BNSF Railway Company v. Panhandle No Railroad, L.L ( 2020 )


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  •      Case: 18-11416   Document: 00515257294        Page: 1   Date Filed: 01/03/2020
    IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
    FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT
    United States Court of Appeals
    Fifth Circuit
    FILED
    January 3, 2020
    No. 18-11416
    Lyle W. Cayce
    Clerk
    BNSF RAILWAY COMPANY,
    Plaintiff – Appellee
    v.
    PANHANDLE NORTHERN RAILROAD, L.L.C.,
    Defendant – Appellant
    Appeal from the United States District Court
    for the Northern District of Texas
    Before DAVIS, GRAVES, and HIGGINSON, Circuit Judges.
    W. EUGENE DAVIS, Circuit Judge:
    In this contract dispute between two railroad companies, Defendant,
    Panhandle Northern Railroad, L.L.C. (“PNR”), appeals the district court’s
    judgment in favor of Plaintiff, BNSF Railway Company (“BNSF”). PNR asserts
    that, contrary to the district court’s determination, the handling-carrier
    relationship established by the 1993 Agreement between the parties was
    terminable at will under Illinois law. PNR argues that the district court
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    consequently erred in ruling that PNR breached the Agreement when it
    terminated unilaterally the handling-carrier relationship effective January 1,
    2017, after reasonable notice to BNSF. PNR further argues that the district
    court erred in dismissing its affirmative defense of BNSF’s prior material
    breach, in requiring PNR to identify an express contractual provision in order
    to assert the defense of justification, and in awarding BNSF exemplary
    damages and specific performance.
    We conclude that the first issue raised by PNR is determinative of this
    appeal. Specifically, we hold that the handling-carrier relationship established
    by the 1993 Agreement between the parties is terminable at will under Illinois
    law and that PNR consequently had a right to terminate the relationship
    unilaterally upon reasonable notice to BNSF. Therefore, we REVERSE the
    district court’s judgment and RENDER judgment in favor of PNR.
    I. Factual Background
    In October 1993, the predecessor companies 1 of BNSF and PNR executed
    a contract entitled: Agreement for Sale of Certain Assets, Rights and
    Obligations of the Atchison, Topeka and Santa Fe Railway Company to
    Panhandle Northern Railroad Company (“1993 Agreement”).                   The 1993
    Agreement concerned one of BNSF’s rail branch lines—the Borger Line. As
    illustrated below, the Borger Line stretches approximately 31 miles from
    Borger, Texas to Panhandle, Texas. At Panhandle, the Borger Line connects
    to BNSF’s Southern Transcon line, a main line running from Chicago to Los
    Angeles.
    1  In 1994, Panhandle Northern Railroad Company changed from a corporation to a
    limited liability company, PNR. In 1995, the Atchison, Topeka, and Santa Fe Railway
    merged with Burlington Northern Railroad to form BNSF. Throughout this opinion, we use
    the contracting parties’ present-day names.
    2
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    As explained by BNSF, it built the Borger Line to serve petrochemical
    refineries constructed in Borger in the 1920s. In the early 1990s, however,
    seeking “to conserve capital, protect customer relationships, and increase
    efficiency,” BNSF sold certain branch lines and abandoned others. Although
    it apparently did not make economic sense to BNSF to operate the Borger Line,
    BNSF did not believe it could obtain the necessary federal regulatory approval
    to abandon the line. Therefore, BNSF sold the Borger Line and, consistent
    with BNSF policy when selling branch lines, contracted with the purchasing
    railroad, PNR, to serve as BNSF’s “handling carrier.” As explained in further
    detail below, a handling-carrier arrangement allowed BNSF to set the routes
    and rates for freight customers requiring service on BNSF’s rail line and PNR’s
    rail line (the newly-acquired Borger Line), and to bill and collect revenue from
    those interline rail service customers, as though the Borger Line were still part
    of the BNSF rail system after the sale. PNR, as the new owner and operator
    of the Borger Line, moved (“handled”) the freight on the Borger Line and was
    3
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    paid a flat fee per rail car by BNSF out of the revenue BNSF received from
    freight customers for the interline rail service provided by both companies. 2
    In the 1993 Agreement, BNSF agreed to sell the Borger Line and
    associated rail business to PNR by November 1993. Specifically, in the first
    section of the Agreement, BNSF agreed to sell to PNR: (1) the Borger Line and
    all of the real estate and improvements associated with the line, (2) the rail
    freight transportation business it conducts on the line (or “Rail Business”), and
    (3) all of the tangible personal property it used in connection with its Rail
    Business and located on the line.           The Agreement provided that the Rail
    Business included BNSF’s rights “to operate freight trains over the Borger
    Line, to establish freight rates over the Borger Line, to enter into freight
    transportation contracts for rail freight operations over the Borger Line, and
    to interchange rail freight traffic to and from the Borger Line with [BNSF].”
