United States v. Russell Pryor ( 2017 )


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  •      Case: 15-20470       Document: 00514245092         Page: 1     Date Filed: 11/21/2017
    REVISED November 21, 2017
    IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
    FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT
    United States Court of Appeals
    Fifth Circuit
    No. 15-20470                                    FILED
    Summary Calendar                          November 20, 2017
    Lyle W. Cayce
    Clerk
    UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
    Plaintiff - Appellee
    v.
    RUSSELL RAY PRYOR,
    Defendant - Appellant
    Appeal from the United States District Court
    for the Southern District of Texas
    USDC No. 4:08-CV-267
    Before BARKSDALE, PRADO, and OWEN, Circuit Judges.
    PER CURIAM: *
    Russell Ray Pryor, federal prisoner #38706-179, and proceeding pro se
    on appeal, was sentenced to 360 months’ imprisonment for possessing a
    firearm after being adjudged guilty of a felony, and possessing a firearm to
    further a drug-trafficking crime, in violation of 18 U.S.C. §§ 922(g)(1),
    924(e)(1), and 924(c)(1)(A), and possessing with intent to distribute
    * Pursuant to 5th Cir. R. 47.5, the court has determined that this opinion should not
    be published and is not precedent except under the limited circumstances set forth in 5th Cir.
    R. 47.5.4.
    Case: 15-20470     Document: 00514245092      Page: 2   Date Filed: 11/21/2017
    No. 15-20470
    dihydrocodeinone, and possessing with intent to distribute codeine, in violation
    of 21 U.S.C. §§ 841(a)(1), 841(b)(1)(D), and 841(b)(3). Following being denied
    28 U.S.C. § 2255 relief, Pryor was denied a certificate of appealability (COA).
    After additional litigation contesting the final judgment, Pryor moved
    under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 60(b)(4) and (6) for relief from the
    judgment denying § 2255 relief. The district court denied Pryor’s motion.
    Our court granted Pryor a COA on one issue: whether the district court
    abused its discretion in denying Rule 60(b) relief from the denial of his § 2255
    motion, by refusing to consider pages missing from his affidavit in opposition
    to counsel’s affidavit, and not holding an evidentiary hearing on his claim
    counsel rendered ineffective assistance regarding the voluntariness of consent
    to a premises search that resulted in the introduction of evidence seized in that
    search.
    Pryor’s opening brief, which only twice mentions Rule 60(b), does not
    address the issue allowed by his COA. As in this instance, it is insufficient to
    allude to a legal theory. McIntosh v. Partridge, 
    540 F.3d 315
    , 325 n.12 (5th
    Cir. 2008). And, because Pryor does not address the issue on which the COA
    was granted, the issue is abandoned. E.g., Davis v. Maggio, 
    706 F.2d 568
    , 571
    (5th Cir. 1983); Cinel v. Connick, 
    15 F.3d 1338
    , 1345 (5th Cir. 1994); Yohey v.
    Collins, 
    985 F.2d 222
    , 224–225 (5th Cir. 1993).
    Pryor asserts his innocence and contends his convictions were
    constitutionally invalid as a result of, inter alia, ineffective assistance of
    counsel. But our jurisdiction does not extend to those issues; it is restricted to
    the above-described issue on which Pryor was granted a COA. 28 U.S.C.
    § 2253(c); Carty v. Thaler, 
    583 F.3d 244
    , 266 (5th Cir. 2009); United States v.
    White, 
    307 F.3d 336
    , 339 n.1 (5th Cir. 2002).
    AFFIRMED.
    2