United States v. Williams ( 2003 )


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  •                IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
    FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT
    No. 02-50546
    Summary Calendar
    UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
    Plaintiff-Appellee,
    versus
    KENYON LAMONTE WILLIAMS,
    Defendant-Appellant.
    Appeal from the United States District Court
    for the Western District of Texas
    USDC No. W-00-CR-55-1
    March 7, 2003
    Before GARWOOD, JOLLY and SMITH, Circuit Judges.
    PER CURIAM:*
    In his instant appeal, Kenyon Lamonte Williams challenges only
    the sufficiency of the evidence to support his conviction for being
    an armed career criminal in possession of a firearm, in violation
    of 
    18 U.S.C. §§ 922
    (g)(1) and 924(e).   Because he did not move for
    a judgment of acquittal below, review “is limited to determining
    *
    Pursuant to 5TH CIR. R. 47.5 the Court has determined that this
    opinion should not be published and is not precedent except under
    the limited circumstances set forth in 5TH CIR. R. 47.5.4.
    whether there was a manifest miscarriage of justice,” which is
    found only where “‘the record is devoid of evidence pointing to
    guilt or contains evidence on a key element of the offense [that
    is] so tenuous that a conviction would be shocking.’” United States
    v. McIntosh, 
    280 F.3d 479
    , 483 (5th Cir. 2002) (citation omitted).
    Williams   argues   only     that   there   has    been     a    manifest
    miscarriage of justice because there was no evidence to show that
    he knowingly possessed the gun that was recovered from his duffel
    bag.   He points to the fact that his fingerprints were not found on
    the gun, that he did not own the car in which the gun was found,
    and that others had access to the bag containing the gun.
    Contrary   to   Williams’s     assertion,    the    record       contains
    sufficient evidence from which the jury could conclude that he
    constructively possessed the gun.           Williams’s ex-wife testified
    that the night before Williams’s arrest, she had found the gun
    wrapped in Williams’s clothes, and concealed in a bag that he had
    packed and over which he had exercised control, giving the bag to
    his sister to put in her car.              Williams’s sister and mother
    similarly testified that Williams exercised control over the bag
    containing the gun. Both testified that after his arrest, Williams
    called them each from jail and asked them to lie on his behalf in
    an attempt to invalidate the search that had uncovered the gun.
    Such testimony constituted additional circumstantial evidence that
    Williams knowingly      possessed    the   gun.    Cf.    United       States   v.
    2
    Fortenberry, 
    919 F.2d 923
    , 925 (5th Cir. 1990).
    Williams, however, ignores the testimony of his mother and
    sister in arguing that the only evidence linking him to the gun
    came from his ex-wife.     He contends that because of her criminal
    history and because collateral portions of her testimony might be
    construed as contradictory to the testimony of Officer Carlile,
    another prosecution witness, she was not a credible witness and
    that her testimony was thus insufficient to prove possession. “The
    jury   is   solely   responsible   for   determining   the   weight   and
    credibility of the evidence.”      United States v. Casilla, 
    20 F.3d 600
    , 603 (5th Cir. 1994).          The jury was free to credit the
    testimony of Williams’s ex-wife, and this court will not disturb
    the jury’s credibility determinations.      United States v. Wise, 
    221 F.3d 140
    , 147 (5th Cir. 2000).      Williams’s argument regarding his
    ex-wife’s credibility is thus unavailing.
    Rather than being devoid of evidence pointing to guilt, the
    record clearly contains sufficient evidence that Williams knowingly
    possessed the gun that was recovered from his bag.             Williams,
    therefore, has not demonstrated that his conviction on the evidence
    presented was a manifest miscarriage of justice, and his conviction
    is therefore
    AFFIRMED.
    3