In the Termination of the Parent-Child Relationship of: E.L.R. and E.J.R. (Minor Children) and J.R. (Father) v. The Indiana Department of Child Services (mem. dec.) , 91 N.E.3d 1096 ( 2017 )


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  • MEMORANDUM DECISION                                                             FILED
    09/06/2017, 10:24 am
    Pursuant to Ind. Appellate Rule 65(D),
    CLERK
    this Memorandum Decision shall not be                                       Indiana Supreme Court
    Court of Appeals
    regarded as precedent or cited before any                                        and Tax Court
    court except for the purpose of establishing
    the defense of res judicata, collateral
    estoppel, or the law of the case.
    ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT                                   ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE
    Evan K. Hammond                                          Curtis T. Hill, Jr.
    Marion, Indiana                                          Attorney General of Indiana
    Robert J. Henke
    Deputy Attorney General
    Indianapolis, Indiana
    IN THE
    COURT OF APPEALS OF INDIANA
    In the Termination of the Parent-                        September 6, 2017
    Child Relationship of:                                   Court of Appeals Case No.
    27A02-1704-JT-694
    E.L.R. and E.J.R. (Minor
    Children)                                                Appeal from the Grant Superior
    Court
    And
    The Honorable Dana J.
    J.R. (Father),                                           Kenworthy, Judge
    Appellant-Respondent,                                    Trial Court Cause No.
    27D02-1601-JT-1 & 27D02-1601-
    v.                                               JT-3
    The Indiana Department of
    Child Services,
    Appellee-Petitioner.
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    Riley, Judge.
    STATEMENT OF THE CASE
    [1]   Appellant-Respondent, J.R. (Father), appeals the trial court’s Order terminating
    his parental rights to his minor children, ELR and EJR (collectively, Children).
    [2]   We affirm.
    ISSUE
    [3]   Father presents us with two issues on appeal, which we consolidate and restate
    as the following single issue: Whether the Indiana Department of Child
    Services (DCS) presented clear and convincing evidence to support the
    termination of Father’s parental rights.
    FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
    [4]   C.N. (Mother) 1 and Father are the biological parents of ELR, born on May 20,
    2008, and EJR, born on June 9, 2009. Mother and Father were never married
    and Father established paternity for the Children by executing a paternity
    affidavit. The Children were in Father’s care and custody until January 2013
    when he became incarcerated on a charge of domestic abuse committed against
    his then-wife, while the Children were in the house. As a result of this
    allegation, a no-contact order was issued against Father, prohibiting him to
    1
    Mother voluntarily relinquished her parental rights to the Children. Facts pertaining to Mother will be
    included in so far as they are relevant to Father’s appeal.
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    contact the Children. After Mother received custody over the Children in
    January 2013, the Children resided with her and Mother’s then-husband, C.N.
    (Stepfather). Mother and Stepfather have one child together, C.N., Jr. 2
    [5]   On November 16, 2016, DCS received a report alleging that EJR had a bruise
    on his neck and forehead. The bruise on his neck was described as being dark
    purple and consistent with a thumb print, while the bruise on EJR’s forehead
    was yellowish and fading, with the knot from the injury still being visible.
    According to the report, EJR stated that “his [M]other [had] picked him up by
    his neck and threw him across the room.” (DCS Exh. 1, pp. 3-4). The report
    indicated that Mother and Stepfather frequently abandoned all three children
    for at least a week. The home had no running water and no plan to reestablish
    utilities as Mother and Stepfather were both addicted to illegal substances and
    could not afford to pay the water bill. As a result of DCS’s investigation into
    Mother’s abuse, the Children became the subject of a court-approved Informal
    Adjustment (IA). During the IA, the Children resided with Mother and
    Stepfather, while DCS provided home-based case management and conducted
    a parenting assessment.