    BNSF also agreed to assign to PNR all of its rights and obligations under
    various contracts “relating to the Borger Line and the Rail Business to the
    extent necessary for PNR to conduct the Rail Business as presently conducted.”
    To complete these transactions, the Agreement required BNSF to deliver a
    quitclaim deed and bill of sale to PNR, as well as execute an assignment in
    favor of PNR, upon “Closing.” The Agreement set a purchase price of $995,000
    “[f]or the rights and interests conveyed and assigned by [BNSF] to PNR,” which
    was to be paid at Closing.
    On November 3, 1993, BNSF sold the Borger Line to PNR by executing
    a quitclaim deed to PNR, conveying all of BNSF’s “right, title and interest . . .
    in and to the lands and premises” described as the Borger Line.                         On
    November 15, 1993, BNSF also executed an assignment in favor of PNR, in
    As described by PNR in its letter to rail customers, freight service provided by BNSF
    2
    and PNR, in effect, was “bundled” such that customers received a single freight bill from
    BNSF for interline service provided by both PNR and BNSF.
    4
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    which BNSF assigned its rights in various contracts to PNR “related to the
    Borger Line and the Rail Business to the extent necessary for PNR to conduct
    the Rail Business as presently conducted.”
    The second section of the 1993 Agreement detailed the transition of the
    Borger Line from being operated by BNSF to being operated by PNR following
    the Closing. The Agreement provided that at 12:01 A.M. on the day following
    the Closing Date, “[a]ll rail operations on the Borger Line and the Rail
    Business shall be transferred from [BNSF] to PNR.”                   This section also
    confirmed that, as owner and operator of the Borger Line, “PNR shall be
    responsible for all common carrier rail operations on the Borger Line.” 3
    The third section of the Agreement, entitled “Operations Following the
    Closing Date,” lies at the heart of the dispute between the parties. This section
    of the Agreement created the handling-carrier relationship between PNR and
    BNSF that would take effect after completion of the sale of the Borger Line to
    PNR. As stated above, this arrangement allowed BNSF to set routes and rates,
    and bill and collect revenue from customers, as though the Borger Line were
    still part of the BNSF rail system. BNSF moved freight on its line, and PNR
    moved freight on the Borger Line, but for those customers requiring interline
    service (i.e., service over both BNSF and PNR rail lines), BNSF billed the
    customers for the services rendered by both railroads. Specifically, the 1993
    Agreement provided that “[u]ntil such time as PNR and [BNSF] otherwise
    mutually agree,” BNSF “shall have the authority to establish through rail
    routes (‘Through Routes’), and to offer through rail freight rates via the
    Through Routes (‘Through Rates’), for interline rail freight transportation
    3   Under federal common-carrier law, “[a] rail carrier providing transportation or
    service . . . shall provide the transportation or service on reasonable request.” 
    49 U.S.C. § 1101
    (a). Thus, as the common carrier of the Borger Line, PNR is required to move freight
    for any rail customer upon reasonable request. PNR is also required to “provide to any
    person, on request, [its] rates and other service terms.” 
    49 U.S.C. § 1101
    (b).
    5
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    service offered by PNR and [BNSF].” The parties further agreed that the
    revenue BNSF received from customers paying for such interline rail service
    would be divided between them and that BNSF would remit a negotiated flat
    fee per rail car to PNR out of that revenue for its rail service.
    From the perspective of a BNSF interline customer requiring service on
    the Borger Line, BNSF’s service with respect to the setting of rates and the
    billing for services rendered was the same prior to and after the sale of the
    Borger Line to PNR. The customer continued to receive just one bill from
    BNSF, rather than two from BNSF for rail service on its rail line and PNR for
    rail service on its newly-acquired Borger Line. 4 BNSF presumably benefitted
    from this arrangement as it continued to bill customers and collect revenue as
    though it still owned the Borger Line. PNR, which was a startup operation,
    also presumably benefitted in that it did not have to establish customer
    relationships or take on the administrative tasks of billing and collecting the
    revenue for the rail service it rendered on the Borger Line.
