United States v. Chavo Thomas ( 2014 )


Menu:
  •      Case: 13-31074       Document: 00512829480         Page: 1     Date Filed: 11/07/2014
    IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
    FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT
    United States Court of Appeals
    Fifth Circuit
    No. 13-31074                                 FILED
    Summary Calendar                        November 7, 2014
    Lyle W. Cayce
    Clerk
    UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
    Plaintiff - Appellee
    v.
    CHAVO T. THOMAS; MAURICE T. SMITH, also known as Maurice Smith,
    Defendants - Appellants
    Appeals from the United States District Court
    for the Western District of Louisiana
    USDC No. 1:12-CR-88
    Before SMITH, BARKSDALE, and PRADO, Circuit Judges.
    PER CURIAM: *
    Chavo T. Thomas and Maurice T. Smith were found guilty of conspiring
    to possess, with intent to distribute, 50 grams or more of methamphetamine
    and 500 grams or more of a mixture or substance containing a detectable
    amount of methamphetamine, in violation of 
    21 U.S.C. §§ 841
    (b)(1)(A) & 846.
    The district court sentenced Thomas to 275 months’ imprisonment, with 24
    months to run concurrent with any state sentence he was ordered to serve and
    * Pursuant to 5th Cir. R. 47.5, the court has determined that this opinion should not
    be published and is not precedent except under the limited circumstances set forth in 5th Cir.
    R. 47.5.4.
    Case: 13-31074     Document: 00512829480      Page: 2    Date Filed: 11/07/2014
    No. 13-31074
    the remaining 251 months to run consecutive to it. The district court sentenced
    Smith to life in prison. Thomas challenges his within-Sentencing Guidelines
    sentence; Smith, the admission of testimony of his prior “bad acts”.
    Although post-Booker, the Guidelines are advisory only, and a properly
    preserved objection to an ultimate sentence is reviewed for reasonableness
    under an abuse-of-discretion standard, the district court must still properly
    calculate the advisory Guidelines-sentencing range for use in deciding on the
    sentence to impose. Gall v. United States, 
    552 U.S. 38
    , 51 (2007). In that
    respect, for issues preserved in district court, its application of the Guidelines
    is reviewed de novo; its factual findings, only for clear error. E.g., United States
    v. Cisneros-Gutierrez, 
    517 F.3d 751
    , 764 (5th Cir. 2008).
    In district court, Thomas objected to the finding that he was not a minor
    participant and to the concomitant denial of a reduction under Guideline
    § 3B1.2 (decrease offense level for minimal or minor participation). When a
    defendant objects to the denial of a Guideline § 3B1.2 role-in-the-offense
    reduction, review is for clear error. E.g., United States v. Alaniz, 
    726 F.3d 586
    ,
    626 (5th Cir. 2013) (citation omitted); see also United States v. Villanueva, 
    408 F.3d 193
    , 203 (5th Cir. 2005) (citation omitted).
    Thomas insists he is not challenging the factual finding underlying the
    determination that he was not a minor participant; nevertheless, he asserts he
    was less culpable than the principals in the conspiracy, the average
    participant, and his coconspirator Marvin Thompson. “The defendant bears
    the burden of proving, by a preponderance of the evidence, [his] minor role in
    the offense”. Alaniz, 726 F.3d at 626 (citation and internal quotation marks
    omitted). Thomas merely asserted in district court he was a minor or minimal
    participant. The entire conspiracy consisted of Thomas’ and others’ traveling
    to California to purchase methamphetamine they would transport to Ferriday,
    2
    Case: 13-31074    Document: 00512829480     Page: 3   Date Filed: 11/07/2014
    No. 13-31074
    Louisiana, to resell.      Thomas’ role was to transport half of that
    methamphetamine. That role was critical to the success of the conspiracy and
    was not “peripheral”. E.g., United States v. Martinez, 
    517 F.3d 258
    , 272 (5th
    Cir. 2008).   Thus, the finding that Thomas was not a minor participant,
    resulting in the refusal to apply a reduction for Thomas’ role in the offense, is
    not clearly erroneous. See Alaniz, 726 F.3d at 626; Martinez, 
    517 F.3d at
    272-
    73 (citation omitted); U.S.S.G. § 3B1.2.
    Thomas claims the district court erred by denying the reduction based
    solely on its finding he was a drug mule. Because he did not raise this issue in
    district court, review is only for plain error. E.g., United States v. Claiborne,
    
    676 F.3d 434
    , 438 (5th Cir. 2012). Thomas must show a forfeited plain (clear
    or obvious) error that affected his substantial rights. Puckett v. United States,
    
    556 U.S. 129
    , 135 (2009). If he does so, we have the discretion to correct the
    error, but should do so only if it seriously affects the fairness, integrity, or
    public reputation of the proceedings. 
    Id.
    Even if Thomas had pointed to any authority stating that it is error for
    a district court to deny a minor role reduction solely because the defendant is
    a drug mule, the court did not deny the reduction for that reason. Thomas has
    not shown the requisite clear or obvious error. See Puckett, 
    556 U.S. at 135
    .
    Thomas also claims, for the first time on appeal, that the court erred by
    denying the reduction without assessing his relative culpability. To the extent
    this is a legal question, Thomas has not shown clear or obvious error. He points
    to no authority demonstrating that, upon a defendant’s bare assertion that he
    is a minor or minimal participant, the district court must conduct its own
    comparative analysis of the relative roles of the participants. Because the
    defendant bears the burden of proving his minor role, Thomas must make that
    comparison. Alaniz, 726 F.3d at 626. The district court considered the parties’
    3
    Case: 13-31074    Document: 00512829480      Page: 4   Date Filed: 11/07/2014
    No. 13-31074
    arguments and the findings in the presentence investigation report, which it
    adopted. By denying a reduction for Thomas’ role in the offense, the district
    court found Thomas was not “substantially less culpable than the average
    participant”. U.S.S.G. § 3B1.2.
    Smith contends the district court reversibly erred by allowing the
    Government to elicit from its witnesses irrelevant and prejudicial extrinsic,
    bad-acts, character evidence. For the following reasons, his claim fails.
    He has not briefed any argument challenging the admission of testimony
    by one witness, Quinn. Smith also did not object, on this basis, to testimony
    by another witness, his coconspirator Thompson, and he has inadequately
    briefed his challenging the admission of that testimony.
    The few record citations he provides are not of Thompson’s testimony on
    direct examination by the Government. Without citation of relevant legal
    authority and without argument, Smith makes conclusional assertions that
    Thompson’s testimony was “character” evidence.         He characterizes all of
    Thompson’s testimony as “extrinsic” evidence without asserting why it should
    not be considered intrinsic evidence, especially in the light of Thompson’s
    participation in the conspiracy. Finally, although he cites United States v.
    Beechum, 
    582 F.2d 898
     (5th Cir. 1978) (en banc), Smith fails to provide any
    analysis or application of the facts to its two-part test for assessing the
    admissibility of evidence.
    AFFIRMED.
    4