Simmons v. TX Dept Cr Justice ( 2002 )

IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT
No. 01-40503
THOMAS E. SIMMONS, Plaintiff - Appellee,
versus
TEXAS DEPARTMENT OF CRIMINAL JUSTICE,
A State Governmental Agency; ET AL., Defendants,
TEXAS DEPARTMENT OF CRIMINAL JUSTICE,
A State Governmental Agency, Defendant - Appellant.
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Southern District of Texas
C-98-CV-547
March 21, 2002
Before EMILIO M. GARZA, BENAVIDES, and STEWART, Circuit Judges.
PER CURIAM:*
The Texas Department of Criminal Justice (“TDCJ”) appeals from an order denying its motion
to dismiss Thomas Simmons’s (“Simmons”) Title II claim under the Americans with Disabilities Act
* Pursuant to 5th CIR. R. 47.5, the court has determined that this opinion should not be published and is not
precedent except under the limited circumstances set forth in 5th CIR. R. 47.5.4.
(“ADA”), 42 U.S.C. § 12132, et seq. (1995). For the following reasons, we hereby VACATE and
REMAND with instructions.
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
Simmons is an inmate currently incarcerated at the TDCJ Institutional Division. Due to an
injury from a gun shot wound and a herniated disc, prison officials have classified him as permanently
disabled. As a result, he has been prevented from performing any work duties, including participation
in an on-the-job training program (“OJT Program”). Through the program, prisoners receive good
time credits toward an early release from prison. Simmons requested that he be allowed to perform
sedentary work in the library in accordance with the OJT Program. Prison officials denied his request.
Proceeding pro se and in forma pauperis, Simmons filed suit alleging discrimination under
Title II of the ADA. Simmons sought declaratory and injunctive relief, as well as monetary damages.
Simmons originally named individual prison officials in their official capacities as defendants.
However, the district court dismissed them from the suit, finding, in part, that there was no reason to
resort to a suit against the individuals in their official capacities, as long as the ADA permitted a suit
against the TDCJ. The TDCJ filed a motion for summary judgment claiming Eleventh Amendment
immunity and various other defenses. Simmons also filed a motion for summary judgment. Both
motions were denied. The TDCJ herein appeals the denial of its motion to dismiss on Eleventh
Amendment immunity grounds.
JURISDICTION AND STANDARD OF REVIEW
Under the collateral order doctrine, we have jurisdiction over an appeal from a denial of a
motion to dismiss based on sovereign immunity. See, e.g., Puerto Rico Aqueduct & Sewer Auth. v.
Metcalf & Eddy, Inc., 506 U.S. 139, 141 (1993). Whether a state is entitled to Eleventh Amendment
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immunity is a question of law, which we review de novo. See, e.g., AT&T Communications v.
BellSouth Telecommunications, Inc., 238 F.3d 636, 643 (5th Cir. 2001).
I. Abrogation of Eleventh Amendment Immunity
In Reickenbacker v. Foster, we determined that Title II of the ADA did not validly abrogate
Eleventh Amendment sovereign immunity. 274 F.3d 974, 975 (5th Cir. 2001). In that opinion, we
found that, based on principles set forth in recent Supreme Court decisions regarding the Eleventh
Amendment, Congress exceeded its powers under Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment when it
applied Title II of the ADA to the states. Id. at 983; see also Garrett v. Bd. of Trustees of the Univ.
of Ala., 531 U.S. 356, 360-74 (2001) (holding that Title I of the ADA did not validly abrogate state
sovereign immunity); Kimel v. Fla. Bd. of Regents, 528 U.S. 62, 82-92 (2000) (holding that the Age
Discrimination in Employment Act did not validly abrogate state sovereign immunity).
In the instant action, the district court denied the TDCJ’s motion without prejudice pending
the Supreme Court’s further development of the doctrine of sovereign immunity in Garrett. The
district court was aware of the potential value of Garrett, and could not have relied on Reickenbacker,
as it post-dated the court’s decision. We therefore REMAND for the district court to reconsider the
question of Eleventh Amendment immunity in light of Reickenbacker.
II. Ex Parte Young
Simmons and the Government, as intervenor, request that if the ADA did not validly abrogate
sovereign immunity, the case be allowed to proceed against the named individual prison officials in
their official capacities under the Ex Parte Young doctrine. 209 U.S. 123, 159-60 (1908) (holding that
the Eleventh Amendment does not prohibit suits against state officials where the relief sought is
injunctive). In Reickenbacker, the plaintiffs’ original complaint named state officials as defendants.
274 F.3d at 976 n.9. However, they subsequently amended their complaint to remove the state
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officials. Id. The plaintiffs argued that the Ex parte Young exception should remain open to them
because they originally named the state officials as defendants. Id. We found that the Ex parte Young
exception was not available because after the complaint was voluntarily amended, there was no longer
an effort to proceed properly under the exception. Id. By contrast, in the case before this Court, the
district court dismissed the claims against the named officials for injunctive relief, over the objection
of Simmons, in part due to its belief that a valid abrogation of sovereign immunity existed. We
therefore REMAND for a reconsideration of the prior dismissals of the named state officials in light
of Reickenbacker.
The district court might consider appointing counsel to assist Simmons, if he so requests, in
order that this complex Ex Parte Young issue may be decided after full briefing by the parties. For
the foregoing reasons, we VACATE and REMAND to the district court for further proceedings not
inconsistent with this opinion.
VACATED and REMANDED.
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