    [6]   As part of the IA, DCS’s family case manager, Cassandra Brubaker (FCM
    Brubaker), frequently visited the home. During these visits, she saw a home in
    “chaos.” (Transcript p. 188). “The boys were out of control[.]” (Tr. p. 188).
    2
    Mother, Stepfather, and C.N., Jr. are subject to separate proceedings. Facts with respect to those
    proceedings will be included in so far as they are relevant to the case before us.
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    They would kick, and jump into walls, “thinking they could go through walls.”
    (Tr. p. 191. The boys would also “climb up on the couch, get on the window
    sill and then jump on [FCM Brubaker’s] shoulders. They’d pick up the dog and
    throw the dog and kick the dog.” (Tr. p. 191). To keep the Children in their
    bedrooms at night, Mother and Stepfather had installed locks on the outside at
    the top of the door. After expressing her concern several times without any
    change, FCM Brubaker bought door alarms which she made Stepfather install.
    [7]   Jeannette Hoeksema (Hoeksema), a therapist with Family Service Society,
    conducted the parenting assessment. She observed the Children to be “very
    physically aggressive toward myself, toward [Stepfather], toward each other.”
    (Tr. p. 136). “[EJR] kicked [Hoeksema]. [EJR] then kicked [Stepfather] who
    ran after [EJR] and kicked him in response.” (Tr. p. 137). ELR would climb
    on Hoeksema’s shoulders, “standing on [her] with his feet.” (Tr. p. 137). She
    noticed that “there were times that there was no response to the [C]hildren’s
    aggression toward [Hoeksema] and toward each other. There were times where
    [Stepfather] intervened, but that didn’t stop the physical aggression.” (Tr. p.
    137).
    [8]   As part of the IA, Mother and Stepfather were required to receive DCS’s
    approval to leave the Children with any other caregiver. Mother and Stepfather
    ignored this condition and allowed the Children to spend nights with a relative,
    where the Children were sexually abused by a member of the relative’s
    household. Due to this incident, as well as other concerns voiced during the
    IA, DCS filed petitions on June 30, 2014, alleging the Children to be Children
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    In Need of Services (CHINS). Although the CHINS petitions allowed the
    Children to remain in the home with Mother and Stepfather, its purpose was
    “[t]o provide more intensive services for the [C]hildren and the parents and to
    have a court intervention, . . . and hope to get the [C]hildren more services.”
    (Tr. p. 194).
    [9]    On September 2, 2014, DCS removed the Children from the home after Mother
    was arrested for domestic battery. DCS placed the Children with Stepfather,
    who entered into a safety plan not to let Mother have contact with the Children
    outside the supervised visitations. Nevertheless, Mother entered the home and
    choked EJR. Consequently, on September 18, 2014, the Children were removed
    from Stepfather’s care and placed with foster parents, pursuant to an order
    authorized by the trial court. Even though Father had been released from
    prison since approximately January 17, 2014, the Children were not placed
    with him because of the no-contact order that was still in effect.
    [10]   On October 16, 2014, Father was placed under a dispositional decree and the
    trial court ordered him to participate in reunification proceedings, which
    included: maintain regular, weekly contact with FCM Brubaker; keep all
    appointments with service providers and FCM Brubaker; maintain suitable,
    safe, and stable housing and household necessities; secure and maintain a legal
    and stable source of income; comply with the terms of probation in the criminal
    case; comply with the no-contact order; and to participate in and successfully
    complete a domestic violence assessment, and to follow all other
    recommendations. Despite the trial court’s order, Father’s contact with the
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    DCS was minimal. Besides participating in a parenting assessment in April
    2015, FCM Brubaker recalled some limited phone contact in early 2015.
