as [defendant]’s criminal sexual conduct and
was intended to facilitate that conduct,” since defendant “moved [victim] away from a
safe location—in which she was out in the open and close to her friends—and transported
her to a place that was confined and isolated, and where she would be more vulnerable to
him”), and State v. Earl, 702 N.W.2d 711, 714, 722–23 (Minn. 2005) (concluding that
removing victims from their living room and bedrooms and confining them in their
kitchen was not merely incidental to burglary, “[a]lthough the confinement or removal
. . . may have been necessary to commit the burglary,” since it “is purposeful behavior in
its own right” that “constitutes criminal conduct distinct from the burglary”), with Welch,
675 N.W.2d at 617, 620–21 (reasoning that any confinement effected by throwing victim
to ground, straddling her, and grabbing her hair “is the very force and coercion that
supports the attempted second-degree criminal sexual conduct conviction” and
concluding that any confinement was incidental), and Smith, 669 N.W.2d at 32–33
(concluding that confinement that occurred when defendant momentarily blocked
doorway of bedroom from which victim was trying to escape “was completely incidental
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to the murder for which [defendant] was convicted”). Because Larson’s confinement and
restraint of C.W. was criminally significant, his argument that his conviction of false
imprisonment is unsupported by sufficient evidence fails.
Admission of hearsay
Larson argues that the district court committed reversible error in admitting
C.W.’s out-of-court statements to the physician assistant—that “the big guy had hurt
him” and had “touched his pee-pee and his butt” and that his “pee-pee and butt hurt”—
under the medical-diagnosis hearsay exception.2 “Generally, a reviewing court defers to
the district court’s evidentiary rulings and will not overturn the rulings absent a clear
abuse of discretion.” State v. Dobbins, 725 N.W.2d 492, 505 (Minn. 2006).
The medical-diagnosis exception provides that out-of-court statements are
admissible to prove the truth of the matter asserted therein if they are “made for purposes
of medical diagnosis or treatment and describing medical history, or past or present
symptoms, pain, or sensations, or the inception or general character of the cause or
external source thereof insofar as reasonably pertinent to diagnosis or treatment.” Minn.
R. Evid. 803(4). The Minnesota Supreme Court has not adopted a broad rule that
2
On appeal, Larson abandons previously asserted arguments that C.W.’s out-of-court
statements to his mother constitute inadmissible hearsay and that admission of any of
C.W.’s out-of-court statements violates Larson’s rights under the Confrontation Clause.
Even if Larson does not abandon his Confrontation Clause challenge to admission of
C.W.’s out-of-court statements to the physician assistant, the challenge lacks merit. See
State v. Krasky, 736 N.W.2d 636, 638, 641–42 (Minn. 2007) (reasoning that the “primary
purpose” of six-year-old victim’s report of sexual abuse by defendant to a nurse at
Midwest Children’s Resource Center was “to assess and protect [victim]’s health and
welfare” and “conclud[ing] that [victim]’s statements to [the nurse] were nontestimonial
and that admission of those statements will not violate [defendant]’s rights under the
Confrontation Clause”).
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“statements of identification by child sexual abuse victims are always admissible under
the medical diagnosis exception.” State v. Robinson, 718 N.W.2d 400, 405 (Minn. 2006).
“[S]tatements attributing fault, including statements identifying the accused perpetrator,
are ordinarily not admissible” under the medical-diagnosis exception. Id. at 404. The
supreme court has “recognized the importance of examining each statement individually
and applying the facts on a case-by-case basis.” Id. at 405. On such individual
examination, statements of identification by child sexual abuse victims may be
admissible under the medical-diagnosis exception. See State v. Larson, 453 N.W.2d 42,
47–48 (Minn. 1990) (Larson I) (holding that out-of-court statement of identification by
preschool-aged victim of sexual abuse was “independently admissible” under medical-
diagnosis exception), vacated on other grounds, 498 U.S. 801, 111 S. Ct. 29 (1990).3 A
child’s statements to medical personnel “are admissible [under the medical-diagnosis
exception] only if the evidence suggests that the child knew she was speaking to medical
personnel and that it was important she tell the truth.” State v. Salazar, 504 N.W.2d 774,
777 (Minn. 1993).
Here, although the district court did not make express findings before admitting
C.W.’s out-of-court statements to the physician assistant under the medical-diagnosis
exception, record evidence reflects that C.W. knew that the physician assistant was a
medical professional and that it was important to tell the truth. C.W.’s parents told him
that the physician assistant was a doctor, and the physician assistant examined C.W. in a
3
We are unaware of any relationship between appellant Hugh Larson in this case and
appellant Bruce Larson in the cited case.