    The    last   section   of   the   1993   Agreement     stated   that   “[t]he
    representations, warranties, and obligations of PNR and [BNSF] in this
    Agreement are continuing and survive Closing.” Additionally, the Agreement
    provided that the “[t]erms of continuing obligations in this Agreement are
    subject to amendment only by a written contract signed by both PNR and
    [BNSF], or their respective successors or assignees.” The Agreement further
    stated that it “shall be governed by and construed in accordance with the laws
    of the State of Illinois.”
    Between 1994 and 2016, the parties amended the 1993 Agreement eight
    times, primarily to reflect increases in the per-car fee BNSF was required to
    4 In that way, BNSF and PNR rail services were bundled in one bill to a freight
    customer needing what had become “interline” service, i.e., service on both the BNSF
    mainline and service on the PNR Borger Line.
    6
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    remit to PNR, but the basic handling-carrier relationship described above
    remained in place for approximately twenty-three years. In September 2016,
    PNR advised BNSF of its intention to terminate the handling-carrier
    relationship effective January 1, 2017, and to begin setting rates on its Borger
    Line and billing and collecting directly from customers for the freight
    transportation services it renders on the line. PNR asserted that it could
    terminate the handling-carrier relationship because under Illinois law, which
    specifically applied to the Agreement, “perpetual agreements are terminable
    by either party on reasonable notice.” BNSF, however, disagreed that the
    handling-carrier arrangement between the parties could be terminated
    unilaterally and filed suit against PNR.
    II. Procedural History
    In October 2016, BNSF filed a petition for declaratory relief and
    damages, an application for a temporary restraining order (“TRO”), and a
    request for injunctive relief against PNR in Texas state court. BNSF asserted
    that PNR had no right, contractual or otherwise, to terminate the handling-
    carrier relationship created by the 1993 Agreement. BNSF further maintained
    that it was entitled to damages based on PNR’s anticipatory breach of the
    Agreement and PNR’s breach of its duty of good faith and fair dealing. BNSF
    additionally contended that PNR threatened to interfere with BNSF’s
    relationships with its customers by separately setting rates and billing BNSF’s
    customers for freight transportation services.
    PNR removed the action to federal district court on the basis of diversity
    jurisdiction. BNSF thereafter filed an amended complaint in which it added
    an alternative claim for rescission of the Agreement. Specifically, if the district
    court determined that the handling-carrier relationship between the parties
    was terminable at will, then BNSF requested the district court to use “its
    equitable powers to rescind and/or unwind” the sale of the Borger Line “subject
    7
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    to the approval of the Surface Transportation Board.” BNSF also filed an
    application for a TRO and preliminary injunction under Rule 65 of the Federal
    Rules of Civil Procedure.       The district court denied BNSF’s application,
    concluding that BNSF had not carried its burden of establishing a substantial
    threat of irreparable injury.
    In response to BNSF’s amended complaint, PNR filed a motion to dismiss
    under Rule 12(b)(6). PNR contended that BNSF’s claims failed because the
    handling-carrier relationship was of indefinite duration and, therefore,
    terminable at will under Illinois law. The district court denied the motion.
    PNR subsequently answered BNSF’s amended complaint, raising numerous
    affirmative defenses. In the event the court determined that the Agreement
    should be rescinded, PNR also asserted a counterclaim against BNSF for
    quantum meruit for the reasonable value of the services PNR rendered BNSF
    and for PNR’s maintenance and improvement of the Borger Line, less any
    amounts BNSF previously paid for the services.
    BNSF filed a motion for partial summary judgment, arguing, inter alia,
    that the “terminable at will” doctrine was inapplicable to PNR’s obligation to
    act as BNSF’s handling carrier.       PNR also filed a motion for summary
    judgment, reasserting the arguments raised in its Rule 12(b)(6) motion. The
    district court granted BNSF’s motion for partial summary judgment and
    denied PNR’s summary judgment motion. Pertinent to the issues on appeal,
    the district court determined that, as a matter of law, the Agreement was not
    terminable at will.    Consequently, the district court concluded that PNR
    breached the Agreement when it unilaterally terminated the Agreement.