    [11]   At the April 9, 2015 dispositional hearing, the trial court found that Father had
    failed to comply with court orders, had not enhanced his parental abilities, and
    had failed to cooperate with DCS. For approximately one month after the
    dispositional decree, from April 2015 until May 2015, Father had bi-weekly
    contact with FCM Brubaker. During that time, he completed a substance abuse
    assessment and a parenting assessment with Hoeksema. Hoeksema concluded
    that Father’s “truthfulness scale score was what was called the problem risk
    range so that suggests that there was what they call distortion in answers in an
    attempt to present him in an overly favorable light.” (Tr. p. 145). Father’s
    assessment revealed that his “violent scale was in the [] medium risk range[,]”
    indicating that Father “is impatient, easily annoyed, and [has] a rather low
    frustration tolerance.” (Tr. p. 145). As a result of the assessment, Hoeksema
    recommended additional testing for Father, as well as a psychological
    evaluation. Father never followed up on these recommendations.
    [12]   On May 21, 2015, the trial court conducted a permanency hearing in the
    CHINS proceedings and found Father not in compliance with the case plan that
    he had just recently started participating in, and had not adhered to the
    recommendations made as a result of DCS’s services. Therefore, the trial court
    ordered Father to complete a psychological evaluation and complete all
    recommendations resulting from that evaluation. The trial court approved
    DCS’s request to change the permanency plan and initiate the termination of
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    parental rights. Starting June 2015, Father ceased all contact with FCM
    Brubaker and stopped all participation in court-ordered services.
    [13]   In late June or early July 2015, Father was arrested in Iowa and extradited to
    Grant County, Indiana, on a Level 5 felony theft charge and two Class B
    misdemeanors for criminal mischief and false informing, respectively. These
    charges resulted in a revocation of his probation in his previous battery
    conviction. At the time of the termination hearing, Father was incarcerated
    with no scheduled release date.
    [14]   On August 6, 2015, and February 4, 2016, the trial conducted periodic case
    reviews and determined both times that Father had not complied with the
    Children’s case plan and affirmed the permanency plan of adoption. On
    January 27, 2016, DCS filed a petition to terminate Father’s parental rights to
    his Children. From February through August 2016, the trial court conducted
    five evidentiary fact-finding hearings at which Father appeared in the custody of
    law enforcement personnel.
    [15]   During the fact-finding hearings, the trial court received testimony from, among
    others, the Children’s foster mother and therapist. Lucretia Swan (Swan), the
    Children’s foster mother, described the Children’s behavior and progress after
    DCS placed them in her care and custody. The initial safety plan called for an
    adult to be in the room with the Children at all times because of their violent
    nature towards each other. “Several times,” Swan found “them choking each
    other.” (Tr. p. 113). The Children acted out sexually, “constantly waving their
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    penises at each other, pulling their pants down, and waving it, asking [Swan’s]
    grandchildren to pull their pants down, so some sexual acting out there.” (Tr.
    p. 117). Swan advised that “[t]he one thing that has worked for them is
    structure.” (Tr. p. 120). Being a foster mother to ELR for two years, she first
    met him when he was “a very angry child. He [was] a bully and he [was] going
    to hit the other kids.” (Tr. p. 114). Re-evaluating ELR at the time of the
    hearing, Swan explained that he is “doing better. [ELR] still has anger issues
    which he works on in counselling.” (Tr. p. 115). Swan only remained a foster
    parent to EJR for one year before she requested his placement elsewhere.
    Although she tried numerous times to bring EJR back into the house, he
    “couldn’t sustain himself.” (Tr. p. 112). During the one year EJR was in her
    care, EJR was “uncontrollable.” (Tr. p. 112). He was defiant. “[EJR]
    threatened people to kill him. He tried to stab [Swan] with a knife and then
    when he came back in May, he threatened to kill us all in our sleep.” (Tr. p.
    112). EJR was seven years old at the time.
