United States v. Lopez ( 1999 )


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  •                   IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
    FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT
    No. 98-40665
    Summary Calendar
    UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
    Plaintiff-Appellee,
    versus
    SAUL ROBERTO LOPEZ,
    Defendant-Appellant.
    Appeal from the United States District Court
    for the Southern District of Texas
    USDC No. L-98-CR-37-1
    July 7, 1999
    Before EMILIO M. GARZA, DeMOSS, and BENAVIDES, Circuit Judges.
    *
    PER CURIAM:
    Saul Roberto Lopez was convicted on his plea of guilty of
    having illegally reentered the United States after having been
    deported, and he appeals.       We AFFIRM.
    Lopez contends that he is entitled to reversal on grounds that
    the   district     court   abused   its   discretion   by   not   holding   a
    competency hearing for him sua sponte, in accordance with 18 U.S.C.
    § 4241(a).        He bases this on the bizarre reasons he gave for
    returning to the United States from Mexico.
    *
    Pursuant to 5TH CIR. R. 47.5, the Court has determined that this
    opinion should not be published and is not precedent except under
    the limited circumstances set forth in 5TH CIR. R. 47.5.4.
    “Whether ‘reasonable cause’ exists to put the court on notice
    that the defendant might be mentally incompetent is left to the
    sound discretion of the district court.”       United States v. Davis,
    
    61 F.3d 291
    , 304 (5th Cir. 1995).      Accordingly, this court reviews
    the district court’s decision not to hold a competency hearing for
    abuse of discretion.    
    Id. “In determining
    whether there is a ‘bona
    fide doubt’ as to the defendant’s competence, the court considers
    three factors: (1) any history of irrational behavior, (2) the
    defendant’s demeanor at trial, and (3) any prior medical opinion on
    competency.”   
    Id. “[T]he standard
    for competence to stand trial [or to plead
    guilty] is whether the defendant has sufficient present ability to
    consult with his lawyer with a reasonable degree of rational
    understanding and has a rational as well as factual understanding
    of the proceedings against him.”       Godinez v. Moran, 
    509 U.S. 389
    ,
    396-97 (1993) (citation and quotation marks omitted).            Lopez
    demonstrated at his rearraignment and his sentencing hearing that
    he possessed the requisite ability and understanding.
    Lopez does not have a significant history of irrational
    behavior. Nor do prior medical opinions concerning his competency,
    one of which was formed shortly prior to Lopez’s sentencing,
    support his contention.       Accordingly, the district court did not
    abuse its discretion by not holding a competency hearing sua
    sponte.   See 
    Davis, 61 F.3d at 304
    .
    Lopez contends that he is entitled to relief on grounds that
    the district court did not specifically advise him that if he
    pleaded   guilty,      he     would   waive   his   privilege   against
    self-incrimination.    See Fed. R. Crim. P. 11(c)(3).
    A defendant-appellant’s “Rule 11 challenges are reviewed under
    a harmless-error analysis.”    United States v. Crow, 
    164 F.3d 229
    ,
    233 (5th Cir. 1999).      “Under the harmless-error analysis, this
    Court must determine (1) whether the sentencing court in fact
    varied from the procedure required by Rule 11 and (2) if so, did
    such variance affect the substantial rights of the defendant.”
    United States v. Suarez, 
    155 F.3d 521
    , 524 (5th Cir. 1998).
    The district court adequately complied with Rule 11. Implicit
    in the court’s advice that if he went to trial, the Government
    would have to prove his guilt and that he “would not have to do
    anything except to show up,” is the advice that Lopez could not be
    compelled to incriminate himself.    See United States v. Bachynsky,
    
    949 F.2d 722
    , 726 (5th Cir. 1991).     Accordingly, Lopez’s Rule 11
    claim has no merit.
    JUDGMENT AFFIRMED.