Brown & Williamson v. Williams ( 2004 )

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FIFTH CIRCUIT
No. 95-60256
BROWN & WILLIAMSON TOBACCO CORP.,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
versus
MERRELL WILLIAMS, ET AL.,
Defendants-Appellees.
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Southern District of Mississippi
(1:95-CV-76GR)
February 22, 1996
Before KING, STEWART, and PARKER, Circuit Judges.
ROBERT M. PARKER, Circuit Judge:*
Plaintiff Brown & Williamson appeals the district court's
order staying the instant proceedings under Burford v. Sun Oil Co.1
and Colorado River Water Conservation Dist. v. United States.2
Finding that we have jurisdiction to hear this appeal and that
these abstention doctrines do not apply, we reverse and remand.
*
Pursuant to Local Rule 47.5, the court has determined that
this opinion should not be published and is not precedent except
under the limited circumstances set forth in Local Rule 47.5.4.
1. 319 U.S. 315, 63 S. Ct. 1098, 87 L. Ed. 1424 (1943).
2. 424 U.S. 800, 96 S. Ct. 1236, 47 L. Ed. 2d 483 (1976).
I. FACTS
Brown & Williamson is a manufacturer of cigarettes. B&W is
facing suits in several jurisdictions, including Mississippi,
related to its potential liability for medical problems and health
care costs caused by its cigarettes and to its alleged
misrepresentations regarding the health risks of smoking. Certain
documents likely relevant to such litigation have circulated
through the press, the halls of Congress, the academic and legal
communities.
In the present case, Brown & Williamson alleges that such
documents were wrongfully removed from the offices of its attorneys
by defendant Merrell Williams. In addition, Brown & Williamson
joined in this action certain defendants who allegedly conspired
with and induced Williams to disclose the documents and information
improperly obtained. Brown & Williamson filed suit in the federal
district court, claiming (1) tortious interference with contract,
(2) inducing breach of fiduciary duty, (3) inducing violation of an
injunction of a Kentucky court, (4) inducing violation of ethical
duties, (5) conversion, and (6) civil conspiracy. Defendant M & S
Enterprises filed a motion to dismiss and, in the alternative, a
motion to abstain. The district court denied M & S Enterprises'
motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim, but granted its
motion to abstain and stayed the proceeding and its ruling on
pending discovery motions.
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II. DISCUSSION
A. JURISDICTION.
This Court has held that for purposes of appellate
jurisdiction, a district court's decision to stay a suit pending
state court proceedings is a final order. Lewis v. Beddingfield,
20 F.3d 123 (5th Cir. 1994); Kershaw v. Shalala, 9 F.3d 11 (5th
Cir. 1993); Barnhardt Marine Ins., Inc. v. New England Int. Surety
of America, Inc., 961 F.2d 529 (5th Cir. 1992); Allen v. Louisiana
State Bd. of Dentistry, 835 F.2d 100 (5th Cir. 1988).
B. ABSTENTION.
"We review a district court's decision to abstain for abuse of
discretion. However, the allowable discretion is quite narrow,
because it `must be exercised within the narrow and specific limits
prescribed by the particular abstention doctrine involved.'"
Wilson v. Valley Elec. Membership Corp., 8 F.3d 311, 313 (5th Cir.
1993). Whether a particular abstention doctrine can be applied in
the present case may be characterized as a question of law.
The district court held that abstention in the present case
was appropriate under Burford v. Sun Oil Co., and Colorado River
Water Conservation Dist. v. United States.3 "Burford abstention is
proper `where timely and adequate state-court review is available,'
3. The district court also cited Louisiana Power & Light Co.
v. City of Thibodaux, 360 U.S. 25, 79 S. Ct. 1070, 3 L. Ed. 2d 1058
(1959) and Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37, 91 S. Ct. 746, 27 L. Ed.
2d 669 (1971) in support of its decision, but did not rely on those
cases as independent bases for its decision. Therefore, we need
not address abstention under those cases separately.
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and `where the "exercise of federal review of the question in a
case and in similar cases would be disruptive of state efforts to
establish a coherent policy with respect to a matter of substantial
public concern."'" Wilson, 8 F.3d at 314.
"Colorado River permits federal courts to abstain from
exercising their jurisdiction over a case where `considerations of
"[w]ise judicial administration, giving regard to conservation of
judicial resources and comprehensive disposition of litigation"' so
warrant." Snap-on Tools Corp. v. Mason, 18 F.3d 1261, 1264 (5th
Cir. 1994). "Abdication of the obligation to decide cases can be
justified under this doctrine only in the exceptional circumstances
where the order to the parties to repair to the State Court would
clearly serve an important countervailing interest." Id. (quoting
Moses H. Cone Mem. Hosp. v. Mercury Constr. Corp., 460 U.S. 1, 14,
103 S. Ct. 927, 936, 74 L. Ed. 2d 765 (1983)). "[T]he decision to
invoke Colorado River necessarily contemplates that the federal
court will have nothing further to do in resolving any substantive
part of the case, whether it stays or dismisses." Moses H. Cone,
460 U.S. at 29, 103 S. Ct. at 943.
Both doctrines are limited to cases where there is parallel
litigation in state court regarding the same claims that are at
issue in the federal litigation. Under Burford, this limitation is
clearly contemplated by the "adequate state court review"
requirement. Under Colorado River, as the Supreme Court has
clearly indicated, abstention is only appropriate if the state
court litigation will fully resolve the substantive claims of the
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litigants in the federal litigation. See Moses H. Cone, supra.
Since it is undisputed that there is no "parallel" litigation in
state court, abstention cannot be justified in the present case
under either Burford or Colorado River. Thus, the district court's
order staying the instant proceedings on the basis of abstention
must be reversed.
However, we do not mean to indicate that the district court's
concerns regarding potential interference with ongoing state court
proceedings are unfounded. Although we must reverse the district
court's order, we note that the district court may, in its sound
discretion, control the proceedings before it in a manner that
promotes efficient disposition and minimizes undesirable
interference with related proceedings.
In addition, we are concerned by Brown & Williamsons's
decision to join in this action "John Doe" defendants who appear to
be attorneys involved in prosecuting various state court actions
against Brown & Williamson. The conduct of this type of action
against such attorneys creates the appearance, at least, of an
attempt to harrass and intimidate opponents. We must not allow
this forum to be used for such a purpose. Therefore, on remand,
the district court should determine whether attorneys have been
joined as defendants in this action for an improper purpose. To
the extent Brown & Williamson has claims against such attorneys
defendants that should be allowed to proceed, the district court
should schedule the necessary proceedings in this action so as not
to prejudice legitimate claims against Brown & Williamson in other
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jurisdictions and so as not to allow undue harrassment of such
attorneys or their clients.
III. CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, the order of the district court
staying the instant proceeding under the Burford and Colorado River
doctrines of abstention is REVERSED, and this case is REMANDED to
the district court for further proceedings consistent with this
opinion.
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