    [16]   Sandra Duecker (Duecker) has been the Children’s therapist since October 27,
    2014. Upon initial evaluation, Duecker diagnosed ELR with post-traumatic
    stress disorder. “He ha[d] a lot of problems with emotional regulation. He
    could not manage his emotions. He couldn’t identify how he felt, what he
    thought he ought to do.” (Tr. p. 161). As a result, “[h]e was having a hard
    time functioning in all social relationships, teachers, peers, brothers, all those
    kinds of areas.” (Tr. p. 161). After working with ELR regularly once a week
    for over two years, Duecker sounded hopeful and indicated that he made a
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    “tremendous improvement.” (Tr. p. 165). She clarified that ELR “can now
    sometimes identify how he’s feeling and talk about ways he can cope with that,
    things he can do. His behavior is just totally different.” (Tr. p. 164). “He
    smiles. He laughs. He gets mad. He has a normal range of emotions that he
    can exhibit and they seem to match the activity and the event.” (Tr. p. 164).
    Duecker added that ELR’s “empathy has gone way up when it even comes to
    his younger brother.” (Tr. p. 165). Overall, she opined that “the majority of
    the fact that he feels good about himself has to do with where he’s been living
    and the kind of care he’s been receiving on that steady, regular emotional”
    basis. (Tr. p. 166). She recommended placement in a family trained in and
    understanding of trauma, who show warmth and consistency, and who are very
    patient and totally committed to his needs.
    [17]   Turning to EJR, Duecker explained that he “is a very different picture.” (Tr. p.
    168). When she first evaluated EJR, she considered him “much more disturbed
    than [ELR] was.” (Tr. p. 169). EJR “couldn’t look you in the eye. His activity
    level was extreme. His anxiety level was so high that he would just buzz from
    event to event to activity to activity. He would laugh inappropriately. He
    would get mad over nothing.” (Tr. p. 169). After working with him, Duecker
    thought “he got better for a period of time and [she] was really hopeful.” (Tr. p.
    171. But “then he just seemed to fall apart and start getting more aggressive
    toward those that [] he really cared for. . . . [I]t was almost as if he was allergic
    to that feeling and then he would overreact in a violent way.” (Tr. p. 171).
    Duecker’s overall prognosis for EJR was cautiously optimistic. While she
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    thought there was a “possibility that he can get better,” it was “much different
    than [ELR’s] hopefulness level.” (Tr. p. 177). She indicated the need for
    intensive therapy and placement with a highly trained family with little
    expectation that EJR will reciprocate. At the time of the termination hearings,
    EJR was placed at Youth Opportunity Center, a residential treatment center, to
    stabilize his behavior and conduct further assessments to better understand his
    needs.
    [18]   John Key, the Court Appointed Special Advocate for the Children (CASA
    Key), testified that the Children are “on a track that is very positive[.]” (Tr. p.
    245). He advised the court that the Children have made “incredible progress in
    behavior and academically.” (Tr. p. 245). Indicating that the stability that the
    Children received in not having had parental visits was a positive influence on
    their progress, CASA Key cautioned that “whenever they have a change where
    they come back to something that was in their past, they just regress, and they
    can’t afford to go back.” (Tr. p. 245).
    [19]   During the hearing, Father testified that he last saw the Children in January of
    2013. He requested the trial court to place the Children with his new wife,
    L.R., whom he had married while he was incarcerated and with whom he had
    an eighteen-year-old son. He explained that the Children had been “very
    young” when they had initially met L.R., and he was unsure they would even
    recognize her. (Tr. p. 99). He admitted that “[t]here would almost be a
    question of recognizing me at this point. It’s been almost four years.” (Tr. p.
    108).
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    [20]   On March 8, 2017, the trial court issued its Order terminating Father’s parental
    rights. The trial court concluded, in pertinent part, that there is a reasonable
    probability that the conditions resulting in the Children’s removal and
    continued placement out of Father’s custody will not be remedied; there is a
    reasonable probability that the continuation of the parent-child relationship
    poses a threat to the Children’s well-being; and termination of Father’s parental
    rights is in the Children’s best interests.
    [21]   Father now appeals. Additional facts will be provided as necessary.
