State of Minnesota v. Stephen Richard Angotti ( 2014 )


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  •                          This opinion will be unpublished and
    may not be cited except as provided by
    Minn. Stat. § 480A.08, subd. 3 (2012).
    STATE OF MINNESOTA
    IN COURT OF APPEALS
    A14-0091
    State of Minnesota,
    Respondent,
    vs.
    Stephen Richard Angotti,
    Appellant.
    Filed November 10, 2014
    Affirmed
    Johnson, Judge
    Dakota County District Court
    File No. 19HA-CR-12-204
    Lori Swanson, Attorney General, St. Paul, Minnesota; and
    James C. Backstrom, Dakota County Attorney, Stacy St. George, Assistant County
    Attorney, Hastings, Minnesota (for respondent)
    Melissa Sheridan, Assistant Public Defender, Eagan, Minnesota (for appellant)
    Considered and decided by Hooten, Presiding Judge; Connolly, Judge; and
    Johnson, Judge.
    UNPUBLISHED OPINION
    JOHNSON, Judge
    A Dakota County jury found Stephen Richard Angotti guilty of criminal sexual
    conduct based on evidence that he sexually abused his daughter on multiple occasions
    over a two-year period. Angotti argues that the district court erred by admitting hearsay
    evidence. We conclude that the district court did not abuse its discretion by admitting
    into evidence a video-recording of a social worker’s interview of the young victim.
    Therefore, we affirm.
    FACTS
    On January 18, 2012, Burnsville Police Detective Jeffrey Pfaff responded to a
    report that a seven-year-old girl had been sexually abused by her father. The report was
    made by Angotti’s girlfriend. When Detective Pfaff arrived at Angotti’s residence, the
    detective asked Angotti’s girlfriend to take the girl to the police station for a forensic
    interview. Paula Pletsch, a child-protection-assessment social worker for Dakota County,
    interviewed the girl. The interview was video-recorded. During the interview, the girl
    stated that Angotti had, on more than one occasion, placed his hands on her bare vaginal
    area, inserted a finger into her vagina, inserted his penis into her mouth, and rubbed his
    bare penis against her bare vagina.
    The state charged Angotti with one count of first-degree criminal sexual conduct,
    in violation of 
    Minn. Stat. § 609.342
    , subd. 1(g) (2012), and one count of second-degree
    criminal sexual conduct, in violation of 
    Minn. Stat. § 609.343
    , subd. 1(a) (2012). In
    March 2013, the state gave notice of its intent to introduce a video-recording of the
    interview of the girl. In March 2013, Angotti filed a motion in limine in which he
    requested that the video-recording be excluded from evidence. Before trial, the district
    court reserved ruling on the motion.
    The case was tried on five days in July 2013. The state called the young victim to
    testify in its case-in-chief. In response to the prosecutor’s questions about the alleged
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    sexual assaults, she repeatedly stated that she does not remember. After the girl testified,
    the state sought to introduce the video-recording of the interview pursuant to section
    595.02, subdivision 3, of the Minnesota Statutes. The district court initially determined
    that the video-recording is hearsay evidence and is not within the exception in Minn. R.
    Evid. 801(d)(1)(B). The district court then conducted a hearing outside the presence of
    the jury to determine whether the evidence satisfied the requirements of the statute. The
    district court received testimony from Pletsch and viewed and listened to the video-
    recording. The district court concluded that the video-recording is admissible, and it was
    played for the jury.
    The jury found Angotti guilty on both counts. In October 2013, the district court
    sentenced Angotti to 187 months of imprisonment on count 1 and 109 months of
    imprisonment on count 2, to be served concurrently. Angotti appeals.
    DECISION
    Angotti argues that the district court erred by admitting into evidence the video-
    recording of the social worker’s interview of the girl. This court applies an abuse-of-
    discretion standard of review to a district court’s evidentiary ruling. State v. Amos, 
    658 N.W.2d 201
    , 203 (Minn. 2003).
    The state sought to introduce the video-recording pursuant to a statute that
    provides as follows:
    An out-of-court statement made by a child under the age of
    ten years . . . alleging, explaining, denying, or describing any
    act of sexual contact or penetration performed with or on the
    child . . . not otherwise admissible by statute or rule of
    evidence, is admissible as substantive evidence if:
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    (a)    the court or person authorized to receive
    evidence finds, in a hearing conducted outside of the presence
    of the jury, that the time, content, and circumstances of the
    statement and the reliability of the person to whom the
    statement is made provide sufficient indicia of reliability; and
    (b)    the child . . . either:
    (i)     testifies at the proceedings; or
    (ii)  is unavailable as a witness and there is
    corroborative evidence of the act; and
    (c)     the proponent of the statement notifies the
    adverse party . . . .
    For purposes of this subdivision, an out-of-court
    statement includes video, audio, or other recorded statements.
    
