United States v. Quinones , 71 F. App'x 319 ( 2003 )


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  •                                                         United States Court of Appeals
    Fifth Circuit
    F I L E D
    IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS           August 1, 2003
    FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT              Charles R. Fulbruge III
    Clerk
    No. 02-11249
    Summary Calendar
    UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
    Plaintiff-Appellee,
    versus
    RICARDO QUINONES,
    Defendant-Appellant.
    --------------------
    Appeal from the United States District Court
    for the Northern District of Texas
    USDC No. 4:00-CR-239-25-A
    --------------------
    Before DUHÉ, BENAVIDES, and STEWART, Circuit Judges.
    PER CURIAM:1
    Ricardo Quinones appeals his sentence imposed after his guilty
    plea conviction for conspiracy to possess with intent to distribute
    more than 100 kilograms of marijuana, in violation of 
    21 U.S.C. § 841
    (a)(1) & (b)(1)(B) and § 846.
    Quinones argues that the sentencing court erred when it used
    cash that was found in his residence to approximate drug quantity
    when it determined his sentence.   During the investigation leading
    1
    Pursuant to 5TH CIR. R. 47.5, the court has determined
    that this opinion should not be published and is not precedent
    except under the limited circumstances set forth in 5TH CIR.
    R. 47.5.4.
    to Quinones’ arrest, more than $500,000 was seized from Quinones’
    vehicle and his home.     The district court’s determination that the
    cash was proceeds of jointly undertaken criminal activity is
    supported by Quinones’ plea agreement, in which he stipulated that
    the money     was   proceeds   of   drug    trafficking.        Therefore,      the
    district court did not clearly err when it used the seized cash to
    approximate drug quantity.      See U.S.S.G. § 2D1.1, comment. (n.12);
    United States v. Johnston, 
    127 F.3d 380
    , 403 (5th Cir. 1997).
    Quinones also challenges the district court’s application of
    U.S.S.G. § 2D1.1(b)(1) by arguing that the fact that five firearms
    were found in his master bedroom does not warrant the                       weapons
    enhancement. He fails to argue that the weapons were not connected
    with the     offense.    The   record      supports    the    district      court’s
    decision, since undisputed facts establish that five firearms were
    found   in   Quinones’    residence        along   with      proceeds    of    drug
    trafficking, scales, and drugs.         Therefore, the district court did
    not commit clear error when it applied U.S.S.G. § 2D1.1.                        See
    United States v. Mergerson, 
    4 F.3d 337
    , 350 (5th Cir. 1993).
    Quinones also argues that the district court erroneously
    determined that he committed perjury and therefore erred when it
    increased    his    sentence   pursuant      to    U.S.S.G.     §   3C1.1,      the
    obstruction of justice guideline, and denied him an adjustment for
    acceptance    of    responsibility    pursuant        to   U.S.S.G.     §     3E1.1.
    Although the district court made repeated findings on these issues
    during the sentencing hearing, Quinones failed to object and failed
    2
    to present the arguments that he now presents to this court.
    Therefore, these issues are reviewed for plain error only.                   See
    United States v. Ocana, 
    204 F.3d 585
    , 588-89 (5th Cir. 2000).
    Additionally, Quinones argues for the first time in his reply brief
    that a perjury determination may only be made when the perjury is
    corroborated by two witnesses. Arguments may not be raised for the
    first time in a reply brief, and therefore this argument is not
    considered.      See United States v. Jackson, 
    50 F.3d 1335
    , 1340 n.7
    (5th Cir. 1995).
    Based on the considerable uncontested evidence contained in
    the presentence report and elsewhere in the record regarding
    Quinones’ active participation in the conspiracy, and giving the
    deference due to the district court’s credibility findings, see
    United States v. Sotelo, 
    97 F.3d 782
    , 789 (5th Cir. 1996), the
    determination that Quinones committed perjury during his sentencing
    hearing when he disavowed knowledge of the cash and weapons that
    were   stashed    in    his   home   is   not   error,   plain   or   otherwise.
    Moreover, the district court’s finding that Quinones intentionally
    provided false testimony on a material issue with the intent to
    persuade the court to lower his sentence provided the requisite
    elements   of    a     perjury   determination     and   therefore     warranted
    application of the obstruction of justice guideline.                  See United
    States v. Cabral-Castillo, 
    35 F.3d 182
    , 186 (5th Cir. 1994) (the
    district court’s finding is sufficient if it encompasses the
    factual predicates for perjury).
    3
    Quinones also contests the district court’s decision not to
    apply U.S.S.G.   §   3E1.1,   which       provides   for   an    offense    level
    reduction if a defendant “clearly demonstrates a recognition and
    affirmative acceptance of personal responsibility for his criminal
    conduct.”   Conduct resulting in an enhancement for obstructing
    justice ordinarily indicates that a defendant has not accepted
    responsibility for his criminal conduct, although both adjustments
    may apply in “extraordinary” cases.           U.S.S.G. § 3E1.1, comment.
    (n.4). The district court’s conclusion that Quinones did not fully
    accept   responsibility   for   his       crime   because       he   lied   about
    possessing cash and weapons, when in fact he did possess cash and
    weapons, is not error, plain or otherwise.            See United States v.
    Lugo-Abundis, 
    897 F.2d 171
    , 172 (5th Cir. 1990) (affirming refusal
    to grant acceptance of responsibility adjustment when sentencing
    defendant for marijuana offense when defendant denied knowledge of
    the presence of drugs).
    The district court’s judgment is therefore AFFIRMED.
    4