    DISCUSSION AND DECISION
    I. Standard of Review
    [22]   Father appeals the trial court’s termination of his parental rights. A parent has
    an “interest in the care, custody, and control of his or her children [that] is
    ‘perhaps the oldest of the fundamental liberty interests.’” In re G.Y., 
    904 N.E.2d 1257
    , 1259 (Ind. 2009) (quoting Troxel v. Granville, 
    530 U.S. 57
    , 65 (2000)). The
    Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution thus safeguards “the
    traditional right of parents to establish a home and raise their children.” 
    Id. Nevertheless, it
    is well established that “parental rights are not absolute and
    must be subordinated to the child’s interests when determining the proper
    disposition of a petition to terminate parental rights.” S.L. v. Ind. Dep’t of Child
    Servs., 
    997 N.E.2d 1114
    , 1122 (Ind. Ct. App. 2013) (internal quotation marks
    omitted) (quoting In re I.A., 
    934 N.E.2d 1127
    , 1132 (Ind. 2010)). Termination
    of parental rights is appropriate where “parents are unable or unwilling to meet
    Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 27A02-1704-JT-694 | September 6, 2017   Page 11 of 21
    their parental responsibilities.” In re 
    G.Y., 904 N.E.2d at 1259-60
    . We
    appreciate that the termination of a parent-child relationship is “an extreme
    measure and should only be utilized as a last resort when all other reasonable
    efforts to protect the integrity of the natural relationship between parent and
    child have failed.” K.E. v. Ind. Dep’t of Child Servs., 
    39 N.E.3d 641
    , 646 (Ind.
    2015) (internal quotation marks omitted).
    [23]   Upon review of a trial court’s termination of parental rights, our court does not
    reweigh evidence or assess the credibility of witnesses. In re 
    G.Y., 904 N.E.2d at 1260
    . Rather, we “consider only the evidence and reasonable inferences that
    are most favorable to the judgment.” 
    Id. Additionally, the
    trial court issued
    specific findings of fact and conclusions thereon, which requires application of
    the two-tiered standard of review set forth in Indiana Trial Rule 52(A): “[f]irst,
    we determine whether the evidence supports the findings, and second we
    determine whether the findings support the judgment.” 
    Id. We “shall
    not set
    aside the findings or judgment unless clearly erroneous, and due regard shall be
    given to the opportunity of the trial court to judge the credibility of the
    witnesses.” Ind. Trial Rule 52(A). A trial court has clearly erred “if the
    findings do not support the trial court’s conclusions or the conclusions do not
    support the judgment.” In re 
    G.Y., 904 N.E.2d at 1260
    (quoting Bester v. Lake
    Cnty. Office of Family & Children, 
    839 N.E.2d 143
    , 147 (Ind. 2005)).
    II. Termination Statute
    [24]   To support the termination of a parent’s rights, DCS must prove, in relevant
    part, that a child has been removed from the home for a certain period, and
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    (B) that one (1) of the following is true:
    (i) There is a reasonable probability that the conditions that
    resulted in the child’s removal or the reasons for placement
    outside the home of the parents will not be remedied.
    (ii) There is a reasonable probability that the continuation of
    the parent-child relationship poses a threat to the well-being of
    the child.
    (iii) The child has, on two (2) separate occasions, been
    adjudicated a [CHINS].
    (C) that termination is in the best interests of the child; and
    (D) that there is a satisfactory plan for the care and treatment of
    the child.
    Ind. Code § 31-35-2-4(b)(2). DCS is required to establish each element by clear
    and convincing evidence. In re 
    G.Y., 904 N.E.2d at 1260
    .
    [25]   On appeal, Father does not challenge the trial court’s conclusions that the
    Children have been removed from their care for the requisite time or that DCS
    has established a satisfactory plan for the Children’s care and treatment going
    forward. Rather, he contends that there is insufficient evidence to support the
    trial court’s conclusions that there is a reasonable probability either that the
    conditions resulting in the Children’s removal and continued placement outside
    the home will not be remedied or that the continuation of the parent-child
    relationship poses a threat to the Children’s well-being 3 and that termination is
    in the Children’s best interests. We address each argument in turn.
