Bennett v. Calabrian Chemicals Corp. , 126 F. App'x 171 ( 2005 )

United States Court of Appeals
Fifth Circuit
F I L E D
IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT March 21, 2005
Charles R. Fulbruge III
Clerk
No. 04-41056
Summary Calendar
LARRY BENNETT,
Plaintiff-Counter Defendant-Appellant,
versus
CALABRIAN CHEMICALS CORP.,
Defendant-Counter Claimant-Appellee.
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Eastern District of Texas, Beaumont Division
USDC No. 1:03-CV-238
Before JONES, BARKSDALE, and PRADO, Circuit Judges.
PER CURIAM:*
Larry Bennett (“Bennett”) appeals the district court’s
grant of summary judgment for Calabrian Corporation (“Calabrian”)
on Bennett’s Americans With Disabilities Act (“ADA”) disability
discrimination claim. The district court ruled for Calabrian based
on its legal conclusion that Bennett failed to proffer any
competent evidence to establish a prima facie case that there was
a “record” of impairment or that Bennett was “regarded as” being
disabled. See Bennett v. Calabrian Chemicals Corp., 324 F. Supp.
*
Pursuant to 5TH CIR. R. 47.5, the court has determined that this
opinion should not be published and is not precedent except under the limited
circumstances set forth in 5TH CIR. R. 47.5.4.
2d 815 (E.D.Tex. 2004). Bennett argues that there is competent
evidence to support both of these conclusions. The following
discussion can add little to the district court’s careful opinion.
We review a summary judgment de novo and are bound by the
same standards as those employed by the district court. See Chaplin
v. NationsCredit Corp., 307 F.3d 368, 371 (5th Cir. 2002). Namely,
summary judgment is appropriate only where the pleadings,
depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file,
together with the affidavits, if any, when viewed in the light most
favorable to the non-movant, show that there is no genuine issue as
to any material fact. TIG Ins. Co. v. Sedgwick James, 276 F.3d
754, 759 (5th Cir. 2002).
The record does not support the conclusion that Bennett
has a record of a “physical or mental impairment that substantially
limits one or more of [Bennett’s] major life activities.” 42
U.S.C. 12102(2). The fact that Bennett was temporarily off work
for a medical condition and surgery does not mean that he was
disabled under the ADA. See Pryor v. Trane Co., 138 F.3d 1024,
1026 (5th Cir. 1998) (stating that temporary, non-chronic
impairments of short duration, with little or no longer term or
permanent impact, are usually not disabilities).
Moreover, the fact that Calabrian previously granted
Bennett’s request for twenty-six weeks of short term disability
leave under Calabrian’s self-funded plan does not by itself
establish that Calabrian “regarded” Bennett as disabled. See,
2
e.g., Linser v. State of Ohio, Dep't of Mental Health, 234 F.3d
1268, 2000 WL 1529809, *4 (6th Cir. 2000). The legal definition of
a disability under the ADA is different from the eligibility
criterion for Calabrian’s short term disability plan (“not able to
perform any work for pay or profit”).
Finally, Bennett fails in arguing that the letter to him
from Charles Cogliandro, President of Calabrian, is competent
evidence to demonstrate that Calabrian regarded Bennett as
disabled.1 Cogliandro testified that he developed a suspicion
Bennett was not in fact unable to work, and when Bennett attempted
to return to work, Cogliandro regarded Bennett as unworthy to
return. This letter tends to show that Cogliandro was disturbed
that Bennett had been on medical leave for a condition that did not
prevent him from working at the plant. The letter, standing by
itself, does not establish a factual basis for the conclusion that
Calabrian regarded Bennett as having an impairment substantially
limiting a major life activity. At most, it shows that Cogliandro
believed that Bennett had the medical condition of arterial
occlusive disease.
1
Cogliandro’s letter states, in part:
[S]ince Dr. Foley had determined that Mr. Bennett was fully disabled
due to his condition (arterial occlusive disease), that a release
from Dr. Foley must state that he no longer has the condition in
order for Mr. Bennett to return to work.
To date, Mr. Bennett has failed to produce a release from Dr. Foley
with the requested information. Hence, he cannot return to work.
3
Accordingly, the judgment of the district court is
AFFIRMED.
4