    Minn. Stat. § 595.02
    , subd. 3 (2012).
    A district court considering the admissibility of a child’s statement under this
    statute must consider the factors described in the statute (time, content, circumstances of
    the statement, and reliability of the person to whom the statements were made). Id.; see
    also In re Welfare of L.E.P., 
    594 N.W.2d 163
    , 171 (Minn. 1999). A district court also
    should consider “a number of additional factors,” including “‘the knowledge of the
    declarant, the motives of the declarant and witnesses to speak truthfully[,] . . . the
    proximity in time between the statement and the events described[,]’ . . . whether the
    person talking with the child had a preconceived idea of what the child would say[,] and
    the lack of leading or suggestive questions.” L.E.P., 594 N.W.2d at 170 (quoting State v.
    Conklin, 
    444 N.W.2d 268
    , 276 (Minn. 1989)). Furthermore, in assessing the reliability of
    the child’s statement, a district court should consider factors such as “spontaneity,
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    consistent repetition, mental state of the declarant, use of terminology unexpected of a
    child of similar age, and lack of motive to fabricate.” 
    Id.
     In essence, the reliability of a
    child’s out-of-court statement is determined based on the totality of the circumstances.
    State v. Edwards, 
    485 N.W.2d 911
    , 915 (Minn. 1992).
    In this case, the district court made findings on each of the four factors identified
    in the statute. Specifically, the district court found that the interview was conducted the
    day after the girl reported the abuse. The district court also found that the content and
    circumstances of the interview indicated reliability. In addition, the district court found
    that Pletsch had 25 years of experience with allegations of sexual abuse and that she
    conducts approximately 125 interviews per year. These findings are supported by the
    evidentiary record. Detective Pfaff’s testimony and Pletsch’s testimony indicate that the
    interview occurred one day after the first report of abuse. Our review of the video-
    recording confirms the district court’s findings that the content and circumstances of the
    interview indicate reliability. For example, the girl used age-appropriate terminology,
    displayed an appropriate demeanor, and used hand motions and dolls to describe
    Angotti’s conduct.    Finally, Pletsch testified about her professional credentials and
    experience and about her interview of the girl, including the fact that she has 25 years of
    experience and conducts approximately 125 interviews per year.
    Angotti contends that, despite the district court’s findings on the four statutory
    factors, the girl’s video-recorded interview lacks sufficient indicia of reliability. He
    challenges the district court’s ruling on the ground that the district court did not make any
    findings concerning the spontaneity of her statements, the consistency of her statements,
    5
    whether her statements were suggested by leading questions, whether she ever recanted
    her statements, and whether her statements were corroborated by physical evidence.
    Angotti’s contention is based on the premise that a district court is obligated to make
    findings on all of the potential factors identified by the applicable caselaw. See L.E.P.,
    594 N.W.2d at 170-71. But there is no requirement in the applicable caselaw that a
    district court must make findings on each and every factor that conceivably may be
    relevant.   The overarching principle is that the reliability of a child’s out-of-court
    statement is determined based on the totality of the circumstances. See Edwards, 485
    N.W.2d at 915. The precedential opinions that conduct a totality analysis rely on some
    but not all of the potentially relevant factors, depending on the facts of each case.
    For example, in L.E.P., the supreme court reasoned that the out-of-court
    statements of the seven-year-old victim were sufficiently reliable because the child had
    no motive to fabricate, the statements were spontaneous, the child’s story remained
    consistent, the child used “unexpected terminology” in describing the assault, the child’s
    demeanor during the interview was cheerful, the child seemed willing to help the
    interviewer understand what had happened, and the child’s admissions did not result from
