Anthony Walker v. William Stephens, Director , 583 F. App'x 402 ( 2014 )


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  •      Case: 13-10344      Document: 00512821510         Page: 1    Date Filed: 10/31/2014
    IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
    FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT
    United States Court of Appeals
    No. 13-10344
    Fifth Circuit
    FILED
    October 31, 2014
    Lyle W. Cayce
    Clerk
    ANTHONY GLENN WALKER,
    Petitioner–Appellant,
    versus
    WILLIAM STEPHENS, Director,
    Texas Department of Criminal Justice, Correctional Institutions Division,
    Respondent–Appellee.
    Appeal from the United States District Court
    for the Northern District of Texas
    No. 3:11-CV-1055
    Before REAVLEY, SMITH, and SOUTHWICK, Circuit Judges.
    PER CURIAM:*
    Anthony Walker is a Texas state inmate who filed a federal habeas
    * Pursuant to 5TH CIR. R. 47.5, the court has determined that this opinion should not
    be published and is not precedent except under the limited circumstances set forth in 5TH
    CIR. R. 47.5.4.
    Case: 13-10344     Document: 00512821510     Page: 2    Date Filed: 10/31/2014
    No. 13-10344
    corpus petition to challenge his convictions of robbery and cocaine possession.
    He appeals an order finding his claim procedurally defaulted under Ex parte
    Gardner, 
    959 S.W.2d 189
    (Tex. Crim. App. 1996). We reverse and remand.
    I.
    Walker was convicted by a jury of two counts of aggravated robbery and
    one count of possession of cocaine and was sentenced to thirty-five years for
    the robberies and two years for the drug offense. On direct appeal, he asserted
    that the trial court erred by denying his motion to suppress the victims’ in-
    court and out-of-court identifications because the pretrial identification proce-
    dure was impermissibly suggestive in violation of his due-process rights. The
    Texas Court of Appeals rejected his argument, and the Texas Court of Criminal
    Appeals (“TCCA”) denied his request to file an out-of-time petition for discre-
    tionary review. Walker then filed three state habeas petitions, one for each
    conviction. The TCCA found his identification claim “not cognizable because
    it could have been, but was not raised on direct appeal.”
    Walker next filed the instant federal habeas petition. In his report, the
    magistrate judge observed that, under Gardner, claims that could have been
    raised on direct appeal, but instead are raised for the first time on state habeas
    review, are procedurally barred. He added that the Gardner rule is an ade-
    quate and independent state ground capable of barring federal habeas review.
    He found that the rule applied to Walker’s identification argument because
    Walked had failed to file a timely petition for discretionary review in the TCCA.
    The district court adopted the magistrate judge’s findings and dismissed the
    petition.   Walker appealed, and we granted a certificate of appealability
    (“COA”) on the sole question of whether the Gardner rule is an adequate and
    independent state ground where a constitutional issue was raised on direct
    appeal but not in a petition for discretionary review.
    2
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    No. 13-10344
    II.
    We review de novo the adequacy and independence of a state procedural
    rule. Reed v. Scott, 
    70 F.3d 844
    , 846 (5th Cir. 1995). A rule is adequate if it
    (1) “was firmly established at the time it was applied” and (2) is “strictly or
    regularly followed by the cognizant state court . . . [and] strictly or regularly
    applied evenhandedly to the vast majority of similar claims.” 
    Id. (alteration and
    omission in original) (emphasis omitted) (quoting Amos v. Scott, 
    61 F.3d 333
    , 339 (5th Cir. 1995)). A rule is independent “if the last reasoned state court
    opinion clearly and expressly indicates that its judgment is independent of fed-
    eral law.” 
    Id. (footnote omitted).
    “We presume the adequacy and independence
    of a state procedural rule when the state court expressly relies on it in deciding
    not to review a claim for collateral relief,” but the applicant can rebut this pre-
    sumption by showing that the “rule is not ‘strictly or regularly followed.’”
    Sones v. Hargett, 
    61 F.3d 410
    , 416 (5th Cir. 1995) (quoting Johnson v. Missis-
    sippi, 
    486 U.S. 578
    , 587 (1988)).