    The district court subsequently tried, before a jury, the issue of the
    amount of damages BNSF was entitled to as a result of PNR’s contractual
    breach and BNSF’s claim against PNR for tortious interference with its
    customer contracts. Based on the jury’s verdict, the district court ultimately
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    entered a final judgment awarding BNSF $900,000 for past contract injury and
    $795,991 for past tortious interference, both amounts “to be construed as an
    equitable recovery.”       The district court also awarded BNSF $1,591,982 in
    exemplary damages and ordered PNR’s specific performance “of its obligations
    under Section III of the Agreement to act as BNSF’s handling carrier.” PNR
    filed a timely notice of appeal. It also filed a motion to stay execution of the
    judgment, which the district court granted. The district court also ordered
    PNR to post a supersedeas bond in the amount of $5,815,083.38 for the
    duration of the pendency of PNR’s appeal.
    III. Discussion
    As stated above, the district court granted partial summary judgment in
    favor of BNSF and determined, as a matter of law, that the handling-carrier
    relationship between the parties was not terminable at will and that PNR was
    not entitled to terminate it unilaterally. This court reviews a district court’s
    grant of summary judgment de novo. 5 Under Rule 56 of the Federal Rules of
    Civil Procedure, “the court shall grant summary judgment if the movant shows
    that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is
    entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” 6
    Because this case arises under our diversity jurisdiction, the Erie
    doctrine requires that we apply the applicable state substantive law. 7 It is
    undisputed that Illinois law governs interpretation of the 1993 Agreement. 8 In
    determining Illinois law, “we look first to the final decisions of . . . the [Illinois]
    Supreme Court.” 9 “In the absence of a determinative decision by that court on
    5 Apache Corp. v. W & T Offshore, Inc., 
    626 F.3d 789
    , 793 (5th Cir. 2010).
    6 FED. R. CIV. P. 56(a).
    7 See Erie R. Co. v. Tompkins, 
    304 U.S. 64
     (1938).
    8 Section IV(6) of the Agreement states that it “shall be governed by and construed in
    accordance with the laws of the State of Illinois.”
    9 ExxonMobil Corp. v. Elec. Reliability Serv., Inc., 
    868 F.3d 408
    , 414 (5th Cir. 2017).
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    the issue of law before us, we must determine, in our best judgement, how we
    believe that court would resolve the issue.” 10             An Erie guess must be an
    “attempt to predict state law, not to create or modify it.” 11
    A. The Illinois Supreme Court’s Jespersen Decision
    As acknowledged by the parties and the district court, Jespersen v.
    Minnesota Mining and Manufacturing Company 12 is the authoritative decision
    from the Illinois Supreme Court regarding the rules applicable to contracts of
    indefinite duration under Illinois law. In Jespersen, the court acknowledged
    that “[i]t has long been recognized that contracts of indefinite duration are
    generally terminable at the will of the parties.” 13 A close look at the court’s
    analysis of the contract involved in Jespersen shows that this general rule of
    at-will termination is strong and that the Illinois Supreme Court requires
    specific and unequivocal language to find the rule inapplicable to a contract of
    indefinite duration.
    In Jespersen, a distributor sued a manufacturer for breach of contract
    after the manufacturer terminated a sales distribution agreement with the
    distributor after thirteen years. 14 The contract provided “that it ‘shall continue
    in force indefinitely’ unless terminated in the manner provided in article IV.” 15
    Under article IV, there were two termination provisions: one applicable to the
    manufacturer and the other applicable to the distributor.                    The provision
    applicable to the manufacturer stated that the manufacturer “may, upon not
    less than thirty (30) days notice to the Distributor, terminate this agreement
    10Id.
    11Bear Ranch, L.L.C. v. Heartbrand Beef, Inc., 
    885 F.3d 794
    , 804 (5th Cir. 2018) (citing
    United Parcel Serv., Inc. v. Weben Indus., Inc., 
    794 F.2d 1005
    , 1008 (5th Cir. 1986)).
    12 
    700 N.E.2d 1014
     (Ill. 1998).
    13 
    Id. at 1015
     (citation omitted).
    14 
    Id.
    15 
    Id.
