United States v. Joe Hernandez ( 2020 )


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  •      Case: 19-40837      Document: 00515431486         Page: 1    Date Filed: 05/28/2020
    IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
    FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT
    United States Court of Appeals
    Fifth Circuit
    FILED
    No. 19-40837                           May 28, 2020
    Summary Calendar
    Lyle W. Cayce
    Clerk
    UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
    Plaintiff-Appellee
    v.
    JOE HERNANDEZ,
    Defendant-Appellant
    Appeal from the United States District Court
    for the Southern District of Texas
    USDC No. 6:18-CR-124-1
    Before DAVIS, SMITH and HIGGINSON, Circuit Judges.
    PER CURIAM: *
    Joe Hernandez pleaded guilty to being a felon in possession of a firearm.
    He reserved the right to challenge the denial of a motion to suppress the gun
    found at his residence, a challenge he now raises on appeal. “When reviewing
    a denial of a motion to suppress evidence, this Court reviews factual findings
    for clear error and the ultimate constitutionality of law enforcement action de
    novo.” United States v. Robinson, 
    741 F.3d 588
    , 594 (5th Cir. 2014). Evidence
    * Pursuant to 5TH CIR. R. 47.5, the court has determined that this opinion should not
    be published and is not precedent except under the limited circumstances set forth in 5TH
    CIR. R. 47.5.4.
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    No. 19-40837
    is reviewed in the light most favorable to the prevailing party, here the
    Government. See United States v. Gibbs, 
    421 F.3d 352
    , 357 (5th Cir. 2005). A
    district court’s ruling on a motion to suppress “should be upheld ‘if there is any
    reasonable view of the evidence to support it.’” United States v. Massi, 
    761 F.3d 512
    , 520 (5th Cir. 2014) (quoting United States v. Michelletti, 
    13 F.3d 838
    ,
    841 (5th Cir. 1994) (en banc)).
    At issue is whether a team of Deputy U.S. Marshals was justified in
    conducting a protective sweep of the premises when they arrested Hernandez
    at his home pursuant to an arrest warrant. “The protective sweep doctrine
    allows government agents, without a warrant, to conduct a quick and limited
    search of premises for the safety of the agents and others present at the scene.”
    United States v. Mendez, 
    431 F.3d 420
    , 428 (5th Cir. 2005). The Supreme Court
    has recognized the lawfulness of sweeps supported by “articulable facts which,
    taken together with the rational inferences from those facts, would warrant a
    reasonably prudent officer in believing that the area to be swept harbors an
    individual posing a danger to those on the arrest scene.” Maryland v. Buie,
    
    494 U.S. 325
    , 334 (1990).
    The record indicates the marshals who approached Hernandez’s
    residence had information that he was a gang member and were aware that he
    was accused of a violent break-in and had been previously charged with
    manslaughter. When they announced their presence, his response was to
    barricade his front and back doors. Although Hernandez subsequently chose
    to submit to the marshals, the district court did not err in finding these
    circumstances sufficient to warrant a protective sweep. Cf. United States v.
    Silva, 
    865 F.3d 238
    , 242 (5th Cir. 2017). That marshals who testified at the
    motion hearing spoke of the sweep as “standard procedure” does not alter this,
    as subjective motivations are generally irrelevant to determining whether
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    No. 19-40837
    actions are reasonable under the Fourth Amendment. See United States v.
    Wallen, 
    388 F.3d 161
    , 167 (5th Cir. 2004). The Supreme Court has given
    weight to subjective intent in only “a very limited subset of [its] Fourth
    Amendment cases,” and no such case applies here. Ashcroft v. al-Kidd, 
    563 U.S. 731
    , 743 (2011).
    AFFIRMED.
    3