    We have previously held that the Gardner rule is adequate and indepen-
    dent where a constitutional issue is not raised on direct appeal, e.g., Aguilar v.
    Dretke, 
    428 F.3d 526
    , 535 (5th Cir. 2005), but we have not considered a case in
    which the issue was raised on direct appeal but not in a petition for discretion-
    ary review. Walker urges that the Gardner rule is not adequate in the latter
    context, and the state concedes this point, noting that the district court made
    its Gardner determination sua sponte.
    The state “acknowledges that the record before this Court does not sup-
    port a finding that the TCCA’s imposition of the Gardner bar in this specific
    context . . . was ‘firmly established’ at the moment it was applied here.” Fur-
    ther, “solely for purposes of the present appeal,” the state “is not prepared to
    argue that the TCCA’s use of the Gardner bar in this specific circumstance was
    ‘strictly or regularly followed’ by that court, as of the time it was invoked.” The
    3
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    state concludes that “the Court could reasonably conclude—on this record—
    that the district court was incorrect in its procedural ruling regarding the
    Gardner bar.”
    The caselaw supports the parties’ shared position that the Gardner rule
    was not adequate as of the date it was applied to Walker’s state habeas peti-
    tions. In Gardner, the applicant had not raised his claim at all on direct review,
    and the court did not purport to announce a rule extending beyond that situa-
    tion. 1 Later Texas cases applying the Gardner rule have addressed similar
    situations and have not mentioned discretionary review at all. 2 Moreover, in
    a pre-Gardner case addressing a different procedural issue, we noted the
    absence of “any Texas authority clearly establishing that . . . the claims made
    . . . in [a] federal habeas [petition] would be foreclosed from consideration on
    state habeas under [Texas Code of Criminal Procedure] article 11.07 merely
    because of the fact that he failed to timely seek discretionary direct review in
    the [TCCA].” Bautista v. McCotter, 
    793 F.2d 109
    , 111 n.2 (5th Cir. 1986).
    Accordingly, where a constitutional issue was raised on direct appeal but
    not in a petition for discretionary review, the Gardner rule was not adequate
    as of the date it was applied to Walker’s state habeas petitions, May 11, 2011.
    See Ex Parte Walker, No. WR-75,625-01, 
    2011 WL 1817625
    , at *1 (Tex. Crim.
    App. May 11, 2011) (per curiam). We reverse the order finding his claim pro-
    cedurally defaulted.
    1See 
    Gardner, 959 S.W.2d at 191
    (“Under these circumstances, we hold applicant
    waived any right he may have had to complain in this proceeding . . . .” (emphasis added)).
    2 See, e.g., Ex parte Nelson, 
    137 S.W.3d 666
    , 667–68 (Tex. Crim. App. 2004); Ex parte
    Townsend, 
    137 S.W.3d 79
    , 81 (Tex. Crim. App. 2004); Ex parte Ramos, 
    977 S.W.2d 616
    , 617
    (Tex. Crim. App. 1998).
    4
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    III.
    The state asks us to deny Walker’s claim instead of remanding. As the
    state notes, however, our appellate review is limited to the issues on which a
    COA has been granted. Lackey v. Johnson, 
    116 F.3d 149
    , 151 (5th Cir. 1997). 3
    We granted a COA on the sole question of whether the Gardner rule is an ade-
    quate and independent state ground in cases where a constitutional issue was
    raised on direct appeal but not in a petition for discretionary review. There-
    fore, the appropriate course of action is to remand to allow the district court to
    decide the merits of Walker’s claim.
    REVERSED and REMANDED.
    3 The state cites two cases for the proposition that we can reach the merits despite the
    limited COA, but neither controls here. In Pape v. Thaler, 
    645 F.3d 281
    , 287 (5th Cir. 2011),
    the state appealed, so no COA was necessary. In Amos v. Thornton, 
    646 F.3d 199
    , 203 (5th
    Cir. 2011) (per curiam), we granted a COA on the issue of whether the applicant’s “claim that
    he suffered a violation of his constitutional right to a speedy trial,” not just on the procedural
    issue.
    5