United States v. Glaspie ( 1999 )

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FIFTH CIRCUIT
_________________
No. 98-30455
Summary Calendar
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UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff-Appellee,
versus
TERRANCE D. GLASPIE,
Defendant-Appellant.
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Western District of Louisiana
(97-CR-20098-1)
June 17, 1999
Before EMILIO M. GARZA, DeMOSS, and BENAVIDES, Circuit Judges.
PER CURIAM:*
Terrance D. Glaspie, Defendant-Appellant, appeals his jury-verdict conviction and sentence
for aiding and abetting another person to possess with intent to distribute cocaine base. He argues
for the first time on appeal that one witness’s testimony against him at trial was improper pursuant
to 18 U.S.C. § 201(c)(2) because it was given in exchange fo r leniency by the Government. We,
however, have previously rejected such an argument. See United States v. Haese, 162 F.3d 359, 366-
67 (5th Cir. 1998), petition for cert. filed, (U.S. Apr. 15, 1999) (No. 98-9005).
Glaspie also contends that the district court erred by denying his motion to suppress
incriminating post-arrest statements he made to FBI agents after waiving his rights under Miranda
v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 88 S. Ct. 1602, 16 L. Ed. 2d 694 (1966), because the statements were not
*
Pursuant to 5TH CIR. R. 47.5, the court has determined that this opinion should not be
published and is not precedent except under the limited circumstances set forth in 5TH CIR. R. 47.5.4.
voluntary and, therefore, were inadmissable under FED. R. CRIM. P. 11(e)(6) and FED. R. EVID. 410.
After considering the factors set forth in Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218, 225-26 (1973),
we conclude that Glaspie’s statements “were the product of his free and rational choice.” United
States v. Restrepo, 994 F.2d 173, 183 (5th Cir. 1993). In addition, because Glaspie was not
negotiating an actual plea with a government attorney, his statements were not inadmissable under
FED. R. CRIM. P. 11(e)(6) and FED. R. EVID. 410. See United States v. Robertson, 582 F.2d 1356,
1368 (5th Cir. 1978).
Glaspie also argues that the district court erred in denying his motion to suppress evidence
seized from his girlfriend’s automobile. We conclude that Glaspie did not have standing to contest
the search of the vehicle because he did not establish an objectively reasonable expectation of privacy.
See United States v. Riazco, 91 F.3d 752, 754 (5th Cir. 1996).
Accordingly, the judgment of the district court is AFFIRMED.
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