Marcus Williams v. Burl Cain, Warden , 578 F. App'x 462 ( 2014 )


Menu:
  •      Case: 13-31234      Document: 00512742186         Page: 1    Date Filed: 08/21/2014
    IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
    FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT
    United States Court of Appeals
    Fifth Circuit
    No. 13-31234                                FILED
    Summary Calendar                        August 21, 2014
    Lyle W. Cayce
    Clerk
    MARCUS WILLIAMS,
    Petitioner-Appellant
    v.
    BURL CAIN, WARDEN, LOUISIANA STATE PENITENTIARY,
    Respondent-Appellee
    Appeal from the United States District Court
    for the Eastern District of Louisiana
    USDC No. 2:12-CV-1162
    Before SMITH, WIENER, and ELROD, Circuit Judges.
    PER CURIAM: *
    Petitioner-Appellant Marcus Williams, Louisiana prisoner # 477846,
    appeals the district court’s denial of his 
    28 U.S.C. § 2254
     habeas petition
    challenging his convictions for armed robbery and aggravated kidnapping. In
    reviewing the denial of § 2254 relief, we address issues of law de novo and
    findings of fact for clear error, applying the same deference to the state court’s
    decision as the district court under the Antiterrorism and Effective Death
    * Pursuant to 5TH CIR. R. 47.5, the court has determined that this opinion should not
    be published and is not precedent except under the limited circumstances set forth in 5TH
    CIR. R. 47.5.4.
    Case: 13-31234     Document: 00512742186     Page: 2   Date Filed: 08/21/2014
    No. 13-31234
    Penalty Act. Ortiz v. Quarterman, 
    504 F.3d 492
    , 496 (5th Cir. 2007). Habeas
    relief may not be granted on a claim that was adjudicated on the merits in state
    court, unless the decision “was contrary to, or involved an unreasonable
    application of, clearly established Federal law as determined by the United
    States Supreme Court,” § 2254(d)(1), or “was based on an unreasonable
    determination of the facts in light of the evidence presented,” § 2254(d)(2). See
    Harrington v. Richter, 
    131 S. Ct. 770
    , 787 (2011).
    Williams argues that the state court erred in determining that the
    evidence was sufficient to support his convictions because the State failed to
    negate the reasonable probability that the victim misidentified him as a
    perpetrator. Employing the standard announced in Jackson v. Virginia, 
    443 U.S. 307
     (1979), the state appellate court determined that the evidence was
    sufficient for a rational trier of fact to conclude that Williams was one of the
    men guilty of the armed robbery and aggravated kidnapping of Owen Santiago.
    In making this determination, the state court considered the evidence that
    Santiago already knew Williams, had an ample opportunity to view him during
    the abduction, and made positive and consistent identifications of Williams as
    a perpetrator. This was bolstered by the testimony of Officer Glapion that, at
    around 1:00 a.m. on the night of Santiago’s abduction, Glapion observed
    Williams and three other men walking away from the vicinity where Santiago’s
    burning vehicle was discovered. This testimony also contradicted Williams’s
    alibi evidence that he was at a club until 3:00 a.m. on the night of the incident.
    Viewing this evidence in the light most favorable to the verdict, and giving the
    jury’s credibility findings the deference they are due, the state court could find
    that the evidence was sufficient to support Williams’s convictions.           See
    Jackson, 
    443 U.S. at 319
    .
    2
    Case: 13-31234    Document: 00512742186     Page: 3   Date Filed: 08/21/2014
    No. 13-31234
    Citing to Louisiana law, Williams asserts that, in addition to the Jackson
    v. Virginia standard, the State was required to negate any reasonable
    probability of misidentification.     Although Louisiana law has such a
    requirement when an offender’s identity is at issue, see State v. Barthelemy, 
    32 So. 3d 999
    , 1015 (La. Ct. App., 2010), “in challenges to state convictions under
    [§ 2254], only Jackson . . . need be satisfied, even if state law would impose a
    more demanding standard of proof.” West v. Johnson, 
    92 F.3d 1385
    , 1394 (5th
    Cir. 1996) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted).
    The second claim presented by Williams is that the state court erred in
    finding that the photographic lineup shown to Santiago was not unduly
    suggestive and did not prejudice his defense. After reviewing the hearing on
    the motion to suppress the identification and the actual photographic lineup,
    the state court considered the relevant factors and determined that there was
    no substantial likelihood of misidentification. See Manson v. Brathwaite, 
    432 U.S. 98
    , 114 (1977). Our review of the record, including the photographic
    lineup, supports this determination. See Richter, 
    131 S. Ct. at 786-87
    .
    Finally, Williams claims that his trial counsel was ineffective in failing
    to impeach the testimony of Santiago and Officer Glapion based on alleged
    inconsistencies in their statements and their testimony.       The state court
    properly applied the analysis announced in Strickland v. Washington, 
    466 U.S. 668
    , 687 (1984), in determining that Williams had not shown deficient
    performance or prejudice.    A state court’s ruling on a claim of ineffective
    assistance of counsel is entitled to high deference. Richter, 
    131 S. Ct. at 788
    .
    The record supports the state court’s determination that Williams’s trial
    counsel was not ineffective in his cross-examination of Santiago and Glapion
    and that his representation did not prejudice Williams. Rather, the record
    3
    Case: 13-31234     Document: 00512742186     Page: 4   Date Filed: 08/21/2014
    No. 13-31234
    supports the state court’s determination that he was convicted in light of the
    victim’s compelling positive identification testimony.
    Williams has failed to show that the state court’s denial of his claims
    involved an unreasonable application of clearly established federal law or
    resulted in a decision that was based on an unreasonable determination of the
    facts in light of the evidence presented at trial. See Richter, 
    131 S. Ct. at
    786-
    87. The denial of his habeas corpus petition is AFFIRMED.
    4