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hospital emergency room. Moreover, C.W. had a “treatment-related motive” to tell the
truth during the examination so that the physician assistant could address C.W.’s
previously reported pain. See State v. Larson, 472 N.W.2d 120, 126 (Minn. 1991)
(Larson II) (reasoning that preschool-aged victim of sexual abuse, who was taken to
family practice clinic after complaining of vaginal soreness and burning urination, “had
the same ‘selfish’ treatment-related motive to speak the truth that anyone has when one
goes to a doctor’s office sincerely inquiring about one or more symptoms” (footnote
omitted)). We therefore conclude that the district court did not err in admitting C.W.’s
out-of-court statements to the physician assistant under the medical-diagnosis exception.
Regardless of whether C.W.’s statements to the physician assistant are admissible
under the medical-diagnosis exception or otherwise, the statements are nearly identical to
other statements made by C.W. to his mother. And Larson does not challenge the
admission of those statements. Moreover, Larson admitted to touching C.W.’s penis, and
much of the circumstantial evidence proving that the touching was done with sexual or
aggressive intent is independent of any out-of-court statement by C.W. Consequently,
any error in the district court’s admission of C.W.’s statements to the physician assistant
is harmless. See State v. McDonald-Richards, 840 N.W.2d 9, 19 (Minn. 2013)
(“Improperly admitted evidence is harmless . . . when the evidence is cumulative or there
is other extensive evidence connecting the defendant to the commission of the crime.”
(quotation omitted)).
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Sentencing error
Larson argues that the district court erred by sentencing him for false
imprisonment because the criminal sexual conduct and the false imprisonment occurred
together as part of a single behavioral incident.4 Generally, “if a person’s conduct
constitutes more than one offense under the laws of this state, the person may be
punished for only one of the offenses.” Minn. Stat. § 609.035, subd. 1 (2010). The state
concedes, and we independently conclude, that the criminal sexual conduct and the false
imprisonment occurred as part of a single behavioral incident, i.e., a single course of
conduct. “Whether a defendant’s [multiple] offenses occurred as part of a single course of
conduct is a mixed question of law and fact” that “depends on the facts and
circumstances of the case. Offenses are part of a single course of conduct if the offenses
occurred at substantially the same time and place and were motivated by a single criminal
objective.” State v. Jones, 848 N.W.2d 528, 533 (Minn. 2014) (citation omitted).
Here, the second-degree criminal sexual conduct and the false imprisonment
occurred during the same eight-to-ten-minute period in the same bathroom. Larson’s
conduct, in entering the bathroom with C.W., locking the door, and touching C.W.’s
penis, reflects a single criminal objective: to molest C.W. without being seen doing so.
Cf. State v. Herberg, 324 N.W.2d 346, 349 (Minn. 1982) (concluding that defendant’s
one “underlying motivation” for two acts of penetration was “to satisfy his perverse
sexual needs,” although “[d]efendant moved the victim to a different place before
4
Although Larson raises his sentencing argument for the first time on appeal, the
statutory protection against multiple sentencing “is not forfeited by failing to raise the
issue in the district court.” State v. Osborne, 715 N.W.2d 436, 441 n.3 (Minn. 2006).
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committing the second act of penetration,” where defendant moved the victim “only
because he feared that the first location was too open and that they might be noticed”).
We therefore conclude that the district court erred by sentencing Larson for both second-
degree criminal sexual conduct and false imprisonment.
Minnesota Statutes section 609.035, subdivision 1, “contemplates that a defendant
should be sentenced only for the most serious offense arising from a single course of
conduct because imposing up to the maximum punishment for the most serious offense
will include punishment for all offenses.” Jones, 848 N.W.2d at 538 n.6 (quotation
omitted). “[The supreme court] ha[s] indicated that an appellate court vacating a sentence
or sentences pursuant to section 609.035 should look to the length of the sentences
actually imposed . . . to ascertain which offense is the most serious, leaving the longest
sentence in place.” State v. Kebaso, 713 N.W.2d 317, 322 (Minn. 2006) (citing State v.
Norregaard, 384 N.W.2d 449, 450 (Minn. 1986); State v. Herberg, 324 N.W.2d 346, 350
(Minn. 1982); State v. Boley, 299 N.W.2d 924, 926 (Minn. 1980)).
In this case, the district court imposed a stayed 36-month prison sentence with
probation for second-degree criminal sexual conduct and a stayed 13-month prison
sentence with probation for false imprisonment. We therefore vacate Larson’s 13-month
sentence for false imprisonment.
Affirmed as modified.
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