United States v. Jacek , 162 F. App'x 308 ( 2006 )


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  •                                                                                            United States Court of Appeals
    Fifth Circuit
    F I L E D
    IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
    January 10, 2006
    FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT
    Charles R. Fulbruge III
    Clerk
    No. 04-50641
    Summary Calendar
    UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
    Plaintiff-
    Appellee,
    versus
    JACQUELINE M. JACEK,
    Defendant-
    Appellant.
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    Appeal from the United States District Court
    for the Western District of Texas
    USDC No. 2:03-CR-518-2-AML
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    Before BARKSDALE, STEWART and CLEMENT, Circuit Judges.
    PER CURIAM:*
    Jacqueline M. Jacek appeals her conviction and sentence for conspiracy to possess with intent
    to distribute marijuana, conspiracy to import marijuana, possession of marijuana with intent to
    distribute, and importation of marijuana. Jacek argues first that the evidence was insufficient on all
    counts of conviction because the Government failed to establish that she had knowledge of the
    marijuana secreted in the Suburban that she was driving.
    *
    Pursuant to 5TH CIR. R. 47.5, the court has determined that this opinion should not be
    published and is not precedent except under the limited circumstances set forth in 5TH CIR.
    R. 47.5.4.
    The argument fails. Viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution, there
    was ample circumstantial evidence of guilty knowledge. See United States v. Mendoza, 
    226 F.3d 340
    , 343 (5th Cir. 2000). Jacek was the driver of a Suburban containing 83.34 kilograms of
    marijuana, valued at approximately $180,000, which had been placed inside the gas tank. On the
    basis of Jacek’s admittedly odd conduct at the Eagle Pass port of entry, implausible stories,
    inconsistent statements, and the large amount of marijuana involved, there was more than sufficient
    evidence to support an inference by the jury that Jacek knew the Suburban contained marijuana. See
    United States v. Ortega Reyna, 
    148 F.3d 540
    , 544 (5th Cir. 1998); United States v. Villarreal, 
    324 F.3d 319
    , 324 (5th Cir. 2003).
    Jacek avers that the district court erred (1) in admitting the testimony of Faline Reetz with
    regard to the circumstances surrounding her February 2003 arrest and conviction for drug smuggling
    and (2) in allowing Special Agent Edward Acuna to testify about two prior border seizures involving
    marijuana secreted in Suburbans and the guilty-plea convictions resulting therefrom. Jacek avers that
    this testimony was prejudicial as there was no evidence linking her to these incidents. Jacek contends
    that the testimony amounted to impermissible character evidence under FED. R. EVID. 404(b), which
    provides, in relevant part, that “[e]vidence of other crimes, wrongs, or acts is not admissible to prove
    the character of a person in order to show action in conformity therewith.”
    Because Jacek objected to the introduction of Agent Acuna’s testimony with regard to prior
    border seizures, the district court’s admission of the evidence is reviewed for abuse of discretion.
    United States v. Cantu, 
    167 F.3d 198
    , 203 (5th Cir. 1999). If the district court abused its discretion,
    the resulting error is reviewed for harmlessness. 
    Id.
     However, as Jacek concedes, there was no
    objection to Reetz’s testimony at trial. Absent a timely objection, this court will review the admission
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    of Reetz’s testimony only for plain error. 
    Id. at 204
    . Error is plain only when it is clear or obvious
    and it affects the defendant’s substantial rights. United States v. Cotton, 
    535 U.S. 625
    , 631 (2002).
    The testimony that Jacek complains of was not within the purview of FED. R. EVID. P. 404(b)
    because it was not “other crimes, wrongs, or acts” of the defendant. Rather, Acuna and Reetz’s
    testimony merely described prior incidences at the Eagle Pass port of entry where older Suburbans
    were discovered to have similar amounts of marijuana secreted in the gas tanks.
    Assuming arguendo that this testimony was not relevant to an issue other than Jacek’s
    character and thus failed the test outlined in United States v. Beechum, 
    582 F.2d 898
     (5th Cir.
    1978)(en banc), the introduction of the evidence was harmless error because the jury would have
    returned a guilty verdict even without it. See United States v. Tomblin, 
    46 F.3d 1369
    , 1387 (5th Cir.
    1995); see also United States v. Rodriguez, 
    43 F.3d 117
    , 123 (5th Cir. 1995). The other evidence
    against Jacek, as outlined above, was sufficient to support her convictions on the drug-trafficking
    charges. Because the introduction of the testimony was harmless error, it did not amount to plain
    error.
    Jacek argues, for the first time on appeal, that the district court erred in sentencing her under
    a mandatory sentencing guidelines scheme found unconstitutional in United States v. Booker, 
    125 S. Ct. 738
    , 756 (2005). Because Jacek raises the issue for the first time on appeal, plain error is the
    correct standard of review. See United States v. Valenzuela-Quevedo, 
    407 F.3d 728
    , 732-33 (5th
    Cir.), cert. denied, 
    126 S. Ct. 267
     (2005); see also United States v. Mares, 
    402 F.3d 511
    , 521
    (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 
    126 S. Ct. 43
     (2005). The district court committed error that is plain when
    it sentenced Jacek under a mandatory sentencing guidelines regime. See Valenzuela-Quevedo, 
    407 F.3d at 732-33
    . Jacek, however, fails to meet her burden of showing that the district court’s error
    -3-
    affected her substantial rights. See 
    id. at 733-34
    ; Mares, 
    402 F.3d at
    521 . The district court’s
    judgment is AFFIRMED.
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