United States v. Benjamin Mason , 583 F. App'x 381 ( 2014 )


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  •      Case: 14-10067      Document: 00512817586         Page: 1    Date Filed: 10/28/2014
    IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
    FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT
    United States Court of Appeals
    No. 14-10067
    Fifth Circuit
    FILED
    Summary Calendar                       October 28, 2014
    Lyle W. Cayce
    Clerk
    UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
    Plaintiff−Appellee,
    versus
    BENJAMIN MASON, Also Known as Chi,
    Defendant−Appellant.
    Appeal from the United States District Court
    for the Northern District of Texas
    No. 4:13-CR-77
    Before SMITH, WIENER, and ELROD, Circuit Judges.
    PER CURIAM: *
    Benjamin Mason appeals the 240-month sentence for his guilty-plea
    conviction of bank robbery. The sentence is an upward departure from the
    guideline range pursuant to U.S.S.G. § 4A1.3 or an upward variance pursuant
    to 
    18 U.S.C. § 3553
    (a). Mason complains that the sentence is substantively
    * Pursuant to 5TH CIR. R. 47.5, the court has determined that this opinion should not
    be published and is not precedent except under the limited circumstances set forth in 5TH
    CIR. R. 47.5.4.
    Case: 14-10067    Document: 00512817586      Page: 2   Date Filed: 10/28/2014
    No. 14-10067
    unreasonable because the district court disregarded the sentencing disparity
    between him and his fellow bank robbers, afforded excessive weight to his crim-
    inal history, and failed properly to consider his acceptance of responsibility.
    We review sentences for substantive reasonableness, in light of the
    § 3553(a) factors, under an abuse-of-discretion standard. Gall v. United States,
    
    552 U.S. 38
    , 49−51 (2007). The record confirms that the district court listened
    to counsel’s arguments and made an individualized assessment based on
    Mason’s personal history and characteristics; the seriousness of the underlying
    offense; and the need to promote respect for the law, to provide just punish-
    ment, to afford adequate deterrence, and to protect the public.          See id.;
    § 3553(a)(1), (2). Mason’s challenge is no more than a disagreement with the
    district court’s balancing of the § 3553(a) factors, an analysis that that court
    was in a better position to perform than are we and to which we accord great
    deference. United States v. Hernandez, 
    633 F.3d 370
    , 375 (5th Cir. 2011).
    Mason has not shown that the decision to sentence him above the advisory
    range was “a clear error of judgment in balancing the sentencing factors.”
    United States v. Smith, 
    440 F.3d 704
    , 708 (5th Cir. 2006).
    As for the increase to 240 months from the 188-month top of the range,
    this court has upheld variances and departures greater than this increase. See
    United States v. Brantley, 
    537 F.3d 347
    , 348−50 (5th Cir. 2008); United States
    v. Jones, 
    444 F.3d 430
    , 433, 441−42 (5th Cir. 2006). The district court acted
    within its discretion. See Hernandez, 
    633 F.3d at 375
    .
    The judgment of sentence is AFFIRMED. Mason’s pro se motion for sub-
    stitution of counsel is DENIED because, inter alia, it was filed after counsel’s
    brief and is thus untimely. Cf. United States v. Wagner, 
    158 F.3d 901
    , 902−03
    (5th Cir. 1998). To the extent that Mason complains that his appointed counsel
    was ineffective, that matter is not appropriate to be addressed on direct appeal.
    2