    3
    Indiana Code section 31-35-2-4(b)(2)(B) is written in the disjunctive; thus, DCS need only prove one of the
    three elements listed. See In re A.K., 
    924 N.E.2d 212
    , 220-21 (Ind. Ct. App. 2010), trans. dismissed. In this
    case, DCS did not allege that the Child has been twice adjudicated a CHINS. Therefore, the relevant inquiry
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    A. Remediation of Conditions
    [26]   In considering whether there is a reasonable probability that conditions will not
    be remedied, we must identify what conditions led to the Children’s “placement
    and retention” outside of the home and then determine whether there is a
    reasonable probability that those conditions will not be remedied. K.T.K. v. Ind.
    Dep’t of Child Servs., 
    989 N.E.2d 1225
    , 1231 (Ind. 2013). In making these
    decisions, “the trial court must judge a parent’s fitness as of the time of the
    termination proceeding, taking into consideration evidence of changed
    conditions—balancing a parent’s recent improvements against habitual
    pattern[s] of conduct to determine whether there is a substantial probability of
    future neglect or deprivation.” In re E.M., 
    4 N.E.3d 636
    , 643 (Ind. 2014)
    (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting 
    Bester, 839 N.E.2d at 152
    ; 
    K.T.K., 989 N.E.2d at 1231
    ). “Habitual conduct may include ‘criminal history, drug
    and alcohol abuse, history of neglect, failure to provide support, and lack of
    adequate housing and employment.’” 
    K.E., 39 N.E.3d at 647
    . DCS “is not
    required to provide evidence ruling out all possibilities of change; rather, it need
    only establish that there is a reasonable probability that the parent’s behavior
    will not change.” A.D.S. v. Ind. Dep’t of Child Servs., 
    987 N.E.2d 1150
    , 1157
    (Ind. Ct. App. 2013) (internal quotation marks omitted), trans. denied.
    is whether DCS established the existence of a reasonable probability either that the conditions resulting in the
    Child’s removal or continued placement outside the home will not be remedied or that the continuation of the
    parent-child relationship poses a threat to the Child’s well-being.
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    [27]   According to Father, the evidence does not support a conclusion that there is a
    reasonable probability that the conditions resulting in the Children’s removal
    and continued placement out of the home will not be remedied. Without
    challenging any of the trial court’s findings, he argues that he was incarcerated
    during a majority of these proceedings. However, he asserts that the evidence
    establishes that “[o]nce released from incarceration,” he “completed the drug
    and alcohol assessment and parenting assessment that he was directed to do.”
    (Appellant’s Br. p. 16). He noted that, even though he is incarcerated, the
    Children need not be placed in foster care, but instead should be placed with his
    new wife during the time period that [he] remains incarcerated” as it “would
    provide the stability and permanency the [C]hildren need.” (Appellant’s Br. p.
    17).
    [28]   Father insists that the present case is analogous to Rowlett v. Vanderburgh County
    OFC, 
    841 N.E.2d 615
    , 622 (Ind. Ct. App. 2006), trans. denied, wherein this court
    determined that termination of a parent’s rights was inappropriate because the
    parent, who was incarcerated throughout the entire termination proceedings
    and for all but two months of the CHINS proceedings, and was set to be
    released six weeks after the hearing, had made a good faith effort to better
    himself as a person and as a parent. He participated in services, took classes in
    parenting skills, domestic violence and substance abuse. 
    Id. He had
    an
    established relationship with the children by sending them letters and calling
    them. 
    Id. Recognizing that
    the parent had made positive strides while
    incarcerated, we concluded that “at this point in time,” there was no clear and
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    convincing evidence that the conditions that had mandated the removal would
    not be remedied. 
    Id. at 623-24.
