Marriage of Phillips CA4/1 ( 2014 )


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  • Filed 11/18/14 Marriage of Phillips CA4/1
    NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS
    California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for
    publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for
    publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.
    COURT OF APPEAL, FOURTH APPELLATE DISTRICT
    DIVISION ONE
    STATE OF CALIFORNIA
    In re the Marriage of LUZVIMINDA B. and
    STEWART H. PHILLIPS.
    D064712
    LUZVIMINDA B. PHILLIPS,
    Appellant,                                                     (Super. Ct. No. DN174329)
    v.
    STEWART H. PHILLIPS,
    Respondent.
    APPEAL from an order of the Superior Court of San Diego County,
    Kelly C. Dowlan, Commissioner. Affirmed.
    William C. Halsey for Appellant.
    Sara R. Neumann for Respondent.
    In 2013, Luzviminda Phillips filed a petition to dissolve her marriage to Stewart
    H. Phillips. Stewart moved to quash the petition on the ground a court in Guam
    entered a final judgment of divorce in 2011, Luzviminda never challenged the validity
    of the judgment in Guam and the judgment was entitled to full faith and credit. The
    trial court granted the motion and dismissed the dissolution petition. Luzviminda
    appeals, contending the Guamanian divorce (1) is void because both parties were
    domiciled in California and (2) was obtained by fraud. We reject her contentions and
    affirm the order.
    DISCUSSION
    Luzviminda notes that when the parties signed a marital settlement agreement
    in 2011 that was later incorporated into the Guamanian judgment of divorce, both
    parties listed California as their address. Accordingly, Luzviminda asserts both parties
    were domiciled in California and the Guamanian judgment of divorce is void under
    Family Code section 2091. (Undesignated statutory references are to the Family
    Code.) We disagree.
    Marriage dissolution is a proceeding in rem where the marriage is the res that is
    adjudicated. (Zaragoza v. Superior Court (1996) 
    49 Cal.App.4th 720
    , 724-725.)
    " 'The res which is the subject of adjudication is an intangible. Jurisdiction is exercised
    not by taking custody of a tangible article, but by serving process [] upon the other
    spouse.' " (Id. at p. 725.) Section 2091 is part of the Uniform Divorce Recognition
    Act. (§ 2090 et seq.) Section 2091 provides the following: "A divorce obtained in
    another jurisdiction shall be of no force or effect in this state if both parties to the
    marriage were domiciled in this state at the time the proceeding for the divorce was
    commenced." The seemingly broad language of section 2091, however, is tempered
    by section 2093, which provides that "[t]he application of this chapter [which includes
    2
    section 2091] is limited by the requirement of the Constitution of the United States that
    full faith and credit shall be given in each state to the public acts, records, and judicial
    proceedings of every other state." (See also, 
    28 U.S.C.A. § 1738
     ["[J]udicial
    proceedings . . . shall have the same full faith and credit in every court within the
    United States and its Territories and Possessions as they have by law or usage in the
    courts of such State, Territory or Possession from which they are taken."].)
    To be entitled to full faith and credit, the issue of jurisdiction need not have
    been actively litigated in the court rendering the divorce decree. (Heuer v. Heuer
    (1949) 
    33 Cal.2d 268
    , 271.) Where a party participated in the proceedings and had full
    opportunity to litigate the issue, the divorce "decree is binding even though a
    relitigation of the question of jurisdictional residence requirements in another state
    might result in a finding that the domiciliary claim was fraudulently asserted for the
    purpose of obtaining a decree which as a matter of policy could not be procured in the
    state of actual domicile." (Ibid.)
    California generally accords full faith and credit to a divorce recognized as
    valid in the state in which it was originally granted. (Estate of Grimble (1974) 
    42 Cal.App.3d 741
    , 748-749.) Under the Family Code, " '[s]tate' means a state of the
    United States, the District of Columbia, or a commonwealth, territory, or insular
    possession subject to the jurisdiction of the United States." (§ 145.) Guam is an
    unincorporated territory of the United States (48 U.S.C.A. § 1421a); thus, Guam is a
    state within the meaning of the Family Code. Accordingly, the judicial proceedings of
    Guam are entitled to full faith and credit if the Guamanian court properly adjudicated
    3
    the divorce. To determine whether Guam properly adjudicated the parties' divorce, we
    must examine the Guamanian statutes.
    In Guam, a court may grant an uncontested divorce if both parties agree to the
    terms of the divorce and at least one spouse has resided in Guam for a minimum of
    seven days immediately preceding the filing of the complaint. (19 G.C.A. § 8318,
    subd. (b).) If the consent to a divorce is signed in the United States, it must be verified
    before a notary public. (19 G.C.A. § 8319, subd. (b).) The Guamanian court may
    grant an uncontested divorce based upon the verified complaint if it appears to be in
    the interests of justice. (19 G.C.A. § 8320.) If the Guamanian court dissolves the
    marriage, it enters an interlocutory judgment (19 G.C.A. § 8321), followed by a final
    divorce decree (19 G.C.A. § 8320).
    In 2011, the parties filled out and signed a marital settlement agreement form in
    California agreeing to settle all matters regarding their marital affairs and intending
    that the marital settlement agreement be incorporated into any subsequent divorce
    decree. The marital settlement agreement was notarized. The following month, a
    Guamanian court entered an interlocutory judgment of divorce and a final divorce
    decree. The interlocutory judgment stated that the matter was uncontested, the court
    acquired jurisdiction based on Stewart's residency in Guam for seven days,
    Luzviminda entered her appearance and consented that the cause be heard as a default
    matter. The court approved the marital settlement agreement and ordered the parties to
    perform the terms of the agreement. The final divorce decree reaffirmed the terms of
    the interlocutory judgment.
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    The recitations within the interlocutory judgment and final divorce decree show
    the Guamanian court complied with Guamanian statutes governing dissolution of
    marriage. Nonetheless, where a court decides a collateral attack on the validity of
    another forum's dissolution judgment, the court is not bound by the first forum's
    jurisdictional recitals and may make a de novo determination based on extrinsic
    evidence. (Crouch v. Crouch (1946) 
    28 Cal.2d 243
    , 249-250.) Here, however,
    nothing in Luzviminda's sworn declaration challenged the recitations within the
    interlocutory judgment and final divorce decree. In contrast, Stewart's declaration
    states he went to Guam in July 2011 to file the divorce action. Accordingly, the trial
    court properly concluded that the Guamanian divorce decree was entitled to full faith
    and credit.
    Luzviminda next argues she is entitled to relief from the Guamanian divorce
    decree because Stewart procured it by fraud. She claims Stewart repeatedly told her
    the divorce was " 'pretend.' " Stewart, however, denied telling Luzviminda the divorce
    was " 'pretend' " and claimed Luzviminda willingly participated in the divorce and later
    held herself out as divorced. Based on this conflicting evidence, the trial court could
    reasonably reject Luzviminda's claim of fraud.
    In summary, because the parties' Guamanian divorce was valid in Guam, it is
    entitled to full faith and credit here. Thus, the trial court properly granted Stewart's
    motion to quash as the res of the marriage no longer existed and there was nothing to
    dissolve. (In re Marriage of Zierenberg (1992) 
    11 Cal.App.4th 1436
    , 1445.)
    5
    DISPOSITION
    The order is affirmed.
    MCINTYRE, J.
    WE CONCUR:
    HALLER, Acting P. J.
    O'ROURKE, J.
    6
    

Document Info

Docket Number: D064712

Filed Date: 11/18/2014

Precedential Status: Non-Precedential

Modified Date: 4/17/2021