Hunter v. State ( 2016 )

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF DELAWARE
MARION HUNTER, §
§ No. 186, 2016
Defendant Below, §
Appellant, § Court Below: Superior Court
§ of the State of Delaware
v. §
§ Cr. ID No. 1211023687
STATE OF DELAWARE, §
§
Plaintiff Below, §
Appellee. §
Submitted: May 18, 2016
Decided: August 1, 2016
Before STRINE, Chief Justice; VAUGHN, and SEITZ, Justices.
ORDER
This 1st day of August 2016, upon consideration of the appellant’s opening
brief, the appellee’s motion to affirm, and the Superior Court record,1 it appears to
the Court that:
(1) The appellant, Marion Hunter, filed this appeal from the Superior
Court’s order dated March 29, 2016, summarily dismissing his motion for
postconviction relief under Superior Court Criminal Rule 61. The State has filed a
motion to affirm the Superior Court’s judgment on the ground that it is manifest on
1
On June 9, 2016, the appellant filed a motion seeking leave to respond to the motion to affirm.
Under Supreme Court Rule 25(a), no response to a motion to affirm is permitted unless requested
by the Court. The Court did not request a response to the motion to affirm in this case and finds
no reason to request a response after considering the appellant’s motion.
the face of Hunter’s opening brief that the appeal is without merit. We agree and
affirm.
(2) Following his arrest in 2012, Hunter was indicted in 2013 on charges
of Rape in the First Degree, Sexual Abuse of a Child by a Person in a Position of
Trust, Strangulation, Assault in the Third Degree, and Terroristic Threatening. On
November 13, 2013, the first day of trial, the trial judge requested that Hunter’s
rejection of a guilty plea offered by the State be placed on the record. During the
court’s colloquy with Hunter, a recess was taken to allow Hunter to speak with his
defense counsel (“Defense Counsel”). Following the discussion with his Defense
Counsel, Hunter decided to accept the State’s plea offer.
(3) Under the plea agreement, Hunter pled guilty to Rape in the Second
Degree as a lesser included offense of Rape in the First Degree, and the State
dismissed the other charges in the indictment. Also, the State agreed to
recommend no more than ten years of imprisonment, the minimum mandatory
period of incarceration for Rape in the Second Degree, and to forego seeking to
have Hunter declared and sentenced as a habitual offender under 11 Del. C. §
4214. After conducting the required guilty plea colloquy, the Superior Court
accepted the guilty plea as knowing, intelligent, and voluntary and sentenced
Hunter to twenty years at Level V incarceration suspended after ten years for ten
years at Level IV suspended after two years for two years at Level III probation.
2
(4) On November 25, 2013, twelve days after the guilty plea proceeding
and sentencing, Hunter filed a motion for postconviction relief, claiming that his
guilty plea was coerced due to the ineffectiveness of his Defense Counsel. The
Superior Court appointed counsel to represent Hunter in the postconviction
proceeding. Counsel reviewed the existing record, which at the time did not
include a transcript of the November 13 guilty plea hearing, and filed a motion to
withdraw, asserting that he could find no grounds to raise in a postconviction
motion. The Superior Court denied counsel’s motion and instructed that new
counsel be assigned to represent Hunter in the postconviction proceeding.
Hunter’s new counsel (“Postconviction Counsel”) arranged for preparation of a
transcript of the guilty plea hearing.
(5) After reviewing the complete record, Postconviction Counsel filed a
motion to withdraw and supporting memorandum. Hunter filed responses raising
additional claims of ineffective assistance of counsel, which Postconviction
Counsel addressed in a reply. Defense Counsel filed an affidavit denying the
allegations of ineffective assistance of counsel raised in Hunter’s postconviction
motion, and the State filed a response in opposition to the motion, arguing that the
claims were without merit or were waived by the guilty plea. Hunter then filed a
response to each of those submissions.
3
(6) To prevail on a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel in the
context of a guilty plea, a defendant must demonstrate that his counsel’s
representation fell below an objective standard of reasonableness and that there is a
reasonable probability that, but for counsel’s errors, the defendant would not have
pled guilty but would have insisted on going to trial.2 In this case, the Superior
Court concluded that Hunter’s claim of ineffective assistance of counsel was
without merit and summarily dismissed the postconviction motion and granted
Postconviction Counsel’s motion to withdraw.3 This appeal followed.
(7) On appeal, Hunter argues that his Defense Counsel was ineffective
when he failed or refused to file a pretrial motion to dismiss. Hunter’s ineffective
assistance of counsel claim is based in part on an underlying claim that the State
lacked the evidence to convict him of the charges in the indictment. The record
reflects that Hunter raised the insufficient evidence claim in a pro se motion to
dismiss, which the Superior Court denied as without merit at final case review on
August 26, 2013.4
(8) The record belies Hunter’s claim that Defense Counsel was
ineffective for failing to file a motion to dismiss based on lack of evidence or for
any other reason. Hunter also has not demonstrated a reasonable probability that,
2
Albury v. State, 551 A.2d 53, 58-60 (Del. 1988) (citing Hill v. Lockhart, 474 U.S. 52, 58-60
(1985)).
3
State v. Hunter, 2016 WL 1424398 (Del. Super. Mar. 29, 2016).
4
Case Review Tr. at 8-14 (Aug. 26, 2013).
4
but for the alleged errors of his Defense Counsel, he would not have pled guilty but
would have insisted on going to trial.5 Given the possibility of a life sentence
Hunter faced if he went to trial, it is clear that Hunter received a substantial benefit
from the plea agreement negotiated by his Defense Counsel.
(9) A valid guilty plea waives any right to challenge the strength of the
State’s evidence and events preceding entry of the plea.6 In this case, during the
guilty plea colloquy on November 13, 2013, Hunter stated that he understood he
was waiving certain trial rights, including the right to a speedy and public trial, the
right to hear and question witnesses, and the opportunity to present evidence in his
own defense. Hunter also stated that he was satisfied with his Defense Counsel’s
representation. Absent clear and convincing evidence to the contrary, Hunter is
bound by those representations.7
NOW, THEREFORE, IT IS ORDERED that the motion to affirm is
GRANTED, and the judgment of the Superior Court is AFFIRMED.
BY THE COURT:
/s/ Collins J. Seitz, Jr.
Justice
5
Supra note 2.
6
Brown v. State, 108 A.3d 1201, 1202 (Del. 2015).
7
Somerville v. State, 703 A.2d 629, 632 (Del. 1997).
5