    [29]   Father’s arguments largely amount to a request to reweigh the evidence, which
    we decline to do. See In re Termination of Parent-Child Relationship of D.D., 
    804 N.E.2d 258
    , 265 (Ind. Ct. App. 2004), trans. denied. Furthermore, we find that
    the evidence and the trial court’s unchallenged findings establish that this case
    is distinct from Rowlett in that during part of the CHINS and termination
    proceedings, Father was released from incarceration, i.e., from January 17, 2014
    until July 2015, and participated in some of DCS’s services until he finally
    ceased all cooperation even before he was incarcerated again. Although Father
    brazenly asserts that the reasons for removing the Children in the first place
    only related to Mother, the trial court, based on the unchallenged findings,
    clearly concluded that “Father’s habitual patterns of conduct demonstrate his
    lack of commitment to fulfilling his parental obligations to his [C]hildren.”
    (Appellant’s App. Vol. II, p.68).
    [30]   The uncontested evidence reflects that during the seventeen-month period
    Father was not incarcerated, Father’s participation and involvement with DCS
    was minimal, to almost non-existent. Even though the trial court’s
    dispositional decree of October 16, 2014 had entered parental participation
    orders, Father did not begin any services until approximately April 2015, more
    than a year after his initial release. For about one month, Father had bi-weekly
    contact with FCM Brubaker. During that time, he also completed a substance
    abuse assessment and a parenting assessment, which reflected Father’s
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    tendency to minimize his violent nature and criminal history. Although
    additional testing had been court-ordered, Father failed to pursue any other
    services or to maintain contact with DCS.
    [31]   Blaming the non-existent relationship with his Children on the no-contact order
    that remained effective during the entirety of these proceedings, we note that
    Father was not precluded from maintaining contact with FCM Brubaker, or
    participating in his court-ordered services. Instead of being pro-active in
    attempting to remain in the Children’s lives by following DCS’s
    recommendations, Father spreads the responsibility everywhere except himself.
    Although Father requested to place the Children with L.R. while awaiting his
    release from incarceration, Father himself testified that he was unsure the
    Children would remember her from previous interactions when they were much
    younger. In light of the therapist’s statement that the Children need to be
    placed in a home with stability and experience dealing with traumatic youth,
    and the CASA’s reflection that the Children’s behavioral progress was the
    greatest during times when they broke with their past, the trial court properly
    concluded that placement with L.R. would “not be a good option for the boys.”
    (Appellant’s App. Vol. II, p. 68). We affirm the trial court’s sentiment that
    “[p]lacement with Father’s wife does not address Father’s failure to follow
    through with [c]ourt-ordered services and fulfill his own parental obligations . .
    . nor does it address Father’s recurring criminal behavior, including crimes of
    domestic violence in the presence of the [C]hildren.” (Appellant’s App. Vol. II,
    p. 68). It is clear that Father refused to prioritize the needs of his Children by
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    failing to implement lasting changes to ensure that the Children would not
    suffer any future neglect. As such, the trial court did not err as there is
    sufficient evidence of a reasonable probability that the conditions resulting in
    the Children’s removal and continued placement outside the home will not be
    remedied. 4
    B. Best Interests 5
    [32]   When considering the best interests of a child, we recognize that the purpose of
    terminating a parent-child relationship is to protect the child, not to punish the
    parent. In re C.C., 
    788 N.E.2d 847
    , 855 (Ind. Ct. App. 2003), trans. denied.
    “[C]lear and convincing evidence need not reveal that the continued custody of
    the parent . . . is wholly inadequate for the child’s very survival[,] . . . it is
    sufficient to show . . . that the child’s emotional and physical development are
    threatened by the respondent parent’s custody.” 
    K.T.K., 989 N.E.2d at 1234-35
    (quoting 
    Bester, 839 N.E.2d at 148
    ). To determine whether termination is in a
    child’s best interests, the trial court must “look beyond the factors identified by
    [DCS] and . . . look to the totality of the evidence.” 