    10
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    for any of the following reasons.”             All of the listed reasons constituted
    “instances of material breach.” 16 The termination provision applicable to the
    distributor provided that “Distributor may terminate this agreement upon
    thirty (30) days written notice to [the manufacturer].” 17
    The court determined that although the termination provision applicable
    to the manufacturer allowed termination for instances of material breach, the
    provision was “not sufficient to take th[e] agreement of indefinite duration out
    of the general rule of at-will termination for two reasons.” 18 First, the language
    of the termination provision was “permissive and equivocal; a party ‘may’
    terminate for the stated grounds—the clear inference being that those grounds
    are not the sole or exclusive basis for termination.” 19 Second, the court noted
    that “the termination events are themselves instances of material breach, and
    any contract is terminable upon the occurrence of a material breach.” 20 The
    court concluded that none of the termination provisions took the contract of
    indefinite duration out of the at-will rule.
    The court explained that its rationale for interpreting the contract as
    terminable at will reflected two important public policies. First, “in general,
    individuals should be free to order their affairs subject to important
    qualifications for instances of fraud, duress, or undue influence.” 21 Second, the
    16 
    Id.
    17 
    Id.
    18 
    Id.
    19 
    Id.
     The court noted that the provision was “in stark contrast to a case in which the
    parties included an exclusive and specific right to terminate for cause in a contract otherwise
    of indefinite duration.” 
    Id.
     (citing Lichnovsky v. Ziebart Int. Corp., 
    324 N.W.2d 732
    , 737
    (1982)).
    20 
    Id.
     (citing Trient Partners I Ltd. v. Blockbuster Enter. Corp., 
    83 F.3d 704
    , 709 (5th
    Cir. 1996)).
    21 
    Id.
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    court noted that “perpetual contracts are disfavored” because “‘[f]orever’ is a
    long time and few commercial concerns remain viable for even a decade.” 22
    The manufacturer and distributor in Jespersen “enjoyed a long and
    presumably profitable relationship of thirteen or more years.” 23 The court
    noted that they expressly drafted a contract that was to last “indefinitely,”
    which the courts of Illinois “have always construed to mean terminable at
    will.” 24 The court held that both parties enjoyed the right to terminate the
    agreement between them at will, “which mean[t] they could terminate the
    agreement for any reason or no reason without committing a breach of
    contract.” 25 Consequently, the court ruled in the manufacturer’s favor and
    determined that it had not breached the contract by terminating it at will. 26
    B. Application of Jespersen
    It is undisputed that there is no durational term for the handling-carrier
    relationship established by the 1993 Agreement between PNR and BNSF.
    Moreover, like the contract in Jespersen, the contract contains language that
    the parties intended the handling-carrier arrangement to be of indefinite
    duration. Specifically, the Agreement provides that “[t]he representations,
    warranties, and obligations of [the parties] in this Agreement are continuing
    and survive Closing.”         Jespersen makes clear that the handling-carrier
    arrangement is thus terminable at will unless there is a termination provision
    “sufficient to take [the] agreement of indefinite duration out of the general rule
    of at-will termination.” 27
    22 
    Id.
    23 
    Id.
    24 
    Id.
    25 
    Id.
    26 
    Id.
    27 Id. at 1016.
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    Review of the 1993 Agreement reveals that there is no provision
    addressing termination of the handling-carrier relationship between PNR and
    BNSF. As noted by the parties and the district court, the Agreement provides
    that the terms of the handling-carrier relationship apply “[u]ntil such time as
    [the parties] otherwise mutually agree.” BNSF argues that this provision is
    sufficient to take the Agreement out of the general rule of at-will termination.
    It asserts that this provision shows that the parties intended their handling-
    carrier relationship to be terminable only by mutual agreement. 28
    We disagree. As stated above, the Erie doctrine instructs us to look first
    to the final decisions of the Illinois Supreme Court and, in the absence of a
    determinative decision by that court, to determine in our best judgement how
    we believe that court would resolve the issue.                The contract of indefinite
    duration in Jespersen contained more specific language regarding termination
    than the contract at issue here, yet the Illinois Supreme Court held that the
    language was not sufficient to prevent application of the general at-will
    termination rule.         The Jespersen contract listed specific grounds for
    termination, but because those grounds were themselves instances of material
    breach for which any contract would be terminable, and because the contract
    stated the manufacturer “may” terminate for those reasons, the court held that
    the general rule of at-will termination applied. 29 In this matter, the phrase
    “[u]ntil such time as [the parties] otherwise mutually agree” does not even
    28   BNSF also asserts that the provision stating that “[t]erms of continuing obligations
    . . . are subject to amendment only by a written contract signed by both [parties]” further
    requires termination only by mutual written agreement. The district court also relied on this
    provision in determining that the handling-carrier relationship was not terminable at will.
