United States v. Grahams Construction, Inc. , 585 F. App'x 173 ( 2014 )

UNPUBLISHED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
No. 14-1492
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA FOR THE USE AND BENEFIT OF POTOMAC
VALLEY BRICK AND SUPPLY COMPANY,
Plaintiff - Appellant,
v.
GRAHAMS CONSTRUCTION, INCORPORATED; THE GUARANTEE COMPANY OF
NORTH AMERICA USA,
Defendants - Appellees.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the District of
Maryland, at Greenbelt. Alexander Williams, Jr., District
Judge. (8:13-cv-02032-MAB)
Submitted: October 31, 2014 Decided: November 12, 2014
Before MOTZ, KING, and DUNCAN, Circuit Judges.
Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.
Frank J. Emig, LAW OFFICES OF FRANK J. EMIG, Laurel, Maryland,
for Appellant. Christopher M. Anzidei, LAW OFFICES OF
CHRISTOPHER M. ANZIDEI, PLLC, Vienna, Virginia, for Appellees.
Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
PER CURIAM:
Potomac Valley Brick & Supply Co. (“PVB”) brought this
breach of contract claim against Grahams Construction, Inc.
(“Grahams”), seeking payment for materials that PVB sold to
Grahams’ subcontractor, JMM Enterprises, Inc. (“JMM”). The
district court granted summary judgment on this claim in
Grahams’ favor, finding that, even if the August 22, 2012, email
between representatives of Grahams and JMM constituted a valid
contract, PVB was not a third-party beneficiary with standing to
bring suit on that contract. On appeal PVB challenges that
holding. We affirm.
We review a district court’s order granting summary
judgment de novo. D.L. ex rel. K.L. v. Balt. Bd. of Sch.
Comm’rs, 706 F.3d 256, 258 (4th Cir. 2013). Summary judgment is
appropriate only where “there is no genuine [dispute] as to any
material fact and . . . the movant is entitled to judgment as a
matter of law.” Seremeth v. Bd. of Cnty. Comm’rs Frederick
Cnty., 673 F.3d 333, 336 (4th Cir. 2012) (internal quotation
marks omitted). In determining whether a genuine dispute
exists, we “view[] the facts and the reasonable inferences
therefrom in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party.”
Bonds v. Leavitt, 629 F.3d 369, 380 (4th Cir. 2011).
Viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to
PVB, we agree with the district court that PVB was not an
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intended third-party beneficiary of the purported contract.
Under Maryland law, “[a]n individual is a third-party
beneficiary to a contract if the contract was intended for his
or her benefit and it clearly appears that the parties intended
to recognize him or her as the primary party in interest and as
privy to the promise.” CR-RSC Tower I, LLC v. RSC Tower I, LLC,
56 A.3d 170, 212 (Md. 2012) (internal citation omitted). “In
applying this standard, [Maryland courts] look to the intention
of the parties to recognize a person or class as a primary party
in interest as expressed in the language of the instrument and
consideration of the surrounding circumstances as reflecting
upon the parties’ intention.” Id. at 213 (internal quotation
marks and alterations omitted).
Here, both the language of the email and the
surrounding circumstances indicate that the purported contract
was made to ensure that JMM would not bear the cost of any
purchases from PVB even if it was unable to complete its work
for Grahams. There is no evidence that Grahams and JMM intended
this language to benefit PVB. Accordingly, we affirm the
judgment of the district court.
We dispense with oral argument because the facts and
legal contentions are adequately presented in the materials
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before this court and argument would not aid the decisional
process.
AFFIRMED
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