    A.D.S., 987 N.E.2d at 1158
    . In formulating its determination, the “trial court must subordinate the
    interest of the parent to those of the child.” In re J.C., 
    994 N.E.2d 278
    , 290
    4
    Based on this determination, we need not address the alternative element of Indiana Code section 31-35-2-
    4(b)(2)(B) regarding whether the continuation of the parent-child relationship poses a threat to the Child’s
    well-being. See In re 
    A.K., 924 N.E.2d at 220-21
    .
    5
    Although Father failed to formulate a Best Interests argument, we will address whether the termination is in
    ELR and EJR’s best interests because of “the parent-child relationship is one of the most valued relationships
    in our culture.” In re D.L.M., 
    725 N.E.2d 981
    , 983 (Ind. Ct. App. 2000).
    Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 27A02-1704-JT-694 | September 6, 2017         Page 18 of 21
    (Ind. Ct. App. 2013), reh’g denied. “[C]hildren cannot wait indefinitely for their
    parents to work toward preservation or reunification—and courts ‘need not
    wait until the child is irreversibly harmed such that the child’s physical, mental
    and social development is permanently impaired before terminating the parent-
    child relationship.’” In re 
    E.M., 4 N.E.3d at 648
    (quoting 
    K.T.K., 989 N.E.2d at 1235
    ). It is well established that “[p]ermanency is a central consideration in
    determining the [child’s] best interests.” 
    K.T.K., 989 N.E.2d at 1235
    (alterations in original) (quoting In re 
    G.Y., 904 N.E.2d at 1265
    ).
    [33]   Our courts have long held that “the recommendation by both the [DCS] case
    manager and child advocate to terminate parental rights, in addition to
    evidence that the conditions resulting in removal will not be remedied, is
    sufficient to show by clear and convincing evidence that termination is in the
    child’s best interests.” 
    A.D.S., 987 N.E.2d at 1158
    . Here, the trial court was
    not only faced with the DCS’s recommendation to terminate Father’s parental
    rights, CASA Key advocated for a similar result. He testified that the absence
    of any relationship between the Children and Father created a “stability” which
    allowed the Children “to progress.” (Tr. p. 242). Based on his interaction with
    the Children, CASA Key confirmed that “whenever [the Children] have a
    change where they come back to something that was in their past, they just
    regress.” (Tr. p. 245). He emphatically reiterated that these Children “can’t
    afford to go back.” (Tr. p. 245).
    [34]   The record supports an abundance of evidence that the Children have been
    harmed by their past experiences, to the point where testimony indicates that
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    they may have been—tragically—damaged irreversibly. Both therapists
    testified to the high stress level of the Children, their aggressiveness, and their
    emotional problems. Even working with the Children on a regular basis,
    progress has been very slow, with a limited chance for future success. While
    the prognosis for ELR is cautiously optimistic, EJR had a “much more
    damaged ability to attach and interact with somebody else,” than his older
    brother had. (Tr. p. 170).
    [35]   Duecker emphasized the need to place both Children with families that are
    totally committed to their needs and have been trained to handle the type of
    extreme trauma these Children have suffered. At no point during Father’s
    testimony did Father acknowledge his sons’ psychological problems, accepted
    their need for treatment, or even inquired after their general wellbeing.
    [36]   These young Children have suffered enough trauma; it is time for them to heal.
    Taking into account the recommendations of DCS and the CASA, along with
    the evidence of the Children’s psychological problems and their progress,
    Father’s lack of meaningful remediation or acceptance of his Children’s needs,
    we agree with the trial court’s determination that there is clear and convincing
    evidence that termination of Father’s rights is in the Children’s best interests.
    CONCLUSION
    [37]   Based on the foregoing, we conclude that the trial court did not clearly err as
    DCS presented sufficient evidence to support the termination of Father’s
    parental rights.
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    [38]   Affirmed.
    [39]   Robb, J. and Pyle, J. concur
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