    We, however, find this provision inapplicable to termination, as an “amendment” to terms is
    different from “termination” of those terms. See MERRIAM-WEBSTER’S NEW DICTIONARY
    (11th ed. 2016) (defining “amend” as “to change or modify (something) for the better” and
    “terminate” as “to bring to an end”).
    29 
    700 N.E.2d at
    1016–17.
    13
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    reference “termination,” much less indicate a sole or exclusive basis for
    termination that would be sufficient to supplant the at-will termination rule.
    Moreover, any contract is terminable upon mutual agreement of the parties.
    Furthermore, in making an Erie guess, “we may look to the decisions of
    intermediate appellate state courts for guidance.” 30 In Rico Industries, Inc. v.
    TLC Group, Inc., an Illinois appellate court examined an almost identical
    provision to the one presented herein. 31 The provision read as follows: “Any
    change to, cancellation of, or termination of this Agreement shall be null and
    void unless [the parties] mutually agree in writing to do so.” 32 The court held
    that based on its reading of Jespersen, “perpetual contracts are contrary to
    public policy.” 33 The court further held that “agreements that are terminable
    only by the mutual agreement of the parties are contracts of indefinite duration
    and, thus, terminable at will.” Rico further supports our conclusion that the
    handling-carrier relationship between PNR and BNSF is terminable at will.
    BNSF argues that Jespersen and Rico are distinguishable from the
    contract at issue here because the contracts in those cases were “simple
    agreements” between a manufacturer and a sales representative.                     BNSF
    asserts that its contract with PNR does not allow for unilateral termination
    because the parties’ “rail lines are physically connected, and they must
    continue interconnecting to transport freight under their common-carrier
    obligations.” BNSF does not explain how termination of the handling-carrier
    relationship results in either its inability or PNR’s inability to continue serving
    rail customers.    Termination of the handling-carrier relationship will not
    prevent or prohibit BNSF’s customers from being able to use the Borger Line.
    30 ExxonMobil Corp., 868 F.3d at 414 (internal quotation marks and citation omitted).
    31 
    6 N.E.3d 415
    , 416–17 (Ill. App. 1st 2014).
    32 
    Id. at 417
    .
    33 
    Id. at 420
    .
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    As the owner, operator, and common carrier of the Borger Line, PNR has the
    obligation to provide rail service upon reasonable request and the authority to
    set rates and bill customers for the rail services it provides on its line. 34 BNSF
    has the same obligation and authority with respect to its own rail line.
    Customers needing service on both lines will now receive two bills for interline
    service instead of one. BNSF fails to persuade us that termination of the
    handling-carrier relationship would prevent either railroad from fulfilling its
    common-carrier obligations.
    Like the parties in Jespersen, PNR and BNSF enjoyed a long and
    presumably profitable relationship, which lasted twenty-three years. They
    expressly drafted a contract that had no durational term for the handling-
    carrier relationship and described the obligations in that relationship as
    “continuing.”     The parties also specifically chose Illinois law as the law
    applicable to their Agreement and presumably knew that the courts of Illinois
    had long followed the general rule that contracts of indefinite duration are
    terminable at will. Contrary to BNSF’s contention, application of the at-will
    termination rule does not mean that PNR could have terminated the handling-
    carrier relationship the day after the Closing. As stated by the Jespersen court,
    it means that PNR could “terminate the agreement for any reason or no reason
    without committing a breach of contract.” 35 The question of when a party to a
    contract of indefinite duration can lawfully terminate the contract presents a
    different inquiry. Under Illinois law, contracts of indefinite duration “may be
    held to continue for a reasonable time under the circumstances.” 36 BNSF has
    never argued that a period of twenty-three years was not a reasonable time for
    34 See § 1101.
    35 Jespersen, 
    700 N.E.2d at 1017
    .
    36 Adkisson v. Ozment, 
    370 N.E.2d 594
    , 598 (Ill. App. 5th Dist. 1977) (citation omitted)
    (holding that period of 18 years was “reasonable time, under the circumstances”).
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    the handling-carrier relationship to last.
