Arinze v. Ashcroft ( 2001 )


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  •                     UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
    FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT
    No. 01-60352
    Summary Calendar
    SYLVESTER OSITA ARINZE,
    Petitioner,
    versus
    JOHN ASHCROFT, U.S. Attorney General,
    Respondent.
    Petition for Review of an Order
    of the Board of Immigration Appeals
    BIA No. A28-583-393
    October 23, 2001
    Before HIGGINBOTHAM, WIENER, and BARKSDALE, Circuit Judges.
    PER CURIAM:*
    Sylvester Osita Arinze, a citizen of Nigeria, seeks review of
    a final order of deportation issued by the Board of Immigration
    Appeals.   He contends:      the BIA erred in requiring proof of
    cohabitation   in   determining    whether    Arinze   entered   into   a
    qualifying marriage in good faith, see 8 U.S.C. § 1186a(c)(4)(B);
    the BIA erred in interpreting that section and in failing to
    consider his poverty as a relevant factor; and the BIA erred in
    concluding that deportation would not result in extreme hardship
    *
    Pursuant to 5TH CIR. R. 47.5, the court has determined that
    this opinion should not be published and is not precedent except
    under the limited circumstances set forth in 5TH CIR. R. 47.5.4.
    when it denied Arinze’s petition for suspension of deportation
    pursuant    to    
    8 U.S.C. § 1254
    (a)(1)    (repealed   by   the     Illegal
    Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act of 1996 §
    308(a)(7), 
    110 Stat. 3009
    -615).
    I.
    Arinze entered the United States in November 1983 as a non-
    immigrant visitor; and, although his visa authorized him to stay in
    the United States until 20 May 1984, he remained to attend school
    and work.         Arinze   married   Cassandra    Sayles,    a   United    States
    citizen, in 1987.       Arinze and Sayles divorced in January 1990.
    On 21 February 1990, Arinze and Sherry Drew were married.
    Based on this marriage, Arinze was granted conditional lawful
    permanent resident status on 19 March 1991.
    On 28 April 1991, Arinze threatened Drew and assaulted her
    with a deadly weapon.          Arinze was charged with felony aggravated
    assault, pleaded        nolo contendre, was sentenced to five years
    probation, and was directed to have no contact with Drew during his
    probation.       Arinze petitioned for dissolution of the marriage, and
    a final divorce decree was issued on 16 September 1991.
    In an application dated 5 January 1993, Arinze petitioned for
    removal of the conditional basis of his permanent resident status,
    applying for a hardship waiver because his marriage to Drew ended
    in divorce.       See 8 U.S.C. § 1186a(c)(4)(B).        On 8 December 1994,
    the Immigration and Naturalization Service informed Arinze it
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    intended to deny his petition for hardship waiver, concluding “a
    lawful and cohabitational marriage did not exist” between Arinze
    and Drew.   On 10 January 1995, the INS received Arinze’s overdue
    response to the notice of intent to deny; and the INS denied
    Arinze’s petition for hardship waiver because Arinze failed to
    submit sufficient proof of cohabitation and a bona fide spousal
    relationship.   Accordingly, on 11 January 1995, INS terminated his
    conditional lawful permanent resident status.
    Deportation proceedings were commenced, and Arinze petitioned
    for a hardship waiver under 8 U.S.C. § 1186a(c)(4)(B) and applied
    for suspension of deportation under former section 244 of the
    Immigration and Nationality Act, 
    8 U.S.C. § 1254
     (1994).     Arinze
    submitted his divorce decree, affidavits, telephone and utility
    bills, a month-to-month lease running from May until July 1990, an
    expired health insurance policy, and a furniture receipt.     After
    several hearings, the Immigration Judge, on 13 October 1995, found
    that Arinze had not met his burden of demonstrating that the
    qualifying marriage was entered into in good faith.     In an order
    dated 6 March 1996, the Immigration Judge denied Arinze’s request
    for suspension of deportation because deportation would not result
    in extreme hardship to him or his United States citizen daughter.
    (Arinze married a citizen of Great Britain, who entered the United
    States in 1995.   Arinze’s wife gave birth to their daughter on 12
    November 1995.)   On 26 March 2001, the BIA adopted and affirmed the
    Immigration Judge’s decisions.       It noted that Arinze lived in
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    Nigeria until he was 23 and decided:          the evidence failed to prove
    cohabitation;    Arinze   had   not    shown       that   he   could   not   find
    employment in Nigeria; and Arinze failed to explain why his family
    in Nigeria could not help him.