    leading or suggestive questions. 594 N.W.2d at 171-72. But the supreme court did not
    discuss other potentially relevant factors, such as whether the child had recanted or
    whether there was corroborating evidence. See id. Similarly, in State v. Lanam, 
    459 N.W.2d 656
     (Minn. 1990), the supreme court reasoned that the out-of-court statements of
    the three-year-old victim were sufficiently reliable because the child’s statements
    regarding the abuse were spontaneous and consistent, the child had no motive to
    6
    fabricate, the questions were not leading questions, and the statements were not the type
    of statements expected of a child that age. 
    Id. at 661
    . But, again, the supreme court did
    not discuss other potentially relevant factors, such as whether the child had recanted or
    whether there was corroborating evidence. See 
    id.
     Contrary to Angotti’s argument, the
    district courts “have considerable leeway in their consideration of appropriate factors as
    long as the factors considered relate to whether the child was particularly likely to be
    truthful.” L.E.P., 594 N.W.2d at 170 (quotation omitted).
    We note that, even if findings on additional factors were required, those additional
    factors likely would not have diminished the reliability of the girl’s statements. For
    example, our review of the video-recording and the corresponding transcript reveals that
    the girl’s statements concerning the sexual assaults were fairly spontaneous and that she
    was consistent when providing details as to where and when the assaults took place.
    Also, the girl’s statements were not the result of leading questions. Pletsch consistently
    asked open-ended questions. The few questions about which Angotti complains were
    very general in nature and were asked for the purpose of making a transition to a
    particular topic. In addition, many of the girl’s statements went beyond the scope of
    Pletsch’s questioning. Furthermore, there is nothing in the record to indicate that the girl
    ever recanted the statements she made in the interview. At trial, the girl testified that she
    could not remember the events referenced by the prosecutor, but she did not disassociate
    herself from the statements she made in the interview, and she did not deny that sexual
    abuse occurred. Moreover, the lack of physical corroboration of the girl’s statements
    does not diminish the reliability of her statements. See Edwards, 485 N.W.2d at 915
    7
    (stating that reliability of statements by child-abuse victim does not depend on “evidence
    corroborating the statement”).
    Thus, the district court did not conduct an improper analysis of the factors relevant
    to the admissibility of the girl’s out-of-court statements under section 595.02,
    subdivision 3. Therefore, the district court did not abuse its discretion by admitting the
    video-recording into evidence.
    Angotti also contends that the district court erred by overruling his objections to
    two specific portions of Officer Pfaff’s testimony. Officer Pfaff testified, among other
    things, that “a young girl was alleging being touched by a parent” and that the girl stated
    that “she was forced to put her mouth on Stephen Angotti’s penis.” Angotti’s attorney
    objected to both of these questions on the ground that they call for hearsay. Each time,
    the prosecutor responded that the evidence was not offered for the truth of the matter
    asserted but to explain the course of the investigation. The district court overruled both
    objections. We need not decide whether the district court’s rulings were proper because,
    even if they were erroneous, the errors would be harmless. See Minn. R. Crim. P. 31.01;
    State v. Vang, 
    774 N.W.2d 566
    , 576 (Minn. 2009).            In light of the abundance of
    incriminating evidence in the video-recorded interview, the jury is very unlikely to have
    rested its verdicts on the two challenged portions of Officer Pfaff’s testimony. Officer
    Pfaff’s testimony would be material only if the video-recorded interview had been
    admitted erroneously. But we have concluded that the district court did not err by
    admitting the video-recorded interview.
    Affirmed.
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Document Info

Docket Number: A14-91

Filed Date: 11/10/2014

Precedential Status: Non-Precedential

Modified Date: 4/18/2021