    BNSF argues, as the district court determined, that its sale of the Borger
    Line cannot be separated from the handling-carrier arrangement with PNR
    and that consequently PNR had no right to terminate the arrangement
    unilaterally. 37 We disagree. The sale of the Borger Line was completed by
    BNSF’s executing a quitclaim deed to PNR at the Closing. PNR obtained full
    ownership (fee title) of the Borger Line at that time. Nothing in the 1993
    Agreement or in the quitclaim deed states that PNR’s ownership of the line
    was conditioned on the handling-carrier arrangement. 38 The merger clause
    upon which the district court relied does not indicate otherwise.
    BNSF asserts that railroad transactions have special public policy
    concerns and that permanent arrangements are generally considered to be in
    the interests of the railroads and the public.                 In making this argument,
    however, BNSF relies on a 1958 case which did not involve a handling-carrier
    agreement but instead a large railroad terminal in Chicago. 39 The Illinois
    appellate court held that the long-term lease at issue was consistent with
    specific state statutory law calling for consolidation of railroad terminals and
    facilities. 40 We see no parallel to this matter.
    BNSF additionally argues that the “economic context” of the 1993
    Agreement further supports its interpretation. Specifically, BNSF contends
    that at-will termination of the handling-carrier relationship makes no
    37  By way of its alternative claim for rescission, BNSF makes the companion argument
    that if the handling-carrier arrangement can be terminated, then the sale of the Borger Line
    should be rescinded.
    38 Consequently, BNSF’s claim for rescission of the sale is similarly without merit. We
    also note that the agreements do not contain any type of buy-back provision, right of first
    refusal, or like provision in the event the handling-carrier arrangement were terminated.
    39 See Illinois Cent. R. Co. v. Michigan Cent. R. Co., 
    152 N.E.2d 627
     (Ill. App. 1st Dist.
    1958).
    40 
    Id. at 642
    .
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    commercial sense in light of “the consideration the parties exchanged” and “the
    pricing rights retained.” It points to the provisions in the Agreement stating
    that the “consideration” inducing the parties to enter the Agreement “includes
    all of the commitments” each party owes to the other as set forth in the
    Agreement. BNSF asserts it is unreasonable for PNR “to take BNSF’s retained
    pricing rights, which were never part of the consideration.”
    BNSF’s argument is flawed in several respects. First, there is nothing
    in the 1993 Agreement or in the quitclaim deed providing that BNSF
    “retained” some type of servitude, easement, or encumbrance on the line that
    entitled BNSF to set rates over the Borger Line after it sold the line to PNR.
    BNSF’s rate-setting authority resulted from PNR’s agreement to the handling-
    carrier arrangement which governed the parties’ relationship going forward
    after PNR obtained full ownership of the line. Therefore, BNSF’s contention
    that when PNR unilaterally terminated the handling-carrier relationship, it
    “took” BNSF’s “retained pricing rights” has no merit.
    Second, BNSF’s argument that the price paid by PNR for its purchase of
    the Borger Line was not “adequate” consideration and that the “primary”
    consideration was a “continuing handling-carrier obligation” would require us
    to evaluate not only the value of the land and assets sold, but also the value
    BNSF received from the twenty-three years the handling-carrier relationship
    lasted.   Not only would that task be far too speculative for this court to
    undertake, but it is also not required under Illinois law. In any event, it is
    apparent from the jury’s award of $900,000 to BNSF for a year and a half of
    past contract injury that BNSF gained substantial profit from the handling-
    carrier relationship over the past twenty-three years.
    As aforementioned, in making an Erie guess, we must determine, in our
    best judgment, how we believe the Illinois Supreme Court would resolve
    whether the handling-carrier relationship between PNR and BNSF is
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    terminable at will. And, as reflected in the Jespersen decision, careful analysis
    of the text of the contract is paramount in making such a determination.
    Moreover, in the cases BNSF relies upon, the courts discussed the economics
    of the parties’ agreements only after first examining closely the text of the
    contracts at issue and determining that there were termination provisions
    sufficient to take the contracts of indefinite duration out of the general rule of
    at-will termination. 41 Although the courts could have ended their decisions
    upon making those determinations, they then went on to discuss the economics
    of the parties’ agreements to further bolster their decisions that the contracts
    were not terminable at will. 42 In this matter, as discussed above and unlike
    the cases relied upon by BNSF, there is no termination provision that is
    sufficient to take the handling-carrier arrangement of indefinite duration out
    of the general rule of at-will termination. 43
    41   See Burford v. Accounting Practice Sales, Inc., 
    786 F.3d 582
    , 586 (7th Cir. 2015)
    (acknowledging that Jespersen requires “close parsing of the contract language” and
    determining that contract language was sufficient to supplant the at-will termination rule
    because contract “said [one party] could terminate the contract only if [other party] violated
    it.”); Baldwin Piano, Inc. v. Deutsche Wurlitzer GMBH, 
    392 F.3d 881
    , 882–83 (7th Cir. 2004)
    (holding that specific language of the contract placed “substantive restrictions” on the
    “reasons for termination” of the agreement between the parties).