    II.
    Judicial review of a deportation order is limited.                 A final
    order of deportation is reviewed on the administrative record upon
    which the order is based, and the court will sustain an order that
    is supported by “reasonable, substantial, and probative evidence”.
    Carbajal-Gonzalez v. I.N.S., 
    78 F.3d. 194
    , 197 (5th Cir. 1996)
    (quoting 8 U.S.C. § 1151a(a)(4) (1994)), cert. denied, 
    510 U.S. 995
    (1993).   The substantial evidence standard “requires only that the
    Board’s conclusion ... be substantially reasonable.” Animashaun v.
    I.N.S., 
    990 F.2d 234
    , 237 (5th Cir. 1993).                 Because a hardship
    waiver is only available at the discretion of the Attorney General,
    our review is limited further to whether there has been an abuse of
    that discretion.     See Nyonzele v. I.N.S., 
    83 F.3d 975
    , 979 (5th
    Cir. 1996) (statutory grant of discretion for hardship waivers,
    asylum requests, and voluntary departure requests requires abuse of
    discretion standard); see also I.N.S. v. Yang, 
    519 U.S. 26
    , 30
    (1996) (interpreting similar language of 
    8 U.S.C. § 1251
    (a)(1)(H)).
    To be eligible for a hardship waiver, Arinze must demonstrate
    that the “qualifying marriage was entered into in good faith”.                  8
    U.S.C.    §   1186a(c)(4)(B).     For       this    determination,     the    INS
    4
    considers:   the commingling of assets, 
    8 C.F.R. § 216.5
    (e)(2)(i);
    the length of cohabitation after marriage and after the alien
    obtained conditional resident status; other evidence, 
    8 C.F.R. § 216.5
    (e)(2)(ii); and the conduct of the parties before and after
    the marriage, see Matter of Soriano, 
    19 I. & N. Dec. 764
     (1988).
    Other evidence of their intent may be demonstrated, for example, by
    listing a spouse on insurance policies, leases, income tax forms,
    or bank accounts and by testimony about courtship, the wedding, or
    shared residences or experiences.             See Matter of Laureano, 
    19 I. & N. Dec. 1
     (1983).    Furthermore, it is the alien’s burden to provide
    “competent objective evidence” in support of a claim of a bona fide
    marriage.    Matter of Ho, 
    19 I. & N. Dec. 582
     (1988).
    Based upon our review of the record, we conclude that the BIA
    did not abuse its discretion in finding Arinze failed to meet his
    burden to prove, by a preponderance of the evidence, that the
    qualifying   marriage     to   Drew     was   entered   into   in   good   faith.
    Although Arinze asserts that the issue before the BIA was proof of
    cohabitation and not whether the marriage was entered into in good
    faith, the hardship waiver requires Arinze to prove the marriage
    was entered into in good faith, a component of which is proof of
    cohabitation.       See   8    U.S.C.    §    1186a(c)(4)(B)   &    
    8 C.F.R. § 216.5
    (e)(2)(ii).
    The evidence shows that the couple separated five weeks after
    Arinze obtained conditional resident status and he filed for
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    divorce less than three months later.              Arinze did not testify, but
    merely relied on several affidavits and evidence submitted to INS.
    With   respect     to   Arinze’s       remaining     contentions,    section
    309(c)(4)(E) of the Illegal Immigration Reform and Responsibility
    Act   bars    judicial    review   of        the   BIA’s   denial    of   Arinze’s
    application for suspension of deportation under 
    8 U.S.C. § 1254
    .
    Moosa v. I.N.S., 
    171 F.3d 994
    , 1013 (5th Cir. 1999).                      Arinze’s
    interpretation of 8 U.S.C. § 1186a(c)(4)(B) is wrong, because the
    “at fault” language in the statute has nothing to do with whether
    Texas provides for “at fault divorces”. Instead, the statutory “at
    fault” language references the time period in which the alien must
    petition for termination of the conditional status.                       Finally,
    Arinze fails to point to any decision holding that poverty is a
    relevant factor to consider, and Arinze’s claim, raised for the
    first time on appeal, regarding ineffective assistance of counsel
    is not properly before the court because Arinze has failed to
    exhaust his administrative remedies.               See Goonsuwan v. Ashcroft,
    
    252 F.3d 383
    , 387, 389 (5th Cir. 2001).
    III.
    For    the   foregoing    reasons,       the   order    of    the   Board   of
    Immigration Appeals is
    AFFIRMED.
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