    42 See Burford, 786 F.3d at 587–88 (discussing economics of a sales representative’s
    contract); Baldwin Piano, Inc., 
    392 F.3d at 885
     (discussing economics of a “trademark license”
    versus a “distribution contract”).
    43 BNSF further points out that the district court determined that PNR’s
    interpretation of the handling-carrier relationship would lead to an “absurd result” because
    it would mean that BNSF “sold the Borger Line at ‘salvage value’ . . . but did not otherwise
    receive the long term benefit of a continuing handling carrier relationship and retained rate-
    making authority.” As we have noted, the specific language of the contract, and not the
    economics of BNSF’s sale of the Borger Line to PNR, is essential in determining whether the
    general rule of at-will termination applies to a contract of indefinite duration under Illinois
    law. Furthermore, the district court did not acknowledge the benefit BNSF received from
    the twenty-three years the handling-carrier relationship lasted. BNSF asserts that it would
    never have sold the Borger Line for just salvage value. In doing so, it does not recognize that
    it did more than that. It sold the Borger Line and contracted for a handling-carrier
    relationship following the sale. In that way, BNSF was able to receive the purchase price
    (which is the only amount it would have received if it could have abandoned the rail line) plus
    the opportunity to generate additional revenue with a handling-carrier arrangement. The
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    Lastly, BNSF contends that its “prior performance” of its contractual
    obligations precludes application of the at-will termination rule. BNSF asserts
    that it fully performed when “it conveyed the Borger Line and local freight
    business to PNR in 1993. All that remained under the Agreement was for PNR
    to discharge its continuing obligation to act as BNSF’s handling carrier.”
    BNSF’s argument would mean that the sale of the Borger Line was not
    completed at the Closing and that the sale involved cash consideration plus
    some type of installment arrangement wherein PNR’s handling services, which
    would be rendered indefinitely, constituted the remainder of the “payment” for
    the line.
    Pretermitting whether such a conditional sale could even be confected
    under Illinois law, there is no language in the 1993 Agreement, or in the
    quitclaim deed, establishing such an installment type of sale contract.
    Moreover, the unpublished order from the Seventh Circuit upon which BNSF
    relies, like the other Seventh Circuit decisions discussed above, determined
    that the contract at issue was not terminable at will based on the specific
    language of the contract—“the terms of the durational paragraph” were “far
    from creating a contract terminable at will.” 44 Rather, the parties “agreed they
    would measure their obligation by reference to specific, external events.” 45
    There is no comparable language in the Agreement between BNSF and PNR.
    Consequently, BNSF’s argument is unavailing. 46
    proof BNSF produced at trial regarding the damage it suffered during just one and half years
    without the handling-carrier arrangement shows that BNSF benefitted much more from a
    sale with handling-carrier arrangement rather than simple abandonment. BNSF’s attempt
    to characterize the deal as one-sided is unpersuasive.
    44 See Yale Security, Inc. v. Freedman Sales, Ltd., 
    165 F.3d 34
     (7th Cir. 1998)
    (unpublished order).
    45 
    Id.
    46 In the last paragraph of its brief, BNSF requests this court to remand if we
    determine that PNR had a right to terminate unilaterally the handling-carrier relationship,
    so that the district court can consider its claims for “rescission and other breaches.” As
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    IV. Conclusion
    Based on the foregoing reasons, we hold that the handling-carrier
    relationship created by the 1993 Agreement between PNR and BNSF is
    terminable at will. We further hold that PNR consequently was entitled to
    terminate the relationship unilaterally upon reasonable notice to BNSF and
    that PNR did not breach the Agreement when it gave such notice to BNSF in
    September 2016. Therefore, we REVERSE the district court’s judgment and
    RENDER judgment in favor of PNR.
    detailed above, however, the sale of the Borger Line was not dependent on the handling-
    carrier relationship, and BNSF is not entitled to rescind the sale based on PNR’s lawful
